Mitsubishi HC Capital UK Plc · DRN-6259969

The complaint Mr L’s complaint is, in essence, that Mitsubishi HC Capital UK Plc (the ‘Lender’) acted unfairly and unreasonably by (1) being party to an unfair credit relationship with him under Section 140A of the Consumer Credit Act 1974 (as amended) (the ‘CCA’) and (2) deciding against paying a claim under Section 75 of the CCA. What happened Mr L and his wife were long-standing members of a timeshare provider (the ‘Supplier’) – having purchased a number of products from it over time. But the product at the centre of this complaint is their membership of a timeshare that I’ll call the ‘Fractional Club’ – which they bought on 28 May 2015 (the ‘Time of Sale’). They entered into an agreement with the Supplier to buy 7,000 fractional points at a cost of £4,375 (the ‘Purchase Agreement’). Fractional Club membership was asset backed – which meant it gave Mr L and his wife more than just holiday rights. It also included a share in the net sale proceeds of a property named on the Purchase Agreement (the ‘Allocated Property’) after their membership term ends. Mr L paid for the Fractional Club membership by taking finance of £4,375 from the Lender (the ‘Credit Agreement’) in his sole name. Mr L settled his loan in February 2016. Mr L – using a professional representative (the ‘PR’) – wrote to the Lender on 5 August 2021 (the ‘Letter of Complaint’) to raise a number of different concerns. Since then, the PR has raised some further matters it says are relevant to the outcome of the complaint. As both sides are familiar with the concerns raised, it isn’t necessary to repeat them in detail here beyond the summary above. The Lender dealt with Mr L’s concerns as a complaint and issued its final response letter on 23 August 2022, rejecting it on every ground. The complaint was referred to the Financial Ombudsman Service. It was assessed by an Investigator who, having considered the information on file, upheld the complaint on its merits. The Lender disagreed with the Investigator’s assessment and asked for an Ombudsman’s decision – which is why it was passed to me. I considered the matter and issued a provisional decision (the ‘PD’) dated 13 March 2026. In that decision, I said: What I’ve provisionally decided – and why I’ve considered all the available evidence and arguments to decide what’s fair and reasonable in the circumstances of this complaint. And having done that, I do not currently think this complaint should be upheld.

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However, before I explain why, I want to make it clear that my role as an Ombudsman is not to address every single point that has been made to date. Instead, it is to decide what is fair and reasonable in the circumstances of this complaint. So, if I have not commented on, or referred to, something that either party has said, that does not mean I have not considered it. Section 75 of the CCA: the Supplier’s misrepresentations at the Time of Sale The CCA introduced a regime of connected lender liability under Section 75 that affords consumers (“debtors”) a right of recourse against lenders that provide the finance for the acquisition of goods or services from third-party merchants (“suppliers”) in the event that there is an actionable misrepresentation and/or breach of contract by the supplier. Certain conditions must be met if the protection afforded to consumers is engaged, including, for instance, the cash price of the purchase and the nature of the arrangements between the parties involved in the transaction. The Lender doesn’t dispute that the relevant conditions are met. But for reasons I’ll come on to below, it isn’t necessary to make any formal findings on them here. The PR has raised several matters as potential misrepresentations, but it seems to me that they are not allegations of the Supplier saying something that was untrue. Rather, it is that Mr L wasn’t told things about the way the membership worked, for example, was that the obligation to pay management fees could be passed on to his children. It seems to me that these are allegations that Mr L wasn’t given all the information he needed at the Time of Sale, and I will deal with this further below. In any case, I don’t think it would be fair or reasonable to uphold this complaint for reasons relating to Mr L’s Section 75 claim. As a general rule, creditors can reasonably reject Section 75 claims that they are first informed about after the claim has become time-barred under the Limitation Act 1980 (the ‘LA’) as it wouldn’t be fair to expect creditors to look into such claims so long after the liability arose and after a limitation defence would be available in court. So, it is relevant to consider whether Mr L’s Section 75 claim was time-barred under the LA before he put it to the Lender. A claim under Section 75 is a “like” claim against the creditor. It essentially mirrors the claim the consumer could make against the Supplier. A claim for misrepresentation against the Supplier would ordinarily be made under Section 2 (1) of the Misrepresentation Act 1967. And the limitation period to make such a claim expires six years from the date on which the cause of action accrued (see Section 2 of the LA). But a claim, like the one in question here, under Section 75 is also ‘an action to recover any sum by virtue of any enactment’ under Section 9 of the LA. And the limitation period under that provision is also six years from the date on which the cause of action accrued. The date on which the cause of action accrued was the Time of Sale. That’s because Mr L entered into the Purchase Agreement at that time based on the alleged misrepresentations of the Supplier – which he says he relied on. And as the loan from the Lender was used to help finance the purchase, it was when he entered into the Credit Agreement that he suffered a loss. I’m aware that the Lender said it did not receive the PR’s complaint letter in August 2021 but was only informed of the complaint once the PR had asked this Service to investigate in November 2021. But as more than six years had passed between the Time of Sale and when Mr L’s claim was first put to the Lender, I don’t think it was unfair or unreasonable of the Lender to reject Mr L’s concerns about the Supplier’s misrepresentations.

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Section 75 of the CCA: the Supplier’s Breach of Contract I have already summarised how Section 75 of the CCA works and why it gives consumers a right of recourse against a lender. So, it is not necessary to repeat that here other than to say that, if I find that the Supplier is liable for having breached the Purchase Agreement, the Lender is also liable. Mr L says that he could not holiday where and when he wanted to. That was framed, in the Letter of Complaint, as an alleged misrepresentation. However, on my reading of the complaint, this suggests that the Supplier was not living up to its end of the bargain, potentially breaching the Purchase Agreement. Mr L does not say when this event took place so it’s possible that this aspect of Mr L’s complaint would also fall outside the time limits set out in the LA. But in any case, like any holiday accommodation, the Supplier’s availability was not unlimited – given the higher demand at peak times, like school holidays, for instance. Some of the sales paperwork likely to have been signed by Mr L states that the availability of holidays was/is subject to demand. It also looks like he made use of the fractional points to holiday on a number of occasions. I accept that he may not have been able to take certain holidays. But I have not seen enough to persuade me that the Supplier had breached the terms of the Purchase Agreement. So, from the evidence I have seen, I do not think the Lender is liable to pay Mr L any compensation for a breach of contract by the Supplier. And with that being the case, I do not think the Lender acted unfairly or unreasonably in relation to this aspect of the complaint either. Section 140A of the CCA: did the Lender participate in an unfair credit relationship? I’ve already explained why I’m not persuaded that Fractional Club membership was actionably misrepresented by the Supplier at the Time of Sale. But there are other aspects of the sales process that, being the subject of dissatisfaction, I must explore with Section 140A in mind if I’m to consider this complaint in full – which is what I’ve done next. Having considered the entirety of the credit relationship between Mr L and the Lender along with all of the circumstances of the complaint, I don’t think the credit relationship between them was likely to have been rendered unfair for the purposes of Section 140A. When coming to that conclusion, and in carrying out my analysis, I have looked at: 1. The standard of the Supplier’s commercial conduct – which includes its sales and marketing practices at the Time of Sale along with any relevant training material; 2. The provision of information by the Supplier at the Time of Sale, including the contractual documentation and disclaimers made by the Supplier; 3. The commission arrangements between the Lender and the Supplier at the Time of Sale and the disclosure of those arrangements; 4. Evidence provided by both parties on what was likely to have been said and/or done at the Time of Sale; 5. The inherent probabilities of the sale given its circumstances; and 6. Any existing unfairness from a related credit agreement. I have then considered the impact of these on the fairness of the credit relationship between Mr L and the Lender.

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The Supplier’s sales & marketing practices at the Time of Sale Mr L’s complaint about the Lender being party to an unfair credit relationship was and is made for several reasons. They include allegations that: 1. the right checks weren’t carried out before the Lender lent to Mr L. 2. the loan interest was excessive. 3. Mr L was not given a choice of lender by the Supplier. However, as things currently stand, none of these strike me as reasons why this complaint should succeed. I haven’t seen anything to persuade me that the right checks weren’t carried out by the Lender given this complaint’s circumstances. But even if I were to find that the Lender failed to do everything it should have when it agreed to lend (and I make no such finding), I would have to be satisfied that the money lent to Mr L was actually unaffordable before also concluding that he lost out as a result and then consider whether the credit relationship with the Lender was unfair to him for this reason. But from the information provided, I am not satisfied that the lending was unaffordable for Mr L. The PR has not explained how, if it were true, Mr L not being offered a different lender to pay for Fractional Club membership caused him any unfairness or financial loss. Mr L was aware of the interest rate set out on the face of the Credit Agreement, as well as the term of the loan and the monthly repayments, so he understood what it was he was taking out. Further, I don’t think the rate of interest was excessive, compared either to other rates available from other point-of-sale lenders or on the open market, so I can’t say it would be fair or reasonable to tell the Lender to do anything because of this. Overall, therefore, I don’t think that Mr L’s credit relationship with the Lender was rendered unfair to him under Section 140A for any of the reasons above. But there is another reason, perhaps the main reason, why the PR now says the credit relationship with the Lender was unfair to him. And that’s the suggestion that Fractional Club membership was marketed and sold to him as an investment in breach of prohibition against selling timeshares in that way. The Supplier’s alleged breach of Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations The Lender does not dispute, and I am satisfied, that Mr L’s Fractional Club membership met the definition of a “timeshare contract” and was a “regulated contract” for the purposes of the Timeshare Regulations. Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations prohibited the Supplier from marketing or selling Fractional Club membership as an investment. This is what the provision said at the Time of Sale: “A trader must not market or sell a proposed timeshare contract or long-term holiday product contract as an investment if the proposed contract would be a regulated contract.” But the PR and Mr L say that the Supplier did exactly that at the Time of Sale – saying, in summary, that he was told by the Supplier that Fractional Club membership was the type of investment that would only increase in value. The term “investment” is not defined in the Timeshare Regulations. But for the purposes of

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this provisional decision, and by reference to the decided authorities, an investment is a transaction in which money or other property is laid out in the expectation or hope of financial gain or profit. A share in the Allocated Property clearly constituted an investment as it offered Mr L the prospect of a financial return – whether or not, like all investments, that was more than what he first put into it. But it is important to note at this stage that the fact that Fractional Club membership included an investment element did not, itself, transgress the prohibition in Regulation 14(3). That provision prohibits the marketing and selling of a timeshare contract as an investment. It doesn’t prohibit the mere existence of an investment element in a timeshare contract or prohibit the marketing and selling of such a timeshare contract per se.1 In other words, the Timeshare Regulations did not ban products such as the Fractional Club. They just regulated how such products were marketed and sold. To conclude, therefore, that Fractional Club membership was marketed or sold to Mr L as an investment in breach of Regulation 14(3), I have to be persuaded that it was more likely than not that the Supplier marketed and/or sold membership to him as an investment, i.e. told him or led him to believe that Fractional Club membership offered him the prospect of a financial gain (i.e., a profit) given the facts and circumstances of this complaint. There is competing evidence in this complaint as to whether Fractional Club membership was marketed and/or sold by the Supplier at the Time of Sale as an investment in breach of regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations. On the one hand, it is clear that the Supplier made efforts to avoid specifically describing membership of the Fractional Club as an ‘investment’ or quantifying to prospective purchasers, such as Mr L, the financial value of their share in the net sales proceeds of the Allocated Property along with the investment considerations, risks and rewards attached to them. On the other hand, I acknowledge that the Supplier’s sales process left open the possibility that the sales representative may have positioned Fractional Club membership as an investment. So, I accept that it’s equally possible that Fractional Club membership was marketed and sold to Mr L as an investment in breach of Regulation 14(3). However, whether or not there was a breach of the relevant prohibition by the Supplier is not ultimately determinative of the outcome in this complaint for reasons I will come on to shortly. And with that being the case, it’s not necessary to make a formal finding on that particular issue for the purposes of this decision. Would the credit relationship between the Lender and Mr L have been rendered unfair to him had there been a breach of Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations? Having found that it was possible that the Supplier breached Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations at the Time of Sale, I now need to consider what impact that breach had on the fairness of the credit relationship between Mr L and the Lender under the Credit Agreement and related Purchase Agreement as the case law on Section 140A makes it clear that regulatory breaches do not automatically create unfairness for the purposes of that 1 The PR has argued that Fractional Club membership amounted to an Unregulated Collective Investment Scheme, however this was considered and rejected in the judgment in R (on the application of Shawbrook Bank Ltd) v Financial Ombudsman Service Ltd and R (on the application of Clydesdale Financial Services Ltd (t/a Barclays Partner Finance)) v Financial Ombudsman Service [2023] EWHC 1069 (Admin).

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provision. Such breaches and their consequences (if there are any) must be considered in the round, rather than in a narrow or technical way. Indeed, it seems to me that, if I am to conclude that a breach of Regulation 14(3) led to a credit relationship between Mr L and the Lender that was unfair to him and warranted relief as a result, whether the Supplier’s breach of Regulation 14(3) led him to enter into the Purchase Agreement and the Credit Agreement is an important consideration. We were provided with an undated statement from Mr L in July 2023. He says little about the purchase he made at the Time of Sale but says: “We eventually bought a Fractional based in the Balkans. Similar to Spain this had a clear end date when the property would be sold and again the profit would be shared amongst the owners.” Mr L does not set out what he was told by the Supplier that specifically attracted him to make the purchase. And while he uses the term profit, he refers to this in the context of the sale of the property and not specifically in terms of a personal financial gain. So on my reading of it, this part of his testimony doesn’t say Mr L expected to personally profit from Fractional Club membership. Later in his statement, Mr L said he had relinquished his timeshares to “stop the maintenance fees and to get rid of what I believed was a great way to make some money but that turned out to be a lie.” He also says he had been mis-sold the property and “all of the conversation about the benefits and the money we would make was lies”. So Mr L does say that he had conversations about the financial aspect of his Fractional Timeshare purchases yet he says little about that (and the other benefits of his purchase) elsewhere in his testimony. And I find that lack of detail surprising if Mr L’s purchase was made because it was sold to him as an investment by the Supplier. Therefore, on my reading of the evidence before me, the prospect of a financial gain from Fractional Club membership was not an important and motivating factor when Mr L decided to go ahead with his purchase. That doesn’t mean Mr L wasn’t interested in a share in the Allocated Property. After all, that wouldn’t be surprising given the nature of the product at the centre of this complaint. But as Mr L himself doesn’t persuade me that the purchase was motivated by his share in the Allocated Property and the possibility of a profit, I don’t think a breach of Regulation 14(3) by the Supplier was likely to have been material to the decision he ultimately made. On balance, therefore, even if the Supplier had marketed or sold the Fractional Club membership as an investment in breach of Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations, I am not persuaded that Mr L’s decision to purchase Fractional Club membership at the Time of Sale was motivated by the prospect of a financial gain (i.e. a profit). On the contrary, I think the evidence suggests he would have pressed ahead with the purchase whether or not there had been a breach of Regulation 14(3). And for that reason, I do not think the credit relationship between Mr L and the Lender was unfair to him even if the Supplier had breached Regulation 14(3). The provision of information by the Supplier at the Time of Sale The PR says that Mr L was not given sufficient information at the Time of Sale by the Supplier about membership, including about the ongoing costs of Fractional Club membership and the fact that Mr L’s heirs could inherit these costs.

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As I’ve already indicated, the case law on Section 140A makes it clear that it does not automatically follow that regulatory breaches create unfairness for the purposes of the unfair relationship provisions. The extent to which such mistakes render a credit relationship unfair must also be determined according to their impact on the complainant. I acknowledge that it is also possible that the Supplier did not give Mr L sufficient information, in good time, on the various charges they could have been subject to as Fractional Club members in order to satisfy the requirements of Regulation 12 of the Timeshare Regulations (which was concerned with the provision of ‘key information’). But even if that was the case, I cannot see that the ongoing costs of membership were applied unfairly in practice. And as neither Mr L nor the PR have persuaded me that they would not have pressed ahead with their purchase had the finer details of the Fractional Club’s ongoing costs been disclosed by the Supplier in compliance with Regulation 12, I cannot see why any failings in that regard are likely to be material to the outcome of this complaint given its facts and circumstances. As for the PR’s argument that Mr L’s heirs would inherit the on-going management charges, I fail to see how that could be the case or that it could have led to an unfairness that warrants a remedy. In conclusion, given the facts and circumstances of this complaint, I did not think that the Lender acted unfairly or unreasonably when it dealt with Mr L’s Section 75 claim, and I was not persuaded that the Lender was party to a credit relationship with him under the Credit Agreement that was unfair to him for the purposes of Section 140A of the CCA. And having taken everything into account, I could see no other reason why it would be fair or reasonable to direct the Lender to compensate him. The Lender did not respond to the PD. The PR responded – they did not accept the PD and provided some further comments and evidence they wish to be considered. Having received the relevant responses from both parties, I’m now finalising my decision. The legal and regulatory context In considering what is fair and reasonable in all the circumstances of the complaint, I am required under DISP 3.6.4R to take into account: relevant (i) law and regulations; (ii) regulators’ rules, guidance and standards; and (iii) codes of practice; and (where appropriate), what I consider to have been good industry practice at the relevant time. The legal and regulatory context that I think is relevant to this complaint is, in many ways, no different to that shared in several hundred published ombudsman decisions on very similar complaints – which can be found on the Financial Ombudsman Service’s website. And with that being the case, it is not necessary to set out that context in detail here. But I would add that the following regulatory rules/guidance are also relevant:

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The Consumer Credit Sourcebook (‘CONC’) – Found in the Financial Conduct Authority’s (the ‘FCA’) Handbook of Rules and Guidance Below are the most relevant provisions and/or guidance as they were at the relevant time: • CONC 3.7.3 [R] • CONC 4.5.3 [R] • CONC 4.5.2 [G] The FCA’s Principles The rules on consumer credit sit alongside the wider obligations of firms, such as the Principles for Businesses (‘PRIN’). Set out below are those that are most relevant to this complaint: • Principle 6 • Principle 7 • Principle 8 What I’ve decided – and why I’ve considered all the available evidence and arguments to decide what’s fair and reasonable in the circumstances of this complaint. Following the responses from both parties, I’ve considered the case afresh and having done so, I’ve reached the same decision as that which I outlined in my provisional findings, for broadly the same reasons. Again, my role as an Ombudsman isn’t to address every single point which has been made to date, but to decide what is fair and reasonable in the circumstances of this complaint. If I haven’t commented on, or referred to, something that either party has said, this doesn’t mean I haven’t considered it. Rather, I’ve focused here on addressing what I consider to be the key issues in deciding this complaint and explaining the reasons for reaching my final decision. The PR’s further comments in response to the PD only relate to the issue of whether the credit relationship between Mr L and the Lender was unfair. In particular, the PR has provided further comments in relation to whether the membership was sold to Mr L as an investment at the Time of Sale. As outlined in my PD, the PR originally raised various other points of complaint, all of which I addressed at that time. But they didn’t make any further comments in relation to those in their response to my PD. Indeed, they haven’t said they disagree with any of my provisional conclusions in relation to those other points. And since I haven’t been provided with anything more in relation to those other points by either party, I see no reason to change my conclusions in relation to them as set out in my PD. So, I’ll focus here on the PR’s points raised in response. Section 140A of the CCA: did the Lender participate in an unfair credit relationship? The Supplier’s alleged breach of Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare regulations

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The PR has provided further comments and evidence which in my view relate to whether Fractional Club membership was marketed as an investment in breach of the prohibition in Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations. However, as I explained in my provisional decision, while the Supplier’s sales processes left open the possibility that the sales representative may have positioned Fractional Club membership as an investment, it isn’t necessary to make a finding on this as it is not determinative of the outcome of the complaint. I explained that Regulatory breaches do not automatically create unfairness and that such breaches and their consequences (if there are any) must be considered in the round, rather than in a narrow or technical way. The PR’s comments and evidence in this respect do not persuade me that I should uphold Mr L’s complaint because they do not make me think it’s any more likely that the Supplier’s breach of Regulation 14(3) led Mr L to enter into the Purchase Agreement and the Credit Agreement. Mr and Mrs L had purchased other types of timeshare membership from the Supplier over a number of years. They’d converted their existing timeshare points into fractional points in 2014 taking out borrowing from a different lender. In contrast, the purchase they made at the Time of Sale was a new and separate arrangement with the Supplier. No existing membership was traded in, and Mr and Mrs L increased the overall number of points they held with the Supplier giving them additional holiday rights. And for completeness, Mr and Mrs L would go on to make a further purchase from the Supplier in 2017 increasing their points total again. The PR says the evidence they have provided demonstrates that Mr and Mrs L believed they were buying an investment as that was how it was sold to them by the Supplier. I’ve already set out above that I accept it’s possible that the sales representative may have positioned Fractional Club membership as an investment, so I don’t consider it’s necessary to comment further on the representations made by the PR specifically on this issue. The PR has provided its further thoughts as to Mr L’s likely motivations for purchasing Fractional Club membership. I recognise it has interpreted Mr L’s testimony differently to how I have and thinks it points to him having been motivated by the prospect of a financial gain from Fractional Club membership. In my provisional decision I explained the reasons why I didn’t think Mr L’s purchase was motivated by the prospect of a financial gain (i.e. a profit). Although, I have carefully considered the PR’s arguments in response to this, I’m not persuaded the conclusion I reached on this point was unfair or unreasonable. As I’ve set out, Mr L’s Fractional Club membership purchase at the Time of Sale was his second fractional timeshare purchase. And in both the statement he has provided and the initial call notes from the PR he, understandably, speaks about both of his Fractional Club purchases. But as Mr L’s statement deals with his purchases separately, I’ve focused on what he said about the Time of Sale and not his previous purchase. In terms of what Mr L recalled about the Time of Sale his statement says the Supplier’s sales representatives were “very old school sellers…in your face and hard sales”. The statement also says he: “Eventually bought a Fractional based in the Balkans. Similar to Spain this had a clear end date when the property would be sold and again the profit would be shared amongst the owners”

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The PR, in its response to my provisional decision, says Mr L’s recollections match the Supplier’s training material. I agree that this section of Mr L’s statement provides a reasonable explanation as to how Fractional Club membership worked. But I don’t consider it provides any insight into Mr L’s reasons for making his purchase at the Time of Sale. The notes of the telephone conversation between Mr L and the PR say about the same purchase (note taker’s emphasis): “Bought Balkan – clear end date of sale of property Profit shared with other owners – Good to own property – Prices always rising – Hitatchi Loan.” The notes do contain more information, but it’s unclear in what context this information was obtained or that it can be attributed to the Supplier’s sales representatives at the Time of Sale. So again, I don’t consider this assists in ascertaining Mr L’s motivation for his purchase. It’s also unclear why, if Mr L’s purchase was made – at least in part – because of the investment element it contained, his statement omitted the additional detail recorded in the telephone note. The PR has also referred to another part of Mr L’s statement: “We had been completely mis-sold as how could they sell the property if they didn’t own it! SO all of the conversation about the benefits and the money we would make was lies” And in the telephone note bracketed next to “mis-sell” it’s recorded that Mr L had discovered that: “[Supplier] didn’t own Balkans just rented rooms How can they sell property they don’t own so all benefits + profit at end were lies!” Overall, having carefully thought about what the PR has said and the evidence they’ve provided, I’m not persuaded that Mr L has demonstrated that a breach of Regulation 14(3) was material to his decision to purchase at the Time of Sale. Mr L was evidently unhappy with what he says he’d found out about his Fractional Club membership and the telephone note indicates he’d already relinquished his membership. I accept Mr L has consistently said that he expected to get something from the sale of the property he’d bought a fraction of. But in light of the limited detail Mr L has provided about the Time of Sale, there isn’t sufficient for me to conclude, on balance, that his purchase was motivated by the prospect of a financial gain. So, ultimately, for the above reasons, I remain unpersuaded that any breach of Regulation 14(3) was material to Mr L’s purchasing decision. And for that reason, I do not think the credit relationship between Mr L and the Lender was unfair to him even if the Supplier had breached Regulation 14(3). S140A conclusion Given all of the factors I’ve looked at in this part of my decision, including the relevant relationships, arrangements and payments between the Lender and the Supplier and having taken all of them into account, I’m not persuaded that the credit relationship between Mr L and the Lender under the Credit Agreement and related Purchase Agreement was unfair to him. So, I don’t think it is fair or reasonable that I uphold this complaint on that basis.

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Conclusion In conclusion, given the facts and circumstances of this complaint, I do not think that the Lender acted unfairly or unreasonably when it dealt with Mr L’s Section 75 claims, and I am not persuaded that the Lender was party to a credit relationship with him under the Credit Agreement that was unfair to him for the purposes of Section 140A of the CCA. And having taken everything into account, I see no other reason why it would be fair or reasonable to direct the Lender to compensate him. My final decision For the reasons set out above, I don’t uphold this complaint. Under the rules of the Financial Ombudsman Service, I’m required to ask Mr L to accept or reject my decision before 27 April 2026. Claire Poyntz Ombudsman

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