Financial Ombudsman Service decision
Revolut Ltd · DRN-6245578
The verbatim text of this Financial Ombudsman Service decision. Sourced directly from the FOS published decisions register. Consumer names are reduced to initials by FOS at point of publication. Not an AI summary, not a paraphrase — every word below is the original decision.
Full decision
The complaint Miss H and Mr K complain that Revolut Ltd has declined to refund disputed transactions that were made from their account. What happened The events surrounding the disputed transactions happened only to Mr K. So I’ll only refer to him throughout this decision. On 1 September 2025, several disputed transactions totalling £1,798 debited Mr K’s joint Revolut account. Mr K has explained that he was aware payments were being made using his Apple Pay, but he was not aware of the specifics of the transactions, including the values (he says he believed he was paying for small bottles of beer for a much lower amount). Mr K says he was under coercion and deception whilst in a club overseas, and he had consumed alcohol, leaving him unable to provide valid consent or even remember the transactions. When Mr K discovered the amounts he’d been charged, he reported what had happened to the relevant authorities in the country he was in and contacted Revolut to report fraud. But Revolut didn’t believe it was liable for his loss. Mr K raised a complaint, and in response, it said: • It was sorry to hear that Mr K’s experience with Revolut was not as positive as it would expect. • Mr K said he’d shared his device with another person. Given these circumstances, the transactions cannot be considered unauthorised. • It would not be refunding the disputed transactions. Mr K then referred his complaint to this service where it was considered by one of our investigators. Given the evidence available, including a report to show that Mr K was actively accessing his Revolut account throughout the duration of the disputed transactions, and that they were only possible as a result of Mr K’s active involvement, he didn’t uphold the complaint. He also explained that in view of the relevant regulations, the concept of giving consent is a formal one. And being tricked or coerced doesn’t invalidate consent. Mr K disagreed with our investigator. As well as other things, he disagreed with the conclusion that he consented to or authorised the disputed transactions. He says his case involves a loss of control over his payment instrument and the authorisation process. He said staff at the venue physically took his phone on multiple occasions, held it to his face to trigger Face ID, and completed Apple Pay transactions themselves. He said he did not initiate these payments, select amounts, or meaningfully participate in the authorisation process. Mr K also said that Revolut should have prevented the transactions from taking place. He said a rapid series of high-value transactions in a foreign club, which emptied his account in a short period, was unusual and should have triggered its fraud systems, despite Apple Pay being used.
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As no agreement could be reached, the complaint has been passed to me to decide. What I’ve decided – and why I’ve considered all the available evidence and arguments to decide what’s fair and reasonable in the circumstances of this complaint. Having done so, I’ve reached the same conclusions as our investigator, for broadly the same reasons. The relevant regulations here are the Payment Services Regulations 2017 (PSRs). In general terms, Revolut is liable if Mr K didn’t authorise the payments, and Mr K is liable if he did authorise them. So, the issue for me to determine is whether Mr K carried out the disputed transactions himself or authorised someone else to make them on his behalf. Having reviewed all available evidence from when Mr K has spoken with both Revolut and our investigator, it appears Mr K was aware payments were to be made using his Apple Pay. Mr K told our investigator ‘Staff at the venue repeatedly directed or physically took my phone, pointed it at my face to activate Face ID, and then tapped it against their terminals to process payments without explaining or showing the amounts. To be clear, I was under the influence of alcohol and therefore disorientated and misled into thinking the charges were small or related to the bar tab for the small bottles of beer I was being given.’ I’ve considered Mr K’s arguments about consent, and his belief that he didn’t authorise the transactions in view of the circumstances surrounding how they were made. But it’s important to note that consent can mean different things in different contexts, and the tests vary depending on the applicable law. For example, the requirements around consent in a healthcare setting are different to a data protection setting. Mr K appears to have accepted that he consented to payments (believing they were small or related to the bar tab). Under the PSRs giving consent to a payment is a formal concept. Consent is given when an agreed procedure is completed by the payer or someone acting on their behalf (in this case taking the necessary steps to make a payment using Mr K’s Apple Pay token). So, whilst I appreciate Mr K says he didn’t know what he was consenting to, authorisation for the purposes of the PSRs doesn’t require Mr K to have been aware at the time or remember now what he was authorising. Even if Mr K was under the influence of something, and/or was being tricked into authorising payments, he would remain responsible for them if the procedure to make payments was completed by Mr K or someone acting on his behalf – which I’m persuaded is what happened here. Mr K has questioned why Revolut didn’t suspend his account or contact him before some of the disputed transactions were processed. I appreciate why he’s raised this point, the transactions were higher than the account’s usual activity, within a short space of time, as well as being overseas. But having said that, I’m mindful that Revolut would have seen the payments were made via Mr K’s established Apple Pay device, (thereby reducing some of the risks), and he was also using that same device to regularly log into the Revolut app throughout the duration of the transactions taking place. And I’m also mindful that a firm can’t reasonably be expected to intervene on all transactions that may be the result of fraud. There’s a balance it needs to strike between identifying unusual payments and ensuring minimal disruption to legitimate ones. So whilst I appreciate Mr K’s point, in the circumstances of this complaint, I don’t think it was unreasonable for Revolut to have processed these transactions without questioning him first. Although I appreciate Mr K will disagree. Overall, I consider Mr K authorised the disputed transactions. I’m willing to accept he may have been targeted in some way by members of the club’s staff, perhaps by charging higher
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amounts than Mr K was expecting. However, I find Mr K still consented to payments, and in view of the relevant regulations and the overall circumstances involved here, I find its fair for Revolut to hold Mr K liable for the disputed transactions. So I don’t require it to do anything further here. My final decision My final decision is that I don’t uphold this complaint. Under the rules of the Financial Ombudsman Service, I’m required to ask Miss H and Mr K to accept or reject my decision before 28 April 2026. Lorna Wall Ombudsman
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