HSBC UK Bank Plc · DRN-6018346

The complaint Mr H complains that HSBC UK Bank Plc (as the recipient bank) didn’t do enough to prevent him from losing money to what he says was a scam. What happened The detailed background to this complaint is well known to both parties. So, I’ll only provide an overview of some of the key events here. Between August 2020 and May 2021 Mr H made the below series of payments to a company I’ll refer to as ‘T’ who held a bank account with HSBC. The payments totalled nearly €109,000. They arrived in the recipient account as the below amounts of British pounds. Date Amount 7 August 2020 £18,358.24 19 August 2020 £34,268.72 24 September 2020 £20,303.47 3 December 2020 £18,366.09 8 February 2021 £5,354 20 May 2021 £5,299.29 The evidence Mr H has provided supports that the payments were for forward sales of a precious metal. In essence he would enter a contract to purchase the metal at a discount from T. The metal was to be delivered 24 months later. In the interim, T would mine, process and refine the agreed amount. Mr H says he was provided with false reassurances about his existing contracts and was pushed to buy more. He believes he was told lies, including about whether mining operations were suspended due to the Covid pandemic. Ultimately Mr H says he never received any of the promised metals or payments and he now believes he’s fallen victim to a scam. T entered into a voluntary arrangement under the Insolvency Act (CVA) in November 2024. The payments were sent through both money transfer services and Mr H’s account with a bank outside the UK. I understand that a police investigation into T resulted in no further action being taken. Mr H complained to HSBC as the provider of the recipient account. He is seeking the return of his lost funds. HSBC didn’t uphold the complaint and said they couldn’t discuss the details of a third party account with Mr H. The complaint was considered by one of our Investigators who said we couldn’t consider all of Mr H’s complaint under our jurisdiction rules (as the account was opened before our jurisdiction to consider such complaints came into force). And for what she could consider, she didn’t recommend it should be upheld. In summary, she wasn’t persuaded there was sufficient evidence to support that T were operating a scam or that HSBC could fairly be said to be responsible for Mr H’s loss. Mr H disagrees and has asked for an Ombudsman to review his complaint.

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What I’ve decided – and why I’ve considered all the available evidence and arguments to decide what’s fair and reasonable in the circumstances of this complaint. Having done so, I’ve reached the same outcome as our Investigator and for similar reasons. I know this will be particularly disappointing for Mr H, especially with such significant sums being involved. I’ll explain why. Mr H has made some detailed submissions in support of his complaint. I’ve read and considered everything he’s sent in, but I don’t intend to respond in similar detail. So if I don’t mention a particular point or piece of evidence, it isn’t because I haven’t seen or thought about it. It’s just that I don’t feel I need to reference it to explain my decision. This isn’t intended as a discourtesy and is just a reflection of the informal nature of our service. The Lending Standards Board’s Contingent Reimbursement Model Code (CRM Code) existed to see the victims of authorised push payment (APP) scams reimbursed in most circumstances. But I can’t fairly say the CRM Code applies to Mr H’s complaint. I say this because it requires that payments are sent between UK based accounts and from a business that was a signatory to the code. Even if it could be shown that T were operating a scam (something I’ll come to in more detail below), Mr H’s payments weren’t sent from signatories to the CRM Code and seem to all have been made internationally. So the CRM Code can’t be used as a basis to expect HSBC to provide reimbursement as Mr H would like. Even where payments are made outside of the CRM Code there are scenarios in which it might be fair and reasonable to require a bank to reimburse a consumer. If, for example, as a recipient bank, where it had failed to appropriately monitor an account in such a way that a scam could and should have been prevented and this would’ve impacted the complainant’s loss. But similarly, there would have to be an identifiable APP scam. And it’s here I find the principal reason for being unable to uphold Mr H’s complaint. I’m not satisfied there’s sufficient evidence to show an APP scam has taken place. In summary terms, I’d need to see persuasive evidence to show T always intended to steal Mr H’s money and that there was no intention to do as it had said it would. Here, the evidence from Companies House shows that T was incorporated in 2012. The accounts that were filed in June 2025 (and which show T used a regulated accountant’s firm) indicate that T had assets of over £6M with over £33M being due to creditors. T hold legitimate mining concessions in the country in which the mining takes place. I’m also aware of an independent valuation by a Royal Institute of Chartered Surveyors (RCIS) regulated agent which shows that T’s operations are supported by tangible infrastructure including heavy plant machinery and other equipment that would be expected in mining operations. T have entered into the CVA that I’ve referenced above. They have sought to explain the reasons for the company facing financial difficulties and have agreed to independent supervision through the CVA period. I’m also aware that the directors of T met with another complainant’s solicitor in 2023 to further explain the position. And whilst this has been reported to the police, I’m not aware of a current or pending prosecution of anyone involved. I appreciate Mr H has shared emails from police officers which he places some weight on. In essence the police officer says that no one is saying that a crime has not been committed, but the decision to close the investigation was based

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on the resources that would be required and the likelihood of anyone being brought to justice. Another email from the police states that they have ‘considered this as a crime from the outset’. I’ve taken account of these, but the context of the emails that were shared was another person who’d paid T being unhappy with the police ceasing their investigation. And I don’t find the emails to be enough (when considered alongside all the other available evidence) to persuade me that T had no intention of fulfilling its agreements with Mr H when accepting payments from him. I accept it’s possible that a company that had been incorporated since 2012, could later go on to attempt to defraud its customers / investors. But the weight of the available evidence leads me to conclude that this isn’t, on balance, the most likely explanation. It would be unusual for a director who had been operating a scam or Ponzi like scheme to engage with independent supervision in the way they have (including the meeting with legal representatives as I’ve mentioned above). I’ve noted Mr H’s point that he believes the CVA is an effort to avoid needing to pay creditors. But there is evidence of a history of genuine operations and tangible assets. And I think it’s more likely than not that (in relation to Mr H’s payments) that T were a legitimate business that has experienced financial difficulty and not that it was their intention to defraud him. Mr H also says there is evidence that T had been identified as a ‘Ponzi Scheme’ by European authorities 15 months prior to his first payment. He’s also highlighted a website which mentions T (amongst others) and seems to be hosted by a claims management or legal firm seeking people who had paid accounts outside the UK for prospective action / claims. He believes this supports both that T were operating a scam and that this is something HSBC ought to have identified. The latest information from the supervisor of the CVA comments on this. He says that the company was subject to an investigation in 2019 which resulted in a freezing order on the company’s escrow account. It comments that this freeze caused significant operational disruption and that all charges were later dropped, and the company was cleared of wrongdoing. It also states that the company is pursuing legal action against the authorities involved due to loss of earnings and reputational damage. I’m placing weight on the content of the supervisor’s report which is filed on Companies House, and I think is likely to be accurate. And I think this supports that there more likely than not wasn’t a scam by T. Even if the charges had been dropped for economic reasons or similar (when the suggestion is actually that T were cleared), it seems unlikely that T would welcome further scrutiny by taking the legal action that is mentioned if they had been operating a scam. I also don’t think this investigation is something that automatically ought to have been picked up by HSBC in their monitoring of the account as Mr H expects, I wouldn’t expect HSBC to be aware of an investigation (which evidently didn’t result in charges) and which took place outside the UK. And even if I’m wrong on this point, as I’m not persuaded there was a scam to uncover, this still wouldn’t impact my thoughts as to the overall outcome of this complaint. I also accept the evidence that Mr H has provided which indicates that at various times HSBC and other banks have referred to T as operating a scam. And that on occasions payments have been made to others on that basis. I don’t know the full details of the basis of other payments that have been made by HSBC or other banks. But this complaint is about HSBC (as the recipient bank) and their position is that they’ve declined to reimburse Mr H. So I have to decide whether (in the circumstances of this complaint) that their decision is fair and reasonable. I can’t comment on payments HSBC might have made to third party’s beyond saying that I don’t think it obligates them to also make a payment to Mr H. It’s possible for a bank to make payments for a variety of reasons, including as a gesture of goodwill. I’ve noted many of the points Mr H has made with regard to HSBC’s monitoring of T’s account. This includes a great amount of detail as to various regulations and legal cases and

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I have considered all this. But, put simply, if there was no scam to protect against or to uncover, then I can’t say HSBC failed in relation to their monitoring of the account in such a way that would’ve made any meaningful difference to the position Mr H now finds himself in. As I’ve mentioned above, our service is intended as an informal alternative to the courts. And having considered all the available evidence, I’m not persuaded it is more likely than not that T’s intentions were to defraud Mr H, it follows that I don’t think there were failures by HSBC which were causal to Mr H’s loss. HSBC don’t have to intervene in genuine transactions. I’m of course sorry to hear that Mr H has suffered a significant loss. But as I don’t think this is something HSBC are responsible for, there isn’t a reasonable basis upon which I can require them to do more to resolve this complaint. I’d like to remind Mr H that he is under no obligation to accept my decision (in which case it won’t be legally binding on either party). He would then be free to continue his dispute with HSBC through other avenues, such as the courts, should he decide to do so. If this is something Mr H is considering, I’d recommend that he seeks legal advice before incurring costs. My final decision For the reasons outlined above, my final decision is that I don’t uphold this complaint Under the rules of the Financial Ombudsman Service, I’m required to ask Mr H to accept or reject my decision before 8 April 2026. Richard Annandale Ombudsman

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