Mitsubishi HC Capital UK Plc · DRN-6247094

The complaint Mr W’s complaint is, in essence, that Mitsubishi HC Capital UK Plc trading as Novuna Personal Finance (the ‘Lender’) acted unfairly and unreasonably by (1) being party to an unfair credit relationship with them under Section 140A of the Consumer Credit Act 1974 (as amended) (the ‘CCA’) and (2) deciding against paying a claim under Section 75 of the CCA. What happened Mr W was the member of a timeshare provider (the ‘Supplier’) – having purchased a number of products from it over time. But the product at the centre of this complaint is their membership of a timeshare that I’ll call the ‘Fractional Club’ – which they bought on 13 May 2012 (the ‘Time of Sale’). They entered into an agreement with the Supplier to buy 2,241 fractional points at a cost of £38,600 (the ‘Purchase Agreement’). The net cost to Mr W was £8,739 after trading in existing memberships. Fractional Club membership was asset backed – which meant it gave Mr W more than just holiday rights. It also included a share in the net sale proceeds of a property named on the Purchase Agreement (the ‘Allocated Property’) after their membership term ends. Mr W paid for their Fractional Club membership by taking finance of £8,739 from the Lender (the ‘Credit Agreement’). Mr W – using a professional representative (the ‘PR’) – wrote to the Lender on 12 November 2018 (the ‘Letter of Complaint’) to raise a number of different concerns. As those concerns haven’t changed since they were first raised, and as both sides are familiar with them, it isn’t necessary to repeat them in detail here beyond the summary above. The Lender dealt with Mr W’s concerns as a complaint and issued its final response letter on 11 January 2019, rejecting it on every ground. The complaint was then referred to the Financial Ombudsman Service. It was assessed by an Investigator who, having considered the information on file, rejected the complaint on its merits. Mr W disagreed with the Investigator’s assessment and asked for an Ombudsman’s decision – which is why it was passed to me. I issued a provisional decision (“PD”) on the case. In summary, I said: Section 75 of the CCA: the Supplier’s misrepresentations at the Time of Sale The CCA introduced a regime of connected lender liability under section 75 that affords consumers (“debtors”) a right of recourse against lenders that provide the finance for the acquisition of goods or services from third-party merchants (“suppliers”) in the event that there is an actionable misrepresentation and/or breach of contract by the supplier.

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Certain conditions must be met if the protection afforded to consumers is engaged, including, for instance, the cash price of the purchase and the nature of the arrangements between the parties involved in the transaction. The Lender doesn’t dispute that the relevant conditions are met, but I disagree. Whilst I haven’t seen the pricing sheet for the sale in question, by Mr W’s account it cost £38,600 before other memberships were traded in against it. One of the conditions of Section 75 is that the cash price of the goods or services must not exceed £30,000. Here the cash price was £38,600. It follows that I don’t think the Lender acted unfairly by declining to take action in relation to Mr W’s Section 75 claim, for that reason. For the avoidance of doubt, however, given the ambiguity about the cash price of this purchase, I’ll explain why I don’t think Mr W’s Section 75 claim out to have succeeded. It was said in the Letter of Complaint that Fractional Club membership had been misrepresented by the Supplier at the Time of Sale because Mr W were told or led to believe by the Supplier that Fractional Club membership: (1) was an investment that could be sold at a profit when that was not true. (2) had a guaranteed end date when that was not true. (3) was the only way of releasing themselves from their existing membership when that was not true; (4) was exclusive to them (and other members) when that was not true. However, telling prospective members that Fractional Club membership was an investment that could be sold at a profit was not untrue. After all, a share in an allocated property was, by its very nature, an investment and it was and is possible that it will be sold at a profit. As I understand it, the sale of the Allocated Property could be postponed in certain circumstances according to the Fractional Club Rules. But Mr W say little to nothing to persuade me that they were given a guarantee by the Supplier that the Allocated Property would be sold on a specific date when such a promise would have been impossible to stand by given the inevitable uncertainty of selling property some way into the future. And as there isn’t enough evidence on file to support the PR’s allegation that Fractional Club membership had been misrepresented for reasons relating to points (3) and (4), I’m not persuaded that there were representations by the Supplier on the issues in question that constituted false statements of existing fact. So, while I recognise that Mr W and the PR have concerns about the way in which Fractional Club membership was sold by the Supplier, when looking at the claim under Section 75 of the CCA, I can only consider whether there was a factual and material misrepresentation by the Supplier. For the reasons I’ve set out above, I’m not persuaded that there was. And that means that I don’t think that the Lender acted unreasonably or unfairly when it dealt with this particular Section 75 claim. Section 75 of the CCA: the Supplier’s Breach of Contract I have already summarised how Section 75 of the CCA works and why it gives consumers a right of recourse against a lender. So, it is not necessary to repeat that here other than to say that, if I find that the Supplier is liable for having breached the Purchase Agreement, the Lender is also liable. And if there’s any doubt about whether the claim exceeded the monetary limit imposed by Section 75, the claim did not exceed the limit imposed by Section 75A, under which it was possible for Mr W to make a claim for Breach of Contract.

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The PR says, on Mr W behalf, that holiday accommodation would be secured thanks to Fractional Club membership when that was not true. And on my reading of the complaint, that suggests that they could not holiday where and when they wanted to, potentially breaching the Purchase Agreement. However, like any holiday accommodation, availability was not unlimited – given the higher demand at peak times, like school holidays, for instance. Some of the sales paperwork likely to have been signed by Mr W states that the availability of holidays was/is subject to demand. It also looks like they made use of their fractional points to holiday on a number of occasions. I accept that they may not have been able to take certain holidays. But I have not seen enough to persuade me that the Supplier had breached the terms of the Purchase Agreement. So, from the evidence I have seen, I do not think the Lender is liable to pay Mr W any compensation for a breach of contract by the Supplier. And with that being the case, I do not think the Lender acted unfairly or unreasonably in relation to this aspect of the complaint either. Section 140A of the CCA: did the Lender participate in an unfair credit relationship? I’ve already explained why I’m not persuaded that Fractional Club membership was actionably misrepresented by the Supplier at the Time of Sale. But there are other aspects of the sales process that, being the subject of dissatisfaction, I must explore with Section 140A in mind if I’m to consider this complaint in full – which is what I’ve done next. The PR says, for instance, that: 1. the right checks weren’t carried out before the Lender lent to Mr W; 2. Mr W were pressured by the Supplier into purchasing Fractional Club membership at the Time of Sale; 3. there was one or more unfair contract terms in the Purchase Agreement; and 4. Fractional Club membership was marketed and sold as investment in breach of a prohibition on doing so. However, having considered the entirety of the credit relationship between Mr W and the Lender along with all of the circumstances of the complaint, I don’t think the credit relationship between them was likely to have been rendered unfair for the purposes of Section 140A. When coming to that conclusion, and in carrying out my analysis, I have looked at: 1. The standard of the Supplier’s commercial conduct – which includes its sales and marketing practices at the Time of Sale along with any relevant training material; 2. The provision of information by the Supplier at the Time of Sale, including the contractual documentation and disclaimers made by the Supplier; 3. Evidence provided by both parties on what was likely to have been said and/or done at the Time of Sale; 4. The inherent probabilities of the sale given its circumstances; and, when relevant 5. Any existing unfairness from a related credit agreement. I have then considered the impact of these on the fairness of the credit relationship between Mr W and the Lender. The Supplier’s sales & marketing practices at the Time of Sale

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While the PR says that the right affordability checks weren’t carried out at the Time of Sale, even if I were to find that the Lender failed to do everything it should have when it agreed to lend (and I make no such finding), I would have to be satisfied that the money lent to Mr W was actually unaffordable before also concluding that they lost out as a result and then consider whether the credit relationship with the Lender was unfair to them for this reason. But from the information provided, I am not satisfied that the lending was unaffordable for the Mr W. I acknowledge that Mr W may have felt weary after a sales process that went on for a long time. But they say little about what was said and/or done by the Supplier during their sales presentation that made them feel as if they had no choice but to purchase Fractional Club membership when they simply did not want to. They were also given a 14-day cooling off period and they have not provided a credible explanation for why they did not cancel their membership during that time. And with all of that being the case, there is insufficient evidence to demonstrate that Mr W made the decision to purchase Fractional Club membership because their ability to exercise that choice was significantly impaired by pressure from the Supplier. Overall, therefore, I don’t think that Mr W credit relationship with the Lender was rendered unfair to them under Section 140A for any of the reasons above. But there is another reason, perhaps the main reason, why the PR says the credit relationship with the Lender was unfair to them. And that’s the suggestion that Fractional Club membership was marketed and sold to them as an investment in breach of prohibition against selling timeshares in that way. The Supplier’s alleged breach of Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations The Lender does not dispute, and I am satisfied, that Mr W’s Fractional Club membership met the definition of a “timeshare contract” and was a “regulated contract” for the purposes of the Timeshare Regulations. Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations prohibited the Supplier from marketing or selling Fractional Club membership as an investment. This is what the provision said at the Time of Sale: “A trader must not market or sell a proposed timeshare contract or long-term holiday product contract as an investment if the proposed contract would be a regulated contract.” But the PR says that the Supplier did exactly that at the Time of Sale. The term “investment” is not defined in the Timeshare Regulations. But for the purposes of this provisional decision, and by reference to the decided authorities, an investment is a transaction in which money or other property is laid out in the expectation or hope of financial gain or profit. A share in the Allocated Property clearly constituted an investment as it offered Mr W the prospect of a financial return – whether or not, like all investments, that was more than what they first put into it. But it is important to note at this stage that the fact that Fractional Club membership included an investment element did not, itself, transgress the prohibition in Regulation 14(3). That provision prohibits the marketing and selling of a timeshare contract as an investment. It doesn’t prohibit the mere existence of an investment element in a timeshare contract or prohibit the marketing and selling of such a timeshare contract per se. In other words, the Timeshare Regulations did not ban products such as the Fractional Club. They just regulated how such products were marketed and sold.

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To conclude, therefore, that Fractional Club membership was marketed or sold to Mr W as an investment in breach of Regulation 14(3), I have to be persuaded that it was more likely than not that the Supplier marketed and/or sold membership to them as an investment, i.e. told them or led them to believe that Fractional Club membership offered them the prospect of a financial gain (i.e., a profit) given the facts and circumstances of this complaint. There is competing evidence in this complaint as to whether Fractional Club membership was marketed and/or sold by the Supplier at the Time of Sale as an investment in breach of regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations. On the one hand, it is clear that the Supplier made efforts to avoid specifically describing membership of the Fractional Club as an ‘investment’ or quantifying to prospective purchasers, such as Mr W, the financial value of their share in the net sales proceeds of the Allocated Property along with the investment considerations, risks and rewards attached to them. On the other hand, I acknowledge that the Supplier’s sales process left open the possibility that the sales representative may have positioned Fractional Club membership as an investment. So, I accept that it’s equally possible that Fractional Club membership was marketed and sold to Mr W as an investment in breach of Regulation 14(3). However, whether or not there was a breach of the relevant prohibition by the Supplier is not ultimately determinative of the outcome in this complaint for reasons I will come on to shortly. And with that being the case, it’s not necessary to make a formal finding on that particular issue for the purposes of this decision. Would the credit relationship between the Lender and Mr W have been rendered unfair to him had there been a breach of Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations? Having found that it was possible that the Supplier breached Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations at the Time of Sale, I now need to consider what impact that breach had on the fairness of the credit relationship between Mr W and the Lender under the Credit Agreement and related Purchase Agreement as the case law on Section 140A makes it clear that regulatory breaches do not automatically create unfairness for the purposes of that provision. Such breaches and their consequences (if there are any) must be considered in the round, rather than in a narrow or technical way. Indeed, it seems to me that, if I am to conclude that a breach of Regulation 14(3) led to a credit relationship between Mr W and the Lender that was unfair to them and warranted relief as a result, whether the Supplier’s breach of Regulation 14(3) led them to enter into the Purchase Agreement and the Credit Agreement is an important consideration. But on my reading of the evidence before me, the prospect of a financial gain from Fractional Club membership was not an important and motivating factor when Mr W decided to go ahead with their purchase. I’ll explain why. The Letter of Complaint sent by the PR on Mr W’s behalf raised the selling of membership as an investment. It did so, using identical or very similar phrases to complaints raised for other customers it represents. It causes me to question whether it’s of value in establishing what Mr W’s recollections of the Time of Sale. I therefore place little weight on what was said in the Letter of Complaint.

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It was only following the judgment in R (on the application of Shawbrook Bank Ltd) v Financial Ombudsman Service Ltd and R (on the application of Clydesdale Financial Services Ltd (t/a Barclays Partner Finance)) v Financial Ombudsman Service [2023] EWHC 1069 (Admin) (‘Shawbrook & BPF v FOS’) being handed down that Mr W’s testimony was supplied, in October 2023. Mr W’s testimony is dated 2017 and it wasn’t supplied with any evidence to demonstrate that’s when it was taken. I have to question why it seems that Mr W’s testimony was not provided to the Lender as part of the complaint process in in 2018, nor to this Service when referring the complaint in 2019. Given the timing of the testimony being provided, I have to question the possibility that it might have been influenced by the judgement I’ve mentioned above. Even if I were to accept the testimony the PR supplied in 2023 was unaltered and taken in 2017 as has been suggested, it’s still five years after the event. And experience tells me that the more time that passes between the event complained about and the consumers sharing their recollections, the greater the risk that those recollections will be vague and inaccurate and/or potentially influenced by discussions with others and even the complaint process itself. In his testimony Mr W gives a detailed account of a number of timeshare purchases – a total of five between 2008 and 2014. I understand the earlier of those purchases were holiday club memberships which simply gave Mr W holiday entitlement. So, I think it’s clear that holiday entitlement was an important factor for him. Referring to the purchase in question, Mr W says that whilst holidaying with the Supplier in 2012, he attended a presentation with the supplier: “He advised that the points system was being phased out and that members were actually buying the properties and that this would make it even more difficult to obtain accommodation. Being an owner would give us preferential treatment. We agreed to transfer and it was discussed that to benefit from the sale of the property in 2030 we needed extra points to bring the value up to an amount that would benefit us upon resale.” I don’t think that Mr W has articulated that membership was marketed and sold as an investment here. He mentions being benefitting from sale (of the Allocated Property presumably), but he doesn’t go as far as to suggest that he was led to believe that he’d gain financially, or make a profit. Moreover, even if one could interpret that from what Mr W said, it doesn’t speak to his motivation in making the purchase. So from what Mr W said, I don’t think that investment was an important and motivating factor in him having made the purchase. Overall, I don’t think I can place sufficient weight on Mr W’s statement necessary to conclude that the credit relationship in question was unfair because of a breach of Regulation 14(3). That doesn’t mean they weren’t interested in a share in the Allocated Property. After all, that wouldn’t be surprising given the nature of the product at the centre of this complaint. But as Mr W themselves don’t persuade me that their purchase was motivated by their share in the Allocated Property and the possibility of a profit, I don’t think a breach of Regulation 14(3) by the Supplier was likely to have been material to the decision they ultimately made. On balance, therefore, even if the Supplier had marketed or sold the Fractional Club membership as an investment in breach of Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations, I am not persuaded that Mr W’s decision to purchase Fractional Club membership at the Time of Sale was motivated by the prospect of a financial gain (i.e., a profit). On the contrary, I

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think the evidence suggests they would have pressed ahead with their purchase whether or not there had been a breach of Regulation 14(3). And for that reason, I do not think the credit relationship between Mr W and the Lender was unfair to them even if the Supplier had breached Regulation 14(3). The provision of information by the Supplier at the Time of Sale The PR says that Mr W were not given sufficient information at the Time of Sale by the Supplier about the ongoing costs of Fractional Club membership. The PR also says that, because some of the terms of the Purchase Agreement weren’t individually negotiated, they were unfair contract terms as were the terms governing the ongoing costs of membership and consequences of non-payment. As I’ve already indicated, the case law on Section 140A makes it clear that it does not automatically follow that regulatory breaches create unfairness for the purposes of the unfair relationship provisions. The extent to which such mistakes render a credit relationship unfair must also be determined according to their impact on the complainant. I acknowledge that it is also possible that the Supplier did not give Mr W sufficient information, in good time, on the various charges they could have been subject to as Fractional Club members in order to satisfy the requirements of Regulation 12 of the 2010 Timeshare Regulations (which was concerned with the provision of ‘key information’). But even if that was the case, I cannot see that the ongoing costs of membership were applied unfairly in practice. And as neither Mr W nor the PR have persuaded me that they would not have pressed ahead with their purchase had the finer details of the Fractional Club’s ongoing costs been disclosed by the Supplier in compliance with Regulation 12, I cannot see why any failings in that regard are likely to be material to the outcome of this complaint given its fact and circumstances. As for the PR’s argument that there were one or more unfair contract terms in the Purchase Agreement, I can’t see that any such terms were operated unfairly against Mr W in practice, nor that any such terms led them to behave in a certain way to their detriment. And with that being the case, I’m not persuaded that any of the terms governing Fractional Club membership are likely to have led to an unfairness that warrants a remedy even if they could be said to be unfair contract terms, which I make no formal finding on. The PR says that a payment of commission from the Lender to the Supplier at the Time of Sale should lead me to uphold this complaint because, simply put, information in relation to that payment went undisclosed at the Time of Sale. As both sides already know, the Supreme Court handed down an important judgment on 1 August 2025 in a series of cases concerned with the issue of commission: Johnson v FirstRand Bank Ltd, Wrench v FirstRand Bank Ltd and Hopcraft v Close Brothers Ltd [2025] UKSC 33 (‘Hopcraft, Johnson and Wrench’). The Supreme Court ruled that, in each of the three cases, the commission payments made to car dealers by lenders were legal, as claims for the tort of bribery, or the dishonest assistance of a breach of fiduciary duty, had to be predicated on the car dealer owing a fiduciary duty to the consumer, which the car dealers did not owe. A “disinterested duty”, as described in Wood v Commercial First Business Ltd & ors and Business Mortgage Finance 4 plc v Pengelly [2021] EWCA Civ 471, is not enough. However, the Supreme Court held that the credit relationship between the lender and Mr Johnson was unfair under Section 140A of the CCA because of the commission paid by the

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lender to the car dealer. The main reasons for coming to that conclusion included, amongst other things, the following factors: 1. The size of the commission (as a percentage of the total charge for credit). In Mr Johnson’s case it was 55%. This was “so high” and “a powerful indication that the relationship…was unfair” (see paragraph 327); 2. The failure to disclose the commission; and 3. The concealment of the commercial tie between the car dealer and the lender. The Supreme Court also confirmed that the following factors, in what was a non-exhaustive list, will normally be relevant when assessing whether a credit relationship was/is unfair under Section 140A of the CCA: 1. The size of the commission as a proportion of the charge for credit; 2. The way in which commission is calculated (a discretionary commission arrangement, for example, may lead to higher interest rates); 3. The characteristics of the consumer; 4. The extent of any disclosure and the manner of that disclosure (which, insofar as Section 56 of the CCA is engaged, includes any disclosure by a supplier when acting as a broker); and 5. Compliance with the regulatory rules. From my reading of the Supreme Court’s judgment in Hopcraft, Johnson and Wrench, it sets out principles which apply to credit brokers other than car dealer–credit brokers. So, when considering allegations of undisclosed payments of commission like the one in this complaint, Hopcraft, Johnson and Wrench is relevant law that I’m required to consider under Rule 3.6.4 of the Financial Conduct Authority’s Dispute Resolution Rules (‘DISP’). But I don’t think Hopcraft, Johnson and Wrench assists Mr W in arguing that his credit relationship with the Lender was unfair to him for reasons relating to commission given the facts and circumstances of this complaint. I haven’t seen anything to suggest that the Lender and Supplier were tied to one another contractually or commercially in a way that wasn’t properly disclosed to Mr W, nor have I seen anything that persuades me that the commission arrangement between them gave the Supplier a choice over the interest rate that led Mr W into a credit agreement that cost disproportionately more than it otherwise could have. I acknowledge that it’s possible that the Lender and the Supplier failed to follow the regulatory guidance in place at the Time of Sale insofar as it was relevant to disclosing the commission arrangements between them. But as I’ve said before, the case law on Section 140A makes it clear that regulatory breaches do not automatically create unfairness for the purposes of that provision. Such breaches and their consequences (if there are any) must be considered in the round, rather than in a narrow or technical way. And with that being the case, it isn’t necessary to make a formal finding on that because, even if the Lender and the Supplier failed to follow the relevant regulatory guidance at the Time of Sale, it is for the reasons set out below that I don’t currently think any such failure is itself a reason to find the credit relationship in question unfair to Mr W.

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In stark contrast to the facts of Mr Johnson’s case, the amount of commission paid by the Lender to the Supplier for arranging the Credit Agreement that Mr W entered into wasn’t high. At £895.75, it was only 10.25% of the amount borrowed and even less than that (5.61%) as a proportion of the charge for credit. So, had he known at the Time of Sale that the Supplier was going to be paid a flat rate of commission at that level, I’m not currently persuaded that he either wouldn’t have understood that or would have otherwise questioned the size of the payment at that time. After all, Mr W wanted Fractional Club membership and had no obvious means of his own to pay for it. And at such a low level, the impact of commission on the cost of the credit he needed for a timeshare he wanted doesn’t strike me as disproportionate. So, I think he would still have taken out the loan to fund his purchase at the Time of Sale had the amount of commission been disclosed. What’s more, based on what I’ve seen so far, the Supplier’s role as a credit broker wasn’t a separate service and distinct from its role as the seller of timeshares. It was simply a means to an end in the Supplier’s overall pursuit of a successful timeshare sale. I can’t see that the Supplier gave an undertaking – either expressly or impliedly – to put to one side its commercial interests in pursuit of that goal when arranging the Credit Agreement. And as it wasn’t acting as an agent of Mr W but as the supplier of contractual rights he obtained under the Purchase Agreement, the transaction doesn’t strike me as one with features that suggest the Supplier had an obligation of ‘loyalty’ to him when arranging the Credit Agreement and thus a fiduciary duty. Overall, therefore, I’m not currently persuaded that the commission arrangements between the Supplier and the Lender were likely to have led to a sufficiently extreme inequality of knowledge that rendered the credit relationship unfair to Mr W. Section 140A: Conclusion Given all of the factors I’ve looked at in this part of my decision, and having taken all of them into account, I’m not persuaded that the credit relationship between Mr W and the Lender under the Credit Agreement and related Purchase Agreement was unfair to him. And as things currently stand, I don’t think it would be fair or reasonable that I uphold this complaint on that basis. Commission: The Alternative Grounds of Complaint While I’ve found that Mr W credit relationship with the Lender wasn’t unfair to him for reasons relating to the commission arrangements between it and the Supplier, two of the grounds on which I came to that conclusion also constitute separate and freestanding complaints to Mr W complaint about an unfair credit relationship. So, for completeness, I’ve considered those grounds on that basis here. The first ground relates to whether the Lender is liable for the dishonest assistance of a breach of fiduciary duty by the Supplier because it took a payment of commission from the Lender without telling Mr W (i.e., secretly). And the second relates to the Lender’s compliance with the regulatory guidance in place at the Time of Sale insofar as it was relevant to disclosing the commission arrangements between them. However, for the reasons I set out above, I’m not persuaded that the Supplier – when acting as credit broker – owed Mr W a fiduciary duty. So, the remedies that might be available at law in relation to the payment of secret commission aren’t, in my view, available to him. And while it’s possible that the Lender failed to follow the regulatory guidance in place at the Time of Sale insofar as it was relevant to disclosing the commission arrangements between it and the Supplier, I don’t think any such failure on the Lender’s part is itself a reason to uphold this complaint because, for the reasons I also set out above, I think he would still have taken out the loan to fund his purchase at the Time of Sale had there been more adequate disclosure of the commission arrangements that applied at that time.

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In conclusion, given the facts and circumstances of this complaint, I did not think that the Lender acted unfairly or unreasonably when it dealt with Mr W Section 75 claim. I was not persuaded that the Lender was party to a credit relationship with him under the Credit Agreement and related Purchase Agreement that was unfair to him for the purposes of Section 140A of the CCA. And having taken everything into account, I saw no other reason why it would be fair or reasonable to direct the Lender to compensate him. Neither party responded to my PD. So, I’m now finalising my findings. The legal and regulatory context In considering what is fair and reasonable in all the circumstances of the complaint, I am required under DISP 3.6.4R to take into account: relevant (i) law and regulations; (ii) regulators’ rules, guidance and standards; and (iii) codes of practice; and (where appropriate), what I consider to have been good industry practice at the relevant time. The legal and regulatory context that I think is relevant to this complaint is, in many ways. no different to that shared in several hundred published ombudsman decisions on very similar complaints – which can be found on the Financial Ombudsman Service’s website. And with that being the case, it is not necessary to set out that context in detail here. But I would add that the following regulatory rules/guidance are also relevant: The Office of Fair Trading’s Irresponsible Lending Guidance – 31 March 2010 The primary purpose of this guidance was to provide greater clarity for businesses and consumer representatives as to the business practices that the Office of Fair Trading (the ‘OFT’) thought might have constituted irresponsible lending for the purposes of Section 25(2B) of the CCA. Below are the most relevant paragraphs as they were at the relevant time: • Paragraph 2.2 • Paragraph 2.3 • Paragraph 5.5 The OFT’s Guidance for Credit Brokers and Intermediaries - 24 November 2011 The primary purpose of this guidance was to provide clarity for credit brokers and credit intermediaries as to the standards expected of them by the OFT when they dealt with actual or prospective borrowers. Below are the most relevant paragraphs as they were at the relevant time: • Paragraph 2.2 • Paragraph 3.7 • Paragraph 4.8 What I’ve decided – and why I’ve considered all the available evidence and arguments to decide what’s fair and reasonable in the circumstances of this complaint. Neither party has submitted new evidence to be considered in response to my PD. As such, I now make the conclusions that I reached in my PD final. So, I don’t uphold this compliant.

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My final decision For the reasons explained above, I don’t uphold this complaint. Under the rules of the Financial Ombudsman Service, I’m required to ask Mr W to accept or reject my decision before 21 April 2026. Stephen Trapp Ombudsman

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