Clydesdale Financial Services Limited · DRN-6075028

The complaint Mrs H and Mr M’s complaint is, in essence, that Clydesdale Financial Services Limited trading as Barclays Partner Finance acted unfairly and unreasonably by (1) being party to an unfair credit relationship with them under section 140A of the Consumer Credit Act 1974 (as amended) (the ‘CCA’) and (2) deciding against paying a claim under section 75 of the CCA. What happened Mrs H and Mr M were existing members of a scheme run by a timeshare provider “C”. On 30 May 2016 (the ‘Time of Sale’) they entered into an agreement with C (the ‘Purchase Agreement’) for membership of C’s ‘Signature Collection’. Under the Purchase Agreement they acquired 2,200 fractional points – the equivalent of one week’s fractional rights. They paid for Signature Collection membership in part by trading-in their existing ‘Fractional Club’ membership at a value of £9,750. And Mrs H and Mr M took out finance totalling £24,096 with Barclays Partner Finance (the ‘Credit Agreement’). A large proportion of this was consolidation of the finance used to fund their original Fractional Club membership. Signature Collection membership was asset backed giving Mrs H and Mr M more than just holiday rights. It also included a share in the net sale proceeds of a property named on the Purchase Agreement (the ‘Allocated Property’) after their membership term ended. Mrs H and Mr M subsequently authorised a professional representative “M” to act for them in pursuing a claim in relation to the Signature Collection purchase. M wrote to Barclays Partner Finance on 25 April 2024 (the “Letter of Complaint”) to complain about misrepresentations, omissions and unfair sales practices by C at the Time of Sale relevant to Mrs H and Mr M’s decision to purchase membership and the associated finance. M argued that these matters gave rise to an unfair credit relationship between Mrs H and Mr M and Barclays Partner Finance pursuant to section 140A of the CCA. It said that this, as well as the connected lender liability provisions of section 75, made Barclays Partner Finance liable to compensate Mrs H and Mr M. The Letter of Complaint raised several points in relation to C’s pre-contractual acts and omissions at the Time of Sale, as well as a post- contractual breach, all of which I’ve summarised below: • C made a statement to Mrs H and Mr M that the purchase was a share of a property and would be an investment that would increase in value. This was both untrue and a breach of relevant regulations governing the sale of timeshares. • C told Mrs H and Mr M that Signature Collection membership gave them access to the holiday apartments at any time all year round. • the Purchase Agreement contained unfair terms that would apply in the event of Mrs H and Mr M’s default. • C’s sales companies went into liquidation, affecting any claim that might be brought against them.

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• the way C was structured meant its sales team acted as unauthorised credit intermediaries, and the decision to lend was irresponsible because C and Barclays Partner Finance didn’t carry out the right creditworthiness assessment. • C failed to provide Mrs H and Mr M with key information or to explain maintenance charges, rushing Mrs H and Mr M into signing documents at the end of a long sales meeting, without being given time to consider the timeshare contract properly. • C failed to disclose commission it would receive from Barclays Partner Finance in relation to the arrangement of credit. Along with the Letter of Complaint, M submitted training materials it said C used in relation to the sale. M didn’t receive a reply from Barclays Partner Finance, which says it has no record of receiving the claim. On Mrs H and Mr M’s behalf, on 28 October 2024 M referred the complaint to our service. Our investigator concluded that the circumstances averred in the Letter of Complaint didn’t give rise to an unfair credit relationship between Mrs H and Mr M and Barclays Partner Finance, saying that in his opinion: • he wasn’t persuaded that C said anything that amounted to an actionable misrepresentation over the nature of the timeshare arrangements or availability of accommodation. It was also possible that Barclays Partner Finance would have a defence to the section 75 claim under the Limitation Act 1980. • whether or not suitable creditworthiness checks were undertaken at the Time of Sale, there was no reason to think that the borrowing was unaffordable for Mrs H and Mr M, or that the decision to lend resulted in an unfair credit relationship. Nor had it been shown that C and its sales staff lacked the appropriate permission to act as a credit intermediary. • he wasn’t persuaded C’s marketing and sales practices or any of the alleged shortcomings in costs, commission, or other information disclosure, were likely to have prejudiced the decision Mrs H and Mr M made to purchase membership. • the amount of commission Barclays Partner Finance paid C as a proportion of the cost of credit was relatively low, such that it was unlikely to have led to them making a different purchase decision. Also, C’s role in matters didn’t give rise to a fiduciary duty owed by it towards Mrs H and Mr M. • there was nothing to indicate C had applied terms unfairly against Mrs H and Mr M, or that the liquidation of its sales companies had resulted in any unfairness in the credit relationship between them and Barclays Partner Finance. M disagreed with the investigator’s assessment. It asked for an ombudsman to review and determine matters. M’s response focused on the argument that C had breached relevant regulation by marketing and selling Signature Collection membership as an investment. Citing R (on the application of Shawbrook Bank Ltd) v Financial Ombudsman Service Ltd and R (on the application of Clydesdale Financial Services Ltd (t/a Barclays Partner Finance)) v Financial Ombudsman Service [2023] EWHC 1069 (Admin), M said: “On the basis of the evidence in this case, it is clear that the investment element of the product was both marketed and / or sold to our clients and that it clearly contributed to their decision to purchase the product. The Purchase Agreement (including the Information Statement and the witness statement) clearly establish the fact that the fractional ownership was marketed and sold as an investment, in breach of Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations, that this

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conduct was causative of the legal relations entered into i.e. the timeshare and the loan and that it therefore created an unfair relationship pursuant to s140 CCA 1974.” On the subject of commission, M added that it believed it would be unreasonable to make a decision in the absence of the commercial agreement between C and Barclays Partner Finance, which it said it and we had not seen. Relevant law and regulations In considering what is fair and reasonable in all the circumstances of the complaint, I am required under DISP 3.6.4R to take into account: relevant (i) law and regulations; (ii) regulators’ rules, guidance and standards; and (iii) codes of practice; and (where appropriate), what I consider to have been good industry practice at the relevant time. Matters of relevance to this complaint include: • Relevant Financial Conduct Authority (“FCA”) rules and guidance as set out in the FCA Handbook, including the Consumer Credit Sourcebook (“CONC”). • The CCA (including section 56, section 75, and sections 140A-140C). • The law on misrepresentation. • The Timeshare, Holiday Products, Resale and Exchange Contracts Regulations 2010 (“the Timeshare Regulations”). • The Consumer Rights Act 2015 (“the CRA”). • The Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008 (“CPUT”). • Case law on Section 140A of the CCA – including, in particular: • The Supreme Court’s judgment in Plevin v Paragon Personal Finance Ltd [2014] UKSC 61 (“Plevin”), which remains the leading case in this area. • Scotland v British Credit Trust [2014] EWCA Civ 790 (“Scotland and Reast”). • Patel v Patel [2009] EWHC 3264 (QB) (“Patel”). • The Supreme Court’s judgment in Smith v Royal Bank of Scotland Plc [2023] UKSC 34 (“Smith”). • Carney v NM Rothschild & Sons Ltd [2018] EWHC 958 (“Carney”). • Kerrigan v Elevate Credit International Ltd [2020] EWHC 2169 (Comm) (“Kerrigan”). • R (on the application of Shawbrook Bank Ltd) v Financial Ombudsman Service Ltd and R (on the application of Clydesdale Financial Services Ltd (t/a Barclays Partner Finance)) v Financial Ombudsman Service [2023] EWHC 1069 (Admin) (“Shawbrook & BPF v FOS”). • Johnson v FirstRand Bank Ltd, Wrench v FirstRand Bank Ltd and Hopcraft v Close Brothers Ltd [2025] UKSC 33 (“Hopcraft, Johnson and Wrench”). Noting the aspects of the complaint relating to payment of commission, the following regulatory rules/guidance1 are also potentially relevant: • The Consumer Credit Sourcebook (“CONC”)2 content at the material time, notably CONC 3.7.3R, CONC 4.5.3R, and CONC 4.5.2G. • Principles 6,7, and 8 of the FCA’s Principles for Businesses (“PRIN”)3. 1 In the FCA Handbook “R” denotes a rule; “G” denotes guidance. 2 The relevant rules, guidance and principles can be found in the FCA Handbook, available on its website.

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CONC provisions sit alongside firms’ wider obligations such as those in PRIN. Good industry practice – the RDO Code The Timeshare Regulations provided a regulatory framework. But I’m also required to take into account, when appropriate, what I consider to have been good industry practice at the relevant time – which, in this complaint, includes the Resort Development Organisation’s Code of Conduct dated 1 January 2010 (the “RDO Code”). What I’ve decided – and why I’ve considered all the available evidence and arguments to decide what’s fair and reasonable in the circumstances of this complaint. M’s response to the investigator’s assessment relates primarily to the issue of whether the credit relationship between Mrs H and Mr M and Barclays Partner Finance was unfair per section 140A of the CCA on the grounds of whether membership was sold to them as an investment at the Time of Sale. But for completeness, I will also set out here my conclusions on the other aspects of Mrs H and Mr M’s complaint. My reasons for those conclusions are the same as those reached by our investigator, but where appropriate I have sought to provide further context. Section 75: C’s alleged misrepresentations at the Time of Sale The CCA introduced a regime of connected lender liability under section 75 that affords consumers (“debtors”) a right of recourse against lenders that provide the finance for the acquisition of goods or services from third-party merchants (“suppliers”) in the event that there is an actionable misrepresentation and/or breach of contract by the supplier. In short, a claim against Barclays Partner Finance made under section 75 essentially mirrors the claim Mrs H and Mr M could make against C. Certain conditions must be met for section 75 to apply including, for instance, the cash price of the purchase and the nature of the arrangements between the parties involved in the transaction. Those conditions are met in this case. Although M (on behalf of Mrs H and Mr M) included in its submissions several examples of what it considered to be C’s misrepresentations, I’m not persuaded any of the points it has made could reasonably meet the definition of a false statement of fact (or law) necessary to an actionable claim in misrepresentation. Some of what M describes as misrepresentations are really mere statements of opinion, or allegations of acts or omissions that would not be covered by a section 75 claim. I’ve not seen sufficient information to suggest Signature Collection membership was described as having unlimited availability, or that it guaranteed Mrs H and Mr M would be able to book whenever and wherever they wanted. Rather, the information seems to suggest members would have to book in advance and holidays would be subject to availability. Like any holiday accommodation, availability was not unlimited – given the higher demand at peak times, like school holidays, for instance. And the sales paperwork Mrs H and Mr M signed states that the availability of holidays was subject to demand. Overall I’m not persuaded that C misled Mrs H and Mr M or breached the terms of the Purchase Agreement in this respect. 3 Ibid.

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Section 75: summary conclusion Taking all of this into account, I don’t think Barclays Partner Finance unfairly or unreasonably declined Mrs H and Mr M compensation for the misrepresentations they say it is liable for under section 75. Section 140A of the CCA While I’ve set out my conclusions on Mrs H and Mr M’s misrepresentation claims in the context of section 75, I have also considered whether they have a bearing on whether what was said and/or done by C at the Time of Sale could give rise to an unfair credit relationship between Mrs H and Mr M and Barclays Partner Finance under section 140A of the CCA. And there are other aspects of the sales process that have been expressed as a cause for Mrs H and Mr M’s dissatisfaction. I will explore these with section 140A in mind. Under section 140A, a debtor-creditor relationship can be found to have been or be unfair to the debtor because of one or more of the following: the terms of the credit agreement itself; how the creditor exercised or enforced its rights under the agreement; and any other thing done (or not done) by, or on behalf of, the creditor (either before or after the making of the agreement or any related agreement). Such a finding may also be based on the terms of any related agreement (which here, includes the Purchase Agreement) and, in light of section 56 of the CCA, on anything done or not done by the supplier on the creditor’s behalf before the making of the credit agreement or any related agreement. In this respect M has made the series of assertions that I have listed. But having considered the entirety of the credit relationship between Mrs H and Mr M and Barclays Partner Finance along with all of the relevant circumstances, like our investigator I’m not minded to conclude that the credit relationship between them was likely to have been rendered unfair for the purposes of section 140A for any of the reasons M suggested. In carrying out my review, I’ve looked at: • the standard of C’s commercial conduct – which includes its sales and marketing practices at the Time of Sale along with any relevant training material; • the provision of information by C at the Time of Sale, including the contractual documentation and disclaimers made by C; • evidence provided by both parties on what was likely to have been said and/or done at the Time of Sale; and • the inherent probabilities of the sale given its circumstances. I’ve then considered the impact of these on the fairness of the credit relationship between Mrs H and Mr M and Barclays Partner Finance. Despite the breadth of the unfair credit relationship test under section 140A, it isn’t something that arises simply because of a breach of a legal or equitable duty. As the Supreme Court said in Plevin (at paragraph 17): “Section 140A…does not impose any obligation and is not concerned with the question whether the creditor or anyone else is in breach of a duty. It is concerned with…whether the creditor’s relationship with the debtor was unfair.”

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Instead, the Supreme Court said in Plevin that the protection afforded to debtors by section 140A is the consequence of all of the relevant facts. I’ve borne this in mind when considering the points Mrs H and Mr M and M have made. Provision of key information I’m conscious that the information M has said C failed to tell Mrs H and Mr M is set out in the documents provided to them at the Time of Sale. This is consistent with the Timeshare Regulations requirement that key information is provided in writing. And while there was a good deal of paperwork C gave to Mrs H and Mr M, the number of documents they needed to read and sign doesn’t appear to me to be particularly excessive, given the nature of the purchase they were making. Unfair contract terms The Letter of Complaint asserted that the contractual terms included unfair default provisions. To conclude that a term in the Purchase Agreement rendered the credit relationship between Mrs H and Mr M and Barclays Partner Finance unfair to them, I’d have to see that the term was unfair under the CRA and operated against Mrs H and Mr M in practice. I note the judge in the case on which M has based this aspect of the complaint attached importance to the question of how an unfair term had been operated in practice4: So I don’t think the mere presence of a contractual term that was/is potentially unfair is likely to lead to an unfair credit relationship unless it was applied in practice. I’ve seen nothing in M’s submissions to suggest that there have been any real-world consequences, in terms of harm or prejudice to Mrs H and Mr M, that have flowed from such a term. With that in mind, it seems unlikely to me that the contract term M cited has led to any unfairness in the credit relationship between Mrs H and Mr M and Barclays Partner Finance for the purposes of section 140A of the CCA. I say this because I cannot see that the term was actually operated against Mrs H and Mr M, let alone unfairly. I haven’t seen anything to suggest that there are any other reasons why the credit relationship between Barclays Partner Finance and Mrs H and Mr M was unfair to them because of an information failing by C, I’m not persuaded it was. Liquidation In my opinion, the point about liquidation, adds little (if anything) of value to the claim that was submitted. Despite what M says, I don’t think C’s sales companies going into liquidation means that Mrs H and Mr M won’t get what they’re entitled to under the Purchase Agreement. In other words, this doesn’t affect fulfilling its contract, and/or Barclays Partner Finance fulfilling its obligations. Barclays Partner Finance’s lending activity M says that the right checks weren’t carried out before Barclays Partner Finance lent to Mrs H and Mr M. Like our investigator, I haven’t seen anything to persuade me that was the case in this complaint given its circumstances. Even if I were to find that Barclays Partner Finance and/or C failed to do everything it should have when considering the lending proposition (and I make no such finding), I’d have to be satisfied that the money Barclays Partner Finance lent to Mrs H and Mr M was actually unaffordable before also concluding 4 see Link Financial v Wilson [2014] EWHC 252 (Ch) para 46.

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that they lost out as a result, and then consider whether that rendered unfair Mrs H and Mr M’s credit relationship with Barclays Partner Finance. But M has said nothing about why the lending was unaffordable for Mrs H and Mr M, given their financial circumstances at the time, nor about how they might have lost out as a result of the lending decision. And from the information provided, I’m not persuaded the lending was unaffordable for Mrs H and Mr M. Connected to this is the suggestion by M that the Credit Agreement was arranged by an unauthorised credit broker, the upshot of which is to suggest that Barclays Partner Finance wouldn’t be permitted to enforce the Credit Agreement. However, it looks to me like Mrs H and Mr M knew, among other things, how much they were borrowing and repaying each month, who they were borrowing from and that they were borrowing money to pay for Signature Collection membership. So this aspect doesn’t appear to have put Mrs H and Mr M at any disadvantage. Even if the Credit Agreement was arranged by a broker that didn’t have the necessary permission to do so (which I make no formal finding on), it isn’t for me to declare the Credit Agreement unenforceable. That is a matter for a court to decide in the event that Barclays Partner Finance at some point seeks to take enforcement action against Mrs H and Mr M. C’s alleged breach of Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations prohibited C from marketing or selling Signature Collection membership as an investment. At the Time of Sale this provision said: “A trader must not market or sell a proposed timeshare contract or long-term holiday product contract as an investment if the proposed contract would be a regulated contract.” The term ‘investment’ isn’t defined in the Timeshare Regulations. But for the purposes of this provisional decision, and by reference to the decided authorities5, I will define an investment as being a transaction in which money or other property is laid out in the expectation or hope of financial gain or profit. I accept it’s possible that Signature Collection membership was marketed and/or sold to Mrs H and Mr M as an investment, in breach of Regulation 14(3). But that doesn’t mean that it’s probable (that is, that it’s more likely than not that C marketed and/or sold membership as an investment). I can see how the training documents and C’s sales process left open the possibility that the sales representative may have positioned Signature Collection membership as an investment that offered them the prospect of a financial gain (a profit). But it is also clear from the sales documents Mrs H and Mr M signed that C made efforts to avoid specifically describing membership of the Signature Collection as an ‘investment’ or quantifying to prospective purchasers such as Mrs H and Mr M, the financial value of her share in the net sales proceeds of the Allocated Property along with the investment considerations, risks and rewards attached to them. Even if Signature Collection membership was marketed and sold to Mrs H and Mr M as an investment in breach of Regulation 14(3), I must return to the point made in Plevin, which makes clear that regulatory breaches do not automatically create unfairness for the purposes of that provision. Such breaches and their consequences (if there are any) must be 5 Shawbrook & BPF v FOS.

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considered in the round, rather than in a narrow or technical way. Relevant case law6 indicates that in considering the question of relief for any resultant unfairness in the credit relationship, I need to take into account any material impact of such a breach on Mrs H and Mr M’s decision whether to enter into the Purchase and Credit Agreements. In its response to the investigator’s assessment M has referred to the way in which C described membership as an investment. It has highlighted Mrs H and Mr M’s recollection that: “He [C’s representative] told us there was a new level of accommodation available called Signature Collection which would work so much better for us because the fractional ownership is an investment that at a later date is sold at which point we receive a percentage of any profits achieved.” M suggests this confirms Mrs H and Mr M’s motivation to be the investment, as was marketed to them. Respectfully, I don’t share M’s interpretation. I would remind M that Mrs H and Mr M were already fractional owners from their existing membership. There isn’t anything in this statement that in my view amounts to them saying they decided to buy Signature Collection membership because it offered potential for greater profit than their current membership. I don’t think a reasonable reading of what Mrs H and Mr M said in their witness statement leads to such a conclusion. Having examined Mrs H and Mr M’s statement, I’m afraid I don’t find the evidence sufficiently persuasive that what they say they were told about membership being an investment affected their purchase decision. So whether or not C marketed or sold Signature Collection membership to Mrs H and Mr M as an investment in breach of Regulation 14(3), I’m not persuaded Mrs H and Mr M’s decision to make the purchase was prompted by the prospect of a financial gain. It follows that I find the credit relationship between Mrs H and Mr M and Barclays Partner Finance was not for this reason rendered unfair to them. Mrs H and Mr M’s complaint about commission The other expressed concerns M has made on behalf of Mrs H and Mr M relate to payments of commission by Barclays Partner Finance to C for acting as a credit broker and arranging the Credit Agreement. My reading of the Supreme Court’s judgment in Hopcraft, Johnson and Wrench is that it sets out principles which can apply to credit brokers other than car dealer–credit brokers. So I’ve taken into account those principles when considering the allegations of undisclosed payments of commission in this complaint. In Hopcraft, Johnson and Wrench the Supreme Court ruled that, in each of the three cases, commission payments made to car dealers by lenders were legal, as claims for the tort of bribery, or the dishonest assistance of a breach of fiduciary duty, had to be predicated on the car dealer owing a fiduciary duty to the consumer, which the car dealers did not owe. A “disinterested duty”, as described in Wood v Commercial First Business Ltd & ors and Business Mortgage Finance 4 plc v Pengelly [2021] EWCA Civ 471, is not enough. However, the Supreme Court held that the credit relationship between the lender and Mr Johnson was unfair under section 140A of the CCA because of the commission paid by the lender to the car dealer. The main reasons for coming to that conclusion included, amongst other things, the following factors: 6 Carney and Kerrigan.

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• The size of the commission (as a percentage of the total charge for credit). In Mr Johnson’s case it was 55%. This was “so high” and “a powerful indication that the relationship…was unfair”7; • The failure to disclose the commission; and • The concealment of the commercial tie between the car dealer and the lender. The Supreme Court also confirmed that the following factors, in what was a non-exhaustive list, will normally be relevant when assessing whether a credit relationship was/is unfair under section 140A of the CCA: • The size of the commission as a proportion of the charge for credit; • The way in which commission is calculated (a discretionary commission arrangement, • for example, may lead to higher interest rates); • The characteristics of the consumer; • The extent of any disclosure and the manner of that disclosure (which, insofar as section 56 of the CCA is engaged, includes any disclosure by a supplier when acting as a broker); and • Compliance with the regulatory rules. I’ve noted M’s submission that it would be unreasonable to make a decision absent the disclosure of any commercial agreement between Barclays Partner Finance and C. Again, I don’t share M’s position. In the absence of persuasive evidence that they were tied to one another contractually or commercially in a way that wasn’t properly disclosed to Mrs H and Mr M, I think it is reasonable to proceed with my decision on the basis that this hasn’t been demonstrated to be the case. Similarly, I haven’t seen anything that persuades me that the commission arrangements between them gave C a choice over the interest rate that led Mrs H and Mr M into a credit agreement that cost disproportionately more than it otherwise could have. I recognise that it’s possible Barclays Partner Finance and C failed to follow the regulatory guidance in place at the Time of Sale insofar as it was relevant to disclosing the commission arrangements between them. But as I’ve already noted, case law on section 140A makes clear that regulatory breaches do not automatically lead to an unfair credit relationship, and that such breaches and any consequences must be considered in the round rather than in a narrow or technical way. With that being the case, even if Barclays Partner Finance and C failed to follow the relevant regulatory guidance at the Time of Sale, I’m not minded to think any such failure is itself a reason to find the credit relationship in question unfair to Mrs H and Mr M. I say this for the following reasons. In contrast to the facts in Mr Johnson’s case, the amount of commission paid by Barclays Partner Finance to C for arranging Mrs H and Mr M’s Credit Agreement wasn’t high. At £602.40, it was 2.5% of the amount borrowed and only 2.32% as a proportion of the charge for credit, which is the calculation the Supreme Court used. Had Mrs H and Mr M known at the Time of Sale that C was going to be paid a flat rate of commission at this level, I’m not persuaded that they either wouldn’t have understood that or 7 Hopcroft, Johnson and Wrench (para 327).

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would have otherwise questioned the size of the payment at that time. After all, Mrs H and Mr M wanted Signature Collection membership and had no obvious means of their own to pay for it. And at such a low level, the impact of commission on the cost of the credit they needed for a timeshare they wanted doesn’t strike me as disproportionate. So, I think they would still have taken out the loan to fund their purchase at the Time of Sale had the amount of commission been disclosed. What’s more, based on what I’ve seen so far, C’s role as a credit broker wasn’t a separate service and distinct from its role as the seller of timeshares. It was simply a means to an end in C’s overall pursuit of a successful timeshare sale. I can’t see that C gave an undertaking – either expressly or impliedly – to put to one side its commercial interests in pursuit of that goal when arranging the Credit Agreement. As it wasn’t acting as an agent of Mrs H and Mr M but as the supplier of contractual rights they obtained under the Purchase Agreement, the transaction doesn’t strike me as one with features that suggest C had an obligation of ‘loyalty’ to Mrs H and Mr M (and thus a fiduciary duty) when arranging the Credit Agreement. After careful consideration, I don’t think Hopcraft, Johnson and Wrench assists Mrs H and Mr M in arguing that their credit relationship with Barclays Partner Finance was unfair to them for reasons relating to commission, given the facts and circumstances of this complaint. Section 140A: summary conclusion Given all of the facts and circumstances of this complaint, I don’t find there is persuasive evidence to support a conclusion that the credit relationship between Barclays Partner Finance and Mrs H and Mr M was unfair to them for the purposes of section 140A. So I don’t propose to uphold this aspect of the complaint. My final decision My final decision is that I don’t uphold this complaint. Under the rules of the Financial Ombudsman Service, I’m required to ask Mrs H and Mr M to accept or reject my decision before 20 April 2026. Niall Taylor Ombudsman

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