Barclays Bank UK PLC · DRN-6020405

The complaint Mr R is unhappy that Barclays Bank UK PLC (Barclays) won’t reimburse money he lost to a scam. What happened The background to this complaint is well known to both parties, so I won’t repeat everything here. In summary, Mr R has explained that in January 2025 he made payments from his Barclays account which he ultimately lost to an impersonation scam. Mr R advised he received calls from people advising they were calling from His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs and the Ministry of Justice (who I will refer to as the ‘scammer’ or ‘scammers’). The scammers told him that his funds were at risk and that he could face prosecution and further legal action if he failed to cooperate. He was sent documentation by the scammers and told he needed to move his funds to a ‘safe account’. Mr R transferred funds from his Barclays Individual Savings Account (ISA) to his Barclays current account. He then moved the funds into another account in his name (which I will refer to as “X”). Mr R then sent the funds from his X account into the control of the scammers. The crux of his complaint concerns the funds transferred out of his ISA for around £6,600. Mr R raised a complaint with Barclays. It agreed that is ISA account had a withdrawal restriction in place and that it shouldn’t have allowed the withdrawals completed in January 2025 to take place. It offered £100 compensation for this mistake. However, it also explained that the funds had been sent to an account in Mr R’s name, so he remained in possession of them and that it wasn’t responsible for any loss after the transfers. So, Mr R brought his complaint to our service. Our Investigator looked into the complaint but didn’t uphold it. He explained that Barclays had discussed a transfer made in relation to the scam with Mr R and he had provided inaccurate information about the payment. This stopped Barclays from uncovering the scam. He also explained that X had also intervened on several payments and that Mr R had provided inaccurate information to it. So, he didn’t think Barclays could have prevented the scam if it had done more at the time. The Investigator also advised that Barclays had increased its offer to £200 for the ISA withdrawals which the Investigator thought was fair. The Investigator reiterated that Barclays had acted reasonably to the risks identified with the payments. So, he didn’t think it should be responsible for the loss of his ISA funds. Mr R didn’t agree with the outcome, so his complaint has been passed to me for review and a final decision. What I’ve decided – and why I’ve considered all the available evidence and arguments to decide what’s fair and

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reasonable in the circumstances of this complaint. Mr R has referred to other outcomes involving scams. I can understand why he would think it has similarities to his complaint, but we look at complaints on a case-by-case basis and consider the unique circumstances of each case before reaching a decision. I’m sorry to learn about what happened to Mr R and the impact this has had on him. However, I’ve come to the same outcome as the Investigator for largely the same reasons. I’ll explain why. I’m aware that I’ve summarised this complaint briefly, in less detail than has been provided, and in my own words. No discourtesy is intended by this. Instead, I’ve focussed on what I think is the heart of the matter here. If there’s something I have not mentioned, it isn’t because I have ignored it. I haven’t. I’m satisfied that I don’t need to comment on every individual point or argument to be able to reach what I think is the right outcome. Our rules allow me to do this. This simply reflects the informal nature of our service as a free alternative to the courts. In broad terms, the starting position in law is that a bank is expected to process payments and withdrawals that a customer authorises it to make. It isn’t disputed that Mr R knowingly made the payments from his account – albeit under the direction of the scammer – and so, I’m satisfied he authorised them. Therefore, under the Payment Services Regulations 2017 and the terms of his account, Barclays is expected to process Mr R’s payments, and he is presumed liable for the loss in the first instance. But in some situations, it might be appropriate for Barclays to take a closer look at the circumstances of the payments – for example, if it ought to be alert to a fraud risk, because the transaction is unusual, or looks out of character or suspicious. And if so, it should intervene, for example, by contacting the customer directly, before releasing the payments. This is to help protect customers from the possibility of financial harm from fraud. But I’d expect any intervention to be proportionate to the circumstances of the payment. Barclays recognised that some of the payments Mr R was making were high risk and provided him with advice and warnings to try and protect him from being scammed. It spoke to him on one of the payments he made and queried why he was transferring payments to X in the way he was. Mr R has argued that his ISA withdrawals had no connection with the call made by Barclays. But the ISA funds were transferred as part of the scam so it wouldn’t be fair to ignore what happened around the time. It is important to look at all the discussions and actions taken by Barclays around the scam period to decide whether it acted fairly and whether any further action is needed. I’m satisfied that Barclays asked questions to work out the reasons for the payment in its call with Mr R and probed him based on the responses he provided. I’ve highlighted some of the key messages shared in the call below. • Mr R confirmed he had held the account with X since October 2022. It asked him to provide the account details so that it could run some checks. • It queried why he needed to send the funds to X and why he couldn’t transfer any funds directly from his Barclays account. It highlighted that transferring it over to X could mean that it wouldn’t be able to provide any support if it later turned out to be a scam. • It queried if he was sending the funds over for a legitimate purpose and asked whether it involved any fraudulent activity. It highlighted that the scams Barclays saw

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were highly professional and, in some cases, involved people requesting customers to move money out of their accounts. It explained that scammers can appear genuine, telling you to transfer money for legitimate purposes but it turns out to be a scam. • Barclays reminded Mr R to answer truthfully and think about why he was making the transfer as once it went through there was no guarantee it could recover the money for him. • It queried if anyone was forcing him to make the payments. He confirmed that he wasn’t being forced. • It highlighted some of the recent payments he had made to X and asked why he had sent them. He advised he had moved money like this previously and that he uses his X account abroad when travelling. It’s clear that Mr R provided incorrect information when questioned. He didn’t highlight the true purpose for the funds or that he was being asked to them by a government organisation to avoid further repercussions. He didn’t highlight that he risked prosecution if he didn’t follow the scammer’s instructions, that he was being pressured or that some of the warnings Barclays shared were relevant to his circumstances. If he had highlighted some of this information, then I think Barclays would have identified he was falling for a common scam type and taken further steps to protect him. Unfortunately, Barclays were prevented from knowing the true circumstances around the payment so, I don’t think it acted unreasonably by providing the scam warnings it did. Overall, it asked proportionate questions based on the answers Mr R provided. Some of the warnings Barclays provided should have prompted him to question the legitimacy of what he was being asked to do. Unfortunately, I think Mr R was sadly very much under the spell of the scammers and believed that he was speaking to legitimate individuals. He was moving payments between his accounts as part of this scam which demonstrates that he was determined to follow the scammers instructions. He also provided inaccurate information when making payments from X in relation to the scam. So, based on Mr R’s responses to Barclays, the responses he provided to X and the level of control the scammer seemed to have, on balance, I don’t think Mr R would have revealed much around the circumstances of the payments if Barclays had probed further. On balance, I believe that Mr R would have continued providing information in line with the advice provided by the scammer or in a way which allowed the payments to go through. In those circumstances I don’t think it would be fair to ask Barclays to do anything further. Barclays made an offer to pay Mr R £200 for allowing Mr R to remove more than three withdrawals from his ISA when it restricted such withdrawals. I have thought about this point carefully and considered whether Barclays should increase this offer. In the overall circumstances I don’t think it would be fair or reasonable to do so. Barclays questioned Mr R about the payments he was attempting to make to reduce the risk of him falling victim to a scam. It also provided warnings relevant to his circumstances which were proportionate to the risks it identified. However, he failed to mitigate any potential losses by providing misleading information when queried about the payments. If he had highlighted some of the red flags, mentioned above, then the losses he suffered could have been prevented. It wouldn’t be fair to say an error in Barclays’s systems should result in them covering all losses Mr R suffered when it did attempt to mitigate his losses by intervening appropriately. So, I won’t be holding Barclays responsible for any additional losses as a result of the withdrawals. Mr R should contact Barclays directly if he now wishes to accept the offer made. I have noted the comments Mr R has made regarding Barclays’s obligations following the introduction of the Consumer Duty. But I’m not persuaded this changes the outcome here.

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While Barclays is expected to avoid causing him foreseeable harm, I’m not persuaded its actions were the main cause of the harm he has said he suffered, nor do I think that harm was reasonably foreseeable given the information that was available to Barclays at the time he made the payments. I have also considered whether Barclays could have done anything to recover Mr R’s payments once the scam was uncovered, but because the payments were sent to another account in Mr R’s name, and then on to the scam, it wouldn’t have been possible for Barclays to recover them. I’m sorry to hear Mr R suffered a financial loss as a result of what happened and the impact the loss has had on him. But it would only be fair for me to direct Barclays to refund his loss if I thought it was responsible – and I’m not persuaded that this was the case. For the above reasons, I think Barclays has acted fairly and so I’m not going to tell it to do anything further. My final decision I don’t think Barclays needs to do anything to settle the complaint. Under the rules of the Financial Ombudsman Service, I’m required to ask Mr R to accept or reject my decision before 20 April 2026. Aleya Khanom Ombudsman

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