First Holiday Finance Ltd · DRN-6103193

The complaint Mr and Mrs P complain, in summary, that First Holiday Finance Ltd (the ‘Lender’) acted unfairly and unreasonably by (1) being party to an unfair credit relationship with them under section 140A of the Consumer Credit Act 1974 (as amended) (the ‘CCA’) and (2) not meeting a claim they made under section 75 of the CCA. Background to this decision I recently issued my provisional decision setting out the events leading up to this complaint and my intended conclusions. I’ve reproduced my provisional decision here and it is incorporated as part of my overall findings. I invited both parties to let me have any further comments they wished to make in response, which I will address later in this decision. My provisional decision Mr and Mrs P held a trial membership with a timeshare provider (the ‘Supplier’). While making use of that membership they attended a sales presentation by the Supplier, which led to them purchasing membership of a timeshare (the ‘Fractional Club’). On 21 July 2015 (the ‘Time of Sale’) Mr and Mrs P entered into an agreement (the ‘Purchase Agreement’) with the Supplier to buy 1,620 fractional points. Mr and Mrs P paid for Fractional Club membership – which cost just under £29,000 in total, including costs – by taking out two loans with different providers, and trading in their trial membership. One of the loans was for £14,992 from the Lender (the ‘Credit Agreement’). Fractional Club membership was asset backed – which meant it gave Mr and Mrs P more than just holiday rights. It also included a share in the net sale proceeds of a property named on the Purchase Agreement (the ‘Allocated Property’) after their membership term ended. On 18 July 2019, Mr and Mrs P wrote to the Lender to complain about the sale of Fractional Club membership and the associated borrowing. They said the loan arrangements weren’t explained and the sale was presented as an investment. The Lender forwarded Mr and Mrs P’s complaint to the Supplier for response. The Supplier rejected their concerns, setting out its response in a letter dated 14 August 2019. In 2021 Mr and Mrs P engaged the services of a professional representative (the ‘PR’). The PR wrote to the Lender on 21 August 2023 to raise a number of points of concern (the ‘Letter of Complaint’). As both sides are familiar with those concerns, it isn’t necessary to repeat them in detail here beyond the summary I’ve already set out. It doesn’t appear that the Lender responded to the Letter of Complaint, and on 14 January 2024 the PR referred matters to us. After considering the information on file, our investigator rejected the complaint on its merits. On behalf of Mr and Mrs P the PR disagreed with the investigator’s assessment and asked for this review. In the course of the complaint, the PR also

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asked that we consider whether any commission arrangement between the Lender and the Supplier had caused unfairness towards Mr and Mrs P. The legal and regulatory context I’m required under DISP 3.6.4R1 to take into account: relevant (i) law and regulations; (ii) regulators’ rules, guidance and standards; and (iii) codes of practice; and (where appropriate), what I consider to have been good industry practice at the relevant time. The legal and regulatory context that I think is relevant to this complaint is, in many ways. no different to that shared in several hundred published ombudsman decisions on very similar complaints – which can be found on the Financial Ombudsman Service’s website. And with that being the case, it is not necessary to set out that context in detail here. But I would add that the following regulatory rules/guidance are also relevant: The Consumer Credit Sourcebook (‘CONC’)2 Below are the most relevant provisions and/or guidance as they were at the material time: • CONC 3.7.3R • CONC 4.5.2G3 • CONC 4.5.3R • The Creditworthiness Assessment provisions in CONC 5.2 The FCA’s Principles The CONC provisions sit alongside the wider obligations of firms, such as the Principles for Businesses (‘PRIN’). Set out below are those that are most relevant to this complaint: • Principle 6 • Principle 7 • Principle 8 What I’ve provisionally decided – and why I’ve considered all the available evidence and arguments to decide what’s fair and reasonable in the circumstances of this complaint. Where necessary, I’ve made my decision on the balance of probabilities – in other words, on what I think is more likely than not to have happened given the available evidence and the wider circumstances. Having done that, I’m currently minded not to uphold Mr and Mrs P’s complaint. Before I explain why, I want to make it clear that my role as an ombudsman doesn’t mean I need to address every single point that has been made to date. Rather, it is to decide what’s fair and reasonable in the circumstances of this complaint. If I haven’t commented on, or referred to, something that either party has said, that doesn’t mean I haven’t considered it. There are various aspects to Mr and Mrs P’s complaint. These include the allegations of misrepresentation in respect of the Fractional Club membership, and the suggestion 1 ‘R’ denotes a rule 2 Found in the Financial Conduct Authority’s (the ‘FCA’) Handbook of Rules and Guidance 3 ‘G’ denotes guidance

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that the Lender ought to have accepted and met their section 75 claim. I’ll deal with those concerns first. Section 75 of the CCA: the Supplier’s misrepresentations at the Time of Sale Certain conditions must be met for section 75 to apply including, but not limited to, the cash price of the purchase and the nature of the arrangements between the parties involved in the transaction. Because of the way in which section 75 operates, if the Supplier is liable for having misrepresented something to Mr and Mrs P at the Time of Sale or has breached its contract with them, that might give rise to a potential joint and several liability on the part of the Lender. Equally, of course, if C has a defence to such a claim, that defence is also available to the Lender. Our investigator noted that the Limitation Act 1980 might afford a complete defence to the section 75 claim made by Mr and Mrs P. That isn’t a line of argument that the Lender has put forward, but that doesn’t prevent it from doing so, should Mr and Mrs P seek to proceed with legal action. I’m not persuaded Mr and Mrs P’s complaint of 18 July 2019 affects that position. And in any event, it’s by no means certain that the conditions necessary to bring a section 75 claim are met in this case. I say this because it’s my understanding that when Mr and Mrs P entered into the Credit Agreement in July 2015, they did so with First Holiday Finance Ltd based in the British Virgin Islands (‘FHFBVI’) and operating from the Isle of Man, rather than the Lender, (that is, the UK entity bearing the same name). The Lender has provided us with evidence that shows it wasn’t engaged in regulated lending activity at the material time. On 1 August 2015, FHFBVI assigned its loan book (including Mr and Mrs P’s loan) to the Lender after it obtained relevant permission from the FCA. Section 75 enables a claim to be brought against the creditor. At the time the Credit Agreement was made, the creditor was FHFBVI. While FHFBVI assigned its loan book to the Lender, it didn’t necessarily follow that all of its duties or other obligations – such as any potential liability for a section 75 claim – were similarly assigned. Although the CCA section 189(1) definition of creditor includes an assignee, Goode4 indicates that this shouldn’t be interpreted as creating a positive liability on the assignee for a monetary claim under (among other things) section 75. I’m further conscious of the conclusions reached by the High Court in Jones v Link Financial Ltd [2012] EWHC 2402 (‘Jones’), which drew a distinction between pre- assignment liabilities such as might arise under section 75 and those statutory duties under the CCA that the assignee was required to perform in order to enforce its assigned rights5. That’s not to say that a section 75 claim can’t be made along the lines outlined by Mr and Mrs P. Rather, both Goode and Jones highlight the inherent difficulty Mr and Mrs P might face in succeeding with that claim. And with this in mind, while it’s disappointing that the Lender didn’t set out its position in response to the claim Mr and Mrs P said it was liable for under section 75, I can’t properly expect it to pay them compensation. 4 Goode: Consumer Credit Law and Practice – Division I Commentary – Part IC Consumer Credit Legislation – 45A Assignment – III Assignment and the CCA 1974: the assignee as creditor/lender or owner – 1 The basic rule – Pre-assignment breaches (para 45A.62) 5 Jones (paras 33-34)

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Section 140A: did the Lender participate in an unfair credit relationship? I’ve explained why I’m not persuaded Mr and Mrs P’s relationship with the Lender could lead to a successful section 75 claim and outcome in this complaint. But Mr and Mrs P also make arguments that either say or infer that the credit relationship between them and the Lender was unfair under section 140A of the CCA, when looking at all the circumstances of the case, including the Supplier’s representations and parts of its sales process at the Time of Sale they’ve mentioned. Mr and Mrs P’s loan from FHFBVI was written under English law and regulated under the CCA. The Lender acquired and continued to administer the loan when Mr and Mrs P made their complaint, so section 140A of the CCA is relevant law. It is not subject to the same difficulty as their section 75 claim6. So determining what’s fair and reasonable in all the circumstances of the complaint includes considering whether the credit relationship between Mr and Mrs P and the Lender was unfair. Under section 140A, a debtor-creditor relationship can be found to have been or be unfair to the debtor because of one or more of the following: the terms of the credit agreement itself; how the creditor exercised or enforced its rights under the agreement; and any other thing done (or not done) by, or on behalf of, the creditor (either before or after the making of the agreement or any related agreement)7. Such a finding may also be based on the terms of any related agreement (which here, includes the Purchase Agreement) and on anything done or not done by the supplier on the creditor’s behalf before the making of the credit agreement or any related agreement. I see no great difficulty with the position that the Supplier is deemed agent of FHFBVI for the purpose of the pre-contractual negotiations, nor with the possibility referenced in Goode that the operation of sections 140A through 140C effectively extend the deemed agent provision to the Lender after the loan was assigned to it. With this in mind I’ve considered the entirety of the credit relationship between Mr and Mrs P and the Lender along with all of the circumstances of the complaint. Having done so, I don’t think the credit relationship between them was likely to have been rendered unfair for section 140A purposes. When coming to that conclusion, and in carrying out my analysis, I have looked at: • The standard of the Supplier’s commercial conduct – which includes its sales and marketing practices at the Time of Sale along with any relevant training material; • The provision of information by the Supplier at the Time of Sale, including the contractual documentation and disclaimers made by the Supplier; • Evidence provided by both parties on what was likely to have been said and/or done at the Time of Sale; and • The inherent probabilities of the sale given its circumstances. I have then considered the impact of these on the fairness of the credit relationship between Mr and Mrs P and the Lender. 6 Goode (para 45A.65) indicates that section 140B empowers a Court to impose a positive liability on an assignee 7 Section 140A(1) of the CCA

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The PR (on behalf of Mr and Mrs P) complained about the Lender being party to an unfair credit relationship for several reasons, detailed in the Letter of Complaint. It included in its submissions references to various statutes, regulations and associated guidance, arguing (among other things) that: • the Supplier misled Mr and Mrs P, either by misrepresentation or by omission, over matters such as the nature of their purchase, the end date of the fractional scheme, and any possible adverse consequences of entering into the arrangements; • the Supplier carried on unfair commercial practices (contrary to the Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008 (‘CPUT’)); and • the lending should never have been made to Mr and Mrs P. No assessment was made of their creditworthiness, nor any explanation of aspects that might have made the credit unsuitable for them. Despite the breadth of the unfair relationship test under section 140A, a credit relationship isn’t rendered unfair to a debtor simply because of a breach of a legal or equitable duty. Rather, the protection afforded to debtors by section 140A is the consequence of all of the relevant facts. As the Supreme Court said in Plevin (at paragraph 17): “Section 140A…does not impose any obligation and is not concerned with the question whether the creditor or anyone else is in breach of a duty. It is concerned with…whether the creditor’s relationship with the debtor was unfair.” I’ve borne this in mind when considering the PR’s submissions relating to regulations and guidance. The Supplier’s sales practices, representations and omissions I’m not persuaded the available evidence supports that the Supplier wrongly told Mr and Mrs P that the Allocated Property would be sold after 19 years, or that it guaranteed membership would end on the date in question. The Schedule to the Fractional Rights Certificate the Supplier issued to Mr and Mrs P doesn’t contain any such guarantee. The date specified on the Schedule is 31 December 2033. Further, it says that the sales process will be started (not completed) on the Allocated Property on the Sale Date. The Fractional Club rules define the Sale Date as meaning “the date on which the sale process for an Allocated Property begins, as detailed in Rule 9 and in the Deed of Trust.” It follows I’m not minded to conclude that the Supplier misrepresented these aspects. Mr and Mrs P’s other concerns include that the Supplier failed to mention certain information at the Time of Sale. They say there was no clear indication as to the Supplier’s duty to actively market and sell the Allocated Property, that the sale could be postponed and that Mr and Mrs P would continue to incur management fees. They also say it wasn’t explained to them that the management fees could increase, and that they were misled about holiday availability and exclusivity. Such omissions and/or statements could amount to an unfair commercial practice and/or a breach of the Timeshare Regulations. So the issues raised are relevant to considering the fairness of the credit relationship between the Lender and Mr and Mrs P.

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That said, even if I were to accept what Mr and Mrs P say they were told about exclusivity, it’s not apparent from the PR’s submissions quite what difficulty Mr and Mrs P experienced as a result of discovering that non-members were able to book holidays at the Supplier’s resorts. They don’t suggest that they suffered any detriment, or that this was a material factor in their decision to purchase Fractional Club membership. I’m further conscious that the information Mr and Mrs P have said the Supplier failed to tell them is set out in the documents provided to them at the Time of Sale, and which the PR submitted to us when referring their complaint. This is consistent with the Timeshare Regulations requirement that key information is provided in writing. In addition, while I haven’t been provided with any details of unsuccessful holiday booking attempts by Mr and Mrs P, those same documents make clear that availability of bookings is not guaranteed. The number of documents Mr and Mrs P needed to read and sign do not appear to me to be particularly excessive, given the nature of the purchase they were making. The decision to lend to Mr and Mrs P The CONC provisions I’ve referenced set out steps lenders must take when considering whether to lend to customers. While I acknowledge what the PR has said, I don’t think it necessarily follows that I need to establish whether the appropriate checks were carried out by the Lender. That’s because even if I were to find that the Lender failed to do everything it should have when it agreed to lend (and I make no such finding), I would have to be satisfied that the money it lent to Mr and Mrs P was actually unaffordable before also concluding that they lost out as a result, and then consider whether the credit relationship with the Lender was unfair to them for this reason. But from the information provided, I am not satisfied that the lending was unaffordable for Mr and Mrs P. That isn’t something Mr and Mrs P have said or sought to demonstrate in any of their complaint correspondence. The only indication of issues arising from their ability to afford the loan payments seems to be from a period during 2016-17, when as I understand it, interest was suspended to facilitate lower monthly payments in response to a personal situation that had arisen. Noting that the payments subsequently resumed and have continued at the contractual level, I see no reason to investigate this aspect of the complaint further. I now turn to the suggestion that Fractional Club membership was marketed and sold to Mr and Mrs P as an investment in breach of prohibition against selling timeshares in that way. The Supplier’s alleged breach of Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations The Lender doesn’t dispute and I am satisfied that Mr and Mrs P’s Fractional Club membership met the definition of a “timeshare contract” and was a “regulated contract” for the purposes of the Timeshare Regulations.

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Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations prohibited the Supplier from marketing or selling Fractional Club membership as an investment. At the Time of Sale the provision said: “A trader must not market or sell a proposed timeshare contract or long-term holiday product contract as an investment if the proposed contract would be a regulated contract.” The PR and Mr and Mrs P say that the Supplier did exactly that at the Time of Sale – saying, in summary, that they were told by the Supplier that Fractional Club membership was the type of investment that would increase in value. The term “investment” isn’t defined in the Timeshare Regulations. But for the purposes of this provisional decision, and by reference to the decided authorities, an investment is a transaction in which money or other property is laid out in the expectation or hope of financial gain or profit. That Fractional Club membership included an investment element would not, itself, transgress the prohibition in Regulation 14(3). That provision prohibits the marketing and selling of a timeshare contract as an investment. It doesn’t prohibit the mere existence of an investment element in a timeshare contract or prohibit the marketing and selling of such a timeshare contract per se. In other words, the Timeshare Regulations did not ban products such as the Fractional Club. They just regulated how such products were marketed and sold. To conclude, therefore, that Fractional Club membership was marketed or sold to Mr and Mrs P as an investment in breach of Regulation 14(3), I have to be satisfied it was more likely than not that the Supplier marketed and/or sold membership to them as an investment; that is, told them or led them to believe that Fractional Club membership offered them the prospect of a financial gain (a profit) given the facts and circumstances of this complaint. Mr and Mrs P’s testimony is that the sales representative positioned Fractional Club membership as “an investment, in the context of not only getting luxury holidays every year, but getting money back, at the end of the term, and maybe get a profit, as property prices always tend to go up, especially in [the location of the Allocated Property].” I am conscious that the PR has said these are not Mr and Mrs P’s own words but a statement prepared on their behalf, noting that English is not their first language. I have borne this in mind when considering the extent to which I can rely on the precise detail of their statement. Despite the Supplier’s efforts to avoid specifically describing membership of the Fractional Club as an ‘investment’ or quantifying to prospective purchasers such as Mr and Mrs P, the financial value of their share in the net sales proceeds of the Allocated Property along with the investment considerations, risks and rewards attached to them, I accept the possibility that Fractional Club membership was marketed and sold to them as an investment in breach of Regulation 14(3). But if I am to conclude that a breach of Regulation 14(3) led to a credit relationship between Mr and Mrs P and the Lender that was unfair to them and warranted relief as a result, whether that breach led Mr and Mrs P to enter into the Purchase Agreement and the Credit Agreement is an important consideration.

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On my reading of the evidence before me, I’m not persuaded the prospect of a financial gain from Fractional Club membership was an important and motivating factor when Mr and Mrs P decided to go ahead with their purchase. That doesn’t mean they weren’t interested in a share in the Allocated Property. After all, that wouldn’t be surprising given the nature of the product at the centre of this complaint. But in their prepared statement Mr and Mrs P haven’t said anything that persuades me that the prospect of a financial gain was material to the decision they ultimately made. What they have said suggests to me they would have pressed ahead with their purchase whether or not there had been a breach of Regulation 14(3). And for that reason, I do not think the credit relationship between Mr and Mrs P and the Lender was unfair to them even if the Supplier had breached Regulation 14(3). Commission disclosure The PR says that a payment of commission from the Lender to the Supplier at the Time of Sale should lead me to uphold this complaint because, simply put, information in relation to that payment went undisclosed at the Time of Sale. As both sides already know, the Supreme Court handed down an important judgment on 1 August 2025 in a series of cases concerned with the issue of commission: Johnson v FirstRand Bank Ltd, Wrench v FirstRand Bank Ltd and Hopcraft v Close Brothers Ltd [2025] UKSC 33 (‘Hopcraft, Johnson and Wrench’). The Supreme Court ruled that, in each of the three cases, the commission payments made to car dealers by lenders were legal, as claims for the tort of bribery, or the dishonest assistance of a breach of fiduciary duty, had to be predicated on the car dealer owing a fiduciary duty to the consumer, which the car dealers did not owe. A ‘disinterested duty’, as described in Wood v Commercial First Business Ltd & ors and Business Mortgage Finance 4 plc v Pengelly [2021] EWCA Civ 471, is not enough. However, the Supreme Court held that the credit relationship between Mr Johnson and his lender was unfair under section 140A of the CCA because of the commission paid by the lender to the car dealer. The main reasons for coming to that conclusion included, amongst other things, the following factors: • The size of the commission (as a percentage of the total charge for credit). In Mr Johnson’s case it was 55%. This was “so high” and “a powerful indication that the relationship…was unfair”8; • The failure to disclose the commission; and • The concealment of the commercial tie between the car dealer and the lender. The Supreme Court also confirmed that the following factors, in what was a non- exhaustive list, will normally be relevant when assessing whether a credit relationship was/is unfair under Section 140A of the CCA: • The size of the commission as a proportion of the charge for credit; • The way in which commission is calculated (a discretionary commission arrangement, for example, may lead to higher interest rates); • The characteristics of the consumer; 8 Hopcraft, Johnson and Wrench – para 327

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• The extent of any disclosure and the manner of that disclosure (which, insofar as section 56 of the CCA is engaged, includes any disclosure by a supplier when acting as a broker); and • Compliance with the regulatory rules. From my reading of the Supreme Court’s judgment in Hopcraft, Johnson and Wrench, it sets out principles which apply to credit brokers other than car dealer–credit brokers. So, when considering allegations of undisclosed payments of commission like the one in this complaint, Hopcraft, Johnson and Wrench is relevant law that I’m required to take into account under DISP 3.6.4R. But I don’t think Hopcraft, Johnson and Wrench assists Mr and Mrs P in arguing that their credit relationship with the Lender was unfair to them for reasons relating to commission given the facts and circumstances of this complaint. Based on what I’ve seen so far, the Supplier’s role as a credit broker wasn’t a separate service and distinct from its role as the seller of timeshares. It was simply a means to an end in the Supplier’s overall pursuit of a successful timeshare sale. I can’t see that the Supplier gave an undertaking – either expressly or impliedly – to put to one side its commercial interests in pursuit of that goal when arranging the Credit Agreement. It wasn’t acting as Mr and Mrs P’s agent but as the supplier of contractual rights they obtained under the Purchase Agreement. So the transaction doesn’t strike me as one with features that suggest the Supplier had an obligation of ‘loyalty’ (and thus a fiduciary duty) to Mr and Mrs P when arranging the Credit Agreement. I recognise that the Lender was and is part of the same group of companies as the Supplier. And I accept the possibility that tie may not have been adequately disclosed at the Time of Sale. But I can’t currently see why that renders the credit relationship between Mr and Mrs P and the Lender unfair to them such that I should uphold the complaint. I say this because the Lender has explained that the Supplier would share finance proposals among its approved external finance partners; that the Supplier couldn’t write all its finance business ‘in-house’ [through the Lender], and that the Lender largely provided loans to customers whose circumstances fell outside of its external finance partners’ lending terms. I further note that in this case Mr and Mrs P obtained a loan with at least one other provider, in addition to the Lender agreeing the loan in question. I’m not persuaded that Mr and Mrs P were led into a credit agreement with the Lender because it was tied in some way to the Supplier. What’s more, in contrast to the facts of Mr Johnson’s case, I do not understand the Lender to have paid the Supplier any commission at the Time of Sale. And with that being the case, even if there were information failings at that time and regulatory failings as a result (which I make no formal finding on), I’m not currently persuaded that the commission arrangements between the Supplier and the Lender were likely to have led to a sufficiently extreme inequality of knowledge that rendered the credit relationship unfair to Mr and Mrs P such that they would be entitled to relief. Summary conclusion In conclusion, then, given all of the facts and circumstances of this complaint, I don’t think the credit relationship between the Lender and Mr and Mrs P was unfair to them for the purposes of section 140A. So I don’t propose to uphold this aspect of the complaint on that basis. Having taken everything into account, I see no reason why it would be fair or

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reasonable to direct the Lender to compensate Mr and Mrs P Responses to my provisional decision The Lender accepted my intended conclusions, saying it had nothing further to add. S, responding on Mr and Mrs P’s behalf, didn’t indicate whether or not they accepted the proposed outcome. Having received and reviewed what S has said, I’m conscious that it has focused solely on issues surrounding the provision of information, rather than the case merits. These include, among other things, requesting that the information we have received from the Lender be shared with it in full, and asking that we do not proceed with a decision before this is done and it has had an opportunity to make further submissions. Those requests are not specific to Mr and Mrs P’s case, and we have addressed them with S previously under separate correspondence. In light of this, and given that there is no other reason given as to why matters should be further delayed, I’ve concluded that it’s appropriate for me to proceed with my determination. The legal and regulatory context The legal and regulatory context that I think is relevant to this complaint has been shared in several hundred published decisions on very similar complaints, as well as in previous correspondence with the parties including my provisional decision. So there’s no need for me to set this out again in detail here. I simply remind the parties that our rules9 say in considering what is fair and reasonable in all the circumstances of the complaint, I will take into account: relevant (i) law and regulations; (ii) regulators’ rules, guidance and standards; and (iii) codes of practice; and (where appropriate), what I consider to have been good industry practice at the relevant time. What I’ve decided – and why I’ve considered all the available evidence and arguments to decide what’s fair and reasonable in the circumstances of this complaint. After considering the case afresh and having regard for what’s been said in response to my provisional decision, I find it offers no persuasive reason to depart from the conclusions I’ve previously set out. I’ll explain why. Mr and Mrs P’s section 75 claim S originally raised various points of complaint, such as those giving rise to Mr and Mrs P’s section 75 claim, which I addressed in my provisional decision. In its response, it hasn’t made any further comments in relation to my conclusion in respect of that claim. It follows that I don’t uphold this aspect of the complaint, for the reasons I set out in my provisional decision and which I adopt as part of this final decision. 9 Financial Conduct Authority (“FCA”) Handbook – DISP 3.6.4R (“R” denotes a rule).

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Mr and Mrs P’s section 140A claim As I’ve noted, S’s response to my provisional decision has focused on its requests for information and for resolution of the complaint to be paused. Although S has in my view had ample opportunity to make submissions in respect of my findings and intended conclusions on Mr and Mrs P’s complaint, nothing S has said or provided in response gives me cause to reach a different conclusion from that set out in my provisional decision. Given all of the factors I’ve looked at in this part of my decision, and having taken all of them into account, I remain unpersuaded that the credit relationship between Mr and Mrs P and the Lender under the Credit Agreement and related Purchase Agreement was unfair to them such that it warrants the Lender offering any redress. So again, I am adopting my provisional findings on this aspect in full in this final decision. Summary Having taken everything into account, I see no reason why it would be fair or reasonable to direct the Lender to compensate Mr and Mrs P. My findings are that: • the Lender did not act unfairly or unreasonably when it dealt with Mr and Mrs P’s section 75 claim; and • I am not persuaded that the Lender was party to a credit relationship with Mr and Mrs P under the Credit Agreement that was unfair to them for the purposes of section 140A of the CCA. My final decision For the reasons set out here and in my provisional decision, my final decision is that I don’t uphold this complaint. Under the rules of the Financial Ombudsman Service, I’m required to ask Mr P and Mrs P to accept or reject my decision before 22 April 2026. Niall Taylor Ombudsman

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