Timandeep Singh Gill v Information Commissioner & Anor

Introduction

1. This is an appeal against a decision of the Information Commissioner (“the Commissioner”) dated 19 May 2025 referenced IC-349744-Z5M5 (“the Decision Notice”). The appeal concerns requests for information made by the Appellant to Kent Police under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (“FOIA”). Procedural Matters

2. The hearing was conducted remotely by online video (cloud video platform). The Tribunal was satisfied that it was fair and just to conduct the hearing in this way.

3. There is no ‘closed’ bundle. All our reasons are set out within this single, open decision.

4. The Appellant attended the hearing in person. Before the hearing, the Tribunal issued a pre-hearing note to facilitate the Appellant’s participation and to address his reasonable adjustments. Kent Police was represented by Edmund Garnett, Counsel, instructed by Giovanni Cacciacarro from the Legal Services Department of Kent Police. Mr Cacciacarro attended as an observer. At the close of the hearing both parties confirmed that they had made all the points that they had wished. The Appellant confirmed that his reasonable adjustments had been met and that he had received a fair hearing (having expressed concerns over whether his Article 6 rights would be met at the start of the hearing).

5. The Commissioner did not appear and was not represented having indicated in advance that he wished instead to rely upon his Decision Notice and written representations. The Appellant took issue with no-one appearing for the Commissioner and sought an order under Rule 16 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (General Regulatory Chamber) Rules 2009 to compel representation. This decision was left to the Tribunal panel who are in the best position to decide.

6. No witness evidence was being relied upon at the hearing. Even if a representative of the Commissioner attended, they would not be a witness answering the Appellant’s questions. Having deliberated, the Tribunal is not satisfied that it would be assisted to any material extent by the presence of someone from the Commissioner’s office. There would be no clear purpose for their attendance. That was particularly so when the Chief Constable of Kent Police (being the relevant public authority affected by our decision) was represented. It is anticipated there would be unnecessary duplication given the degree of overlap in their cases. The Tribunal finds it unnecessary and disproportionate to adjourn and prolong this appeal by compelling the attendance of a representative for the Commissioner. The application for a Rule 16 Order is refused.

7. In reaching its conclusions on the grounds of appeal, the Tribunal has considered the written material relied upon by the Commissioner.

8. Ahead of the hearing, the Appellant alerted the Tribunal to judicial review proceedings that he has now initiated against Kent Police, which were issued by the High Court on 31 October 2025. The Appellant considers those proceedings are relevant to this appeal. The claim form has been provided but not the accompanying statement of facts and grounds. The Appellant says that the claim concerns alleged unlawful management practices of Kent Police with regard to its camera network. At the outset, we observe that it is no part of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction to consider matters before the High Court in active judicial review proceedings.

9. The appeal before this Tribunal concerns requests for information made by the Appellant to Kent Police under FOI. The Tribunal explained in advance, and at the hearing itself, that the question for the Tribunal is whether the requests for information were vexatious under section 14(1) FOIA. At the start of the hearing, the Appellant expressed concern that this narrowed the scope of his appeal as expressed in the GRC 1 Notice of Appeal and the outcomes that were being sought. Judge Saward explained that GRC 1 is a standard form on which appellants must state the outcome they seek. That does not mean the requested outcome is deliverable.

10. The Tribunal cannot decide any and every matter that an appellant may ask. The appeal process is governed by FOIA. Registration of the appeal is not an acceptance that all matters raised are relevant or will be decided. The Tribunal can only deal with matters raised in the appeal insofar as relevant to the Decision Notice albeit we are not confined to the material that was before the Commissioner. The Tribunal must operate within the constraints of the law. We explain our role further below.

11. Ultimately, it is a matter for the Tribunal panel to establish what is relevant to our decision. To facilitate the unrepresented Appellant, a clear steer was given as to those factors clearly falling outside the scope of the appeal. In arriving at our decision, we have considered all the information placed before us up until the date of the hearing in order to establish what is relevant to our determination.

12. The Appellant identifies section 16 FOIA as an issue for determination in terms of whether Kent Police complied with its duty to provide advice and assistance to him as the requester. An application to amend the grounds of appeal to include section 16 were refused by Judge Harris on 25 July 2025 having considered the arguments at length. The conclusion reached was that “ there is nothing in the Section 16 or the code of practice that indicates an obligation on a public authority to disclose details of its contractual relationships .” The Tribunal panel agrees and sees no reason to depart from the detailed reasoning of Judge Harris. Background

13. We understand that the Appellant was convicted of speeding offences that occurred in 2023 after being recorded by an ‘automatic camera device’ as having exceeded the relevant speed limit. On each occasion the Appellant pleaded guilty to the offence.

14. The Appellant made four requests to Kent Police. The first request was made on 14 March 2024 followed by a second on 24 April 2024, and two more on 21 October 2024. It is undisputed that all four requests concerned the topic of speed enforcement relying upon speed cameras. The two requests of 21 October 2024 are the subject of this appeal. The earlier requests were not appealed to the Tribunal. The Requests

15. On 21 October 2024, the Appellant sent the following two requests (“the Requests”) to Kent Police: Request 1 “ For the twelve months to 31 december 2023, how many notices did each fixed speed camera in Kent generate? Please feel free to anonymise the location and identity for any camera. Please could you let me know, for each camera: (i) what is the speed limit zone that the camera is located in (eg. 30 mph, 60 mph, ...), (ii) a location description that the police uses to know the local environment of a camera (eg. residential, rural, motorway ....) and (iii) the original installation date of the camera. Please could you present this information in a table format in Microsoft excel (see summary of table headings below). Please could you provide the equivalent information for each camera for the same time period in 2022, 2019, 2018 and 2017. I would like to be able to read across the information for any given camera from 2023 to 2017. column headings for the table: (i) Camera Number (ii) Original Installation Date (iii) Speed Limit in the Zone (iv) Location Description (v) Number of Notices of Intended Prosecution Generated in the twelve months to 31 December 2023 (vi) Number of Notices of Intended Prosecution Generated in the twelve months to 31 December 2022 (vii) Number of Notices of Intended Prosecution Generated in the twelve months to 31 December 2019 (viii) Number of Notices of Intended Prosecution Generated in the twelve months to 31 December 2018 (ix) Number of Notices of Intended Prosecution Generated in the twelve months to 31 December 2017 (this foi request is part of a series about Kent Police's management of its network of speed cameras : [two reference numbers redacted])”. Request 2 “There has been some ambiguity about what Kent Police is referring to when it mentions ‘faults’ with its fixed speed cameras. These things that happen throughout the year and a third-party company (like Cubic Systems) repairs the camera In its most recent policy and internal guidelines for the Kent Police (“KP”) driver diversion unit, how does KP define ‘fault’ at a speed camera when asked about any given cameras [sic] ‘history of faults’ by another team within the police or by a member of the public? If you are unable to provide a response to this, please send me a copy of the most recent policy and guidelines for monitoring speed cameras shared internally within KP officers dealing with speed camera notices This is what i am defining as a ‘fault’ in this FOI and a recent FOI [reference number redacted]: “fault”: a fault to the interior mechanism of a camera or a faulty calibration setting on the camera (in all cases inside the metal case). I would like to compare this definition of ‘fault’ alongside KP’s definition of ‘fault’: to see whether KP is referring to faults with the exterior metal shell casing of the camera, or internal mechanisms (as I describe), all both. In all my fois, I will keep to this same definition of ‘fault’ to make it easier: if a repair of the exterior metal casing of the camera is needed, then that is a case of ‘damage’. Information Request (re: identifying faults) : please provide the badge numbers or any more appropriate identifying information for any police officers that have been involved with identifying a fault with any camera in the county, in the past five years, in the following scenario: it involved the officer physically opening the external metal shell of a camera to inspect the inner workings of a camera. If there were many, please provide the top 10 officers (by number of inspections). Given the ambiguity, I would like to note, on public record, the officers who will be able to answer questions (if they are ever required to by an authoritative body) about the identifications that they were involved with (I don't have any intention of contacting the officers myself) Information Request (re: monitoring cameras): please provide the badge numbers (or any more appropriate identifying information) for any officers who have been responsible for the daily or monthly monitoring of the number of notices generated by a camera with the purpose of seeing whether any cameras have started generating an abnormally large number of notices, as part of their normal duties. again, there are instances of cameras generating extraordinary volumes of notices (as compared to the average) so I would like to be sure that cameras are being monitored diligently”. Refusal of the Requests

16. On 28 October 2024 Kent Police refused the Requests on the basis that the information requested was exempt from disclosure under section 14(1) of FOIA (vexatious requests). Kent Police stated that the requester had so far in 2024 submitted four lengthy and repetitive requests for information about the same subject matter under different names. The cumulative effect of the requests was placing a disproportionate and unjustified level of burden and disruption onto its service. It considered that complying with the Requests would be likely to result in further disruption and the unjustified use of limited resources.

17. Following the Appellant’s request for an internal review on 15 November 2024, Kent Police upheld its original decision to refuse both Requests on 26 November 2024. The Decision Notice

18. In the Decision Notice of 19 May 2025, the Commissioner decided that Kent Police were entitled to rely upon section 14(1) FOIA to refuse the Requests. The Commissioner did not require steps to be taken as a result of his decision.

19. The Decision Notice records how Kent Police had requested that the complainant verify his identity in order to satisfy section 8(1)(b) of FOIA. However, Kent Police did not go on to insist on this and its final refusal relied on section 14 FOIA and not section 8(1)(b). It was noted that the Appellant did not contest being the author of the earlier requests, and so the Commissioner did not consider the point further.

20. In summary, the Commissioner accepted that the Appellant has genuine concern about the reliability of speeding enforcement penalty notices. He further accepted that the Appellant believes it is only through his own investigations that deficiencies will be brought to light.

21. The Commissioner recorded that he has not seen anything to suggest the Appellant is pursuing a grievance or deliberately trying to disrupt Kent Police’s work. The complainant’s correspondence is polite and not aggressive or abusive. He can see no evidence that the Appellant is trying to harass or cause distress to Kent Police staff.

22. The Commissioner did not agree with Kent Police that the Appellant’s name change was an attempt to conceal his identity to circumvent section 14 FOIA being applied to refuse the Requests.

23. The Commissioner recognised the reasons why the Appellant wanted the information but considered it to be of limited use to the wider public. The Appellant’s declared intention to submit more requests further indicated the relatively low value of the Requests. They appear to be part of a pattern of fishing for information in the hope of proving his belief that the speed cameras are not operating correctly. It is likely that further requests on related subjects will continue.

24. The Commissioner observed that it could be argued that, in isolation, the Requests were not unreasonable, but the Requests cannot be considered in isolation. They should be considered in conjunction with the Appellant’s other interactions with Kent Police. It is the volume, unfocussed and repeated nature of much of the Appellant’s correspondence between March and October 2024, which led the Commissioner to conclude that the Requests would be overly burdensome. The Commissioner found that compliance would involve a disproportionate burden which is not justified by the purpose and value of the Requests. The Appeal

25. The grounds of appeal are summarised as follows: 25.1 The Appellant considers that the Commissioner failed to recognise the severity and seriousness of the Requests. His case officer chose not to have a conversation with the Appellant to ensure that the significance of the Requests was understood. The Appellant is stunned that the case officer described the Requests as “low value”. 25.2 The Tribunal is asked to consider the Appellant’s standing. He holds two degrees in Physics from the University of Oxford and has spent over 15 years working at the highest levels of the private equity and hedge fund industries. He has ability with regard to pattern recognition in systems and the behaviour of groups that is far beyond what is considered typical. This ability is intuitive and precise. 25.3 He has a level of intuition and clarity that goes beyond analysis – the ability to see what others cannot. That ability underpins the concerns raised in this case. It is why the Appellant holds a solid belief that his concerns are serious, valid, and deserving of urgent attention. 25.4 The Appellant believes the case officer reached a series of unfounded assumptions and applied a lax standard in assessing the public interest — favouring institutional defence over independent scrutiny. 25.5 In terms of Kent Police, the Appellant says there is a clear trail suggesting successive attempts by them to conceal, mislead, and dissuade genuine inquiry, including: (a) A threat to apply section 14(2) FOIA in the summer of 2024 that was subsequently dispelled once challenged. (b) An attempt to slander the Appellant by accusing him of using a false name to bypass their previously proposed application of section 14. This was dispelled by the Commissioner in the Decision Notice. (c) An attempt to apply section 14(1) FOIA by purporting to be inundated with emails and messages and being overburdened as a team. The Appellant provides a schedule to show that his email correspondence was entirely relevant and in keeping with standard communication pathways for a FOIA request. It also dispels the purported ‘burdensome’ nature of the Requests. 25.6 The Appellant highlights the Commissioner’s acceptance of the Appellant’s genuine concerns and the lack of evidence that the Appellant is trying to harass or cause distress to Kent Police staff. 25.7 The Appellant provides an extract from his service level complaint to the Commissioner following the Decision Notice. It includes a transcript of a brief conversation with an AI system on the subject of speed camera calibration and evidence reliability to illuminate the seriousness of his case. 25.8 The Appellant emphasises the high importance of the ‘certificate of failure’ in assessing this case. He states that: “ my queries have been seeking to establish where these certificates are and which organisation has the responsibility to generate and preserve this critical information. This certificate is the information that reveals any false prosecutions or fines obtained under a false premise (ie. a faulty camera) .” 25.9 Kent Police purports that there are no contracts with its third-party camera manufacturers. To highlight the high improbability of this, the Appellant seeks a determination for one of two things: (a) that there are indeed no contracts, in which case he will pursue this in the Administrative Court as a gross negligence, or (b) contracts in fact exist. 25.10 The Appellant considers that this case also reflects a larger, more prominent issue: whether public authorities can be trusted to maintain transparency in systems that directly affect people’s legal standing and criminal records. It will form the basis for future judicial reviews. 25.11 Whilst concerns are expressed over the adequacy of the culture at the Information Commissioner’s Office, the Tribunal is not asked to judge this matter in any way and nor would it be able to. The Commissioner’s response

26. The Commissioner’s response of 19 June 2025 opposes the appeal and stands by his Decision Notice. If the Tribunal concludes that the request is not vexatious under section 14(1) FOIA, the Commissioner invites us to order steps obliging Kent Police to issue a fresh response to the Requests not relying upon section 14(1) FOIA. Response from Kent Police

27. In summary, Kent Police says by way of background that while the Appellant acknowledged receiving two speeding notices originating from the same camera, he represented to the Commissioner that he had taken steps to monitor his speed, and he was unlikely to be speeding. He concluded that there must be something wrong with the camera.

28. Contrary to those representations, the Appellant was convicted of four offences of exceeding the 30mph speed limit by increasing margins between 28 February 2023 and 14 August 2023. Whilst the Appellant purports to be a concerned citizen acting on behalf of the motoring public, he showed ever greater disregard for the 30mph speed limit “ and now seeks to use the Act to cast down on his convictions and to criticise Kent Police .”

29. Kent Police says that the first two requests received substantive responses. Each response led to a further request based on misinterpretation of the admittedly limited information. Kent Police maintains that the Appellant mistakenly made a “presumption of fault” that led to the Requests relating to fault detection, maintenance and calibration certificates. Had Kent Police responded to those Requests, they would in effect be required to prove a negative i.e., that the enforcement system was free from fault.

30. While the Requests were expressed without aggression or abuse, Kent Police considers that they were confrontational in imputing fault on the part of the Police in the management of speed limit enforcement. Kent Police considers that the accusation of slander in the Notice of Appeal, in response to the querying of requests in different names is another example of confrontation and manufactured sleight.

31. It is submitted that FOIA is being used to acquire information to confirm a speculative hypothesis critical of the Police which is manifestly improper and unjustified.

32. As well as the Requests, Kent Police refers to “a good deal of commentary” adding to the administrative burden of dealing with the Requests. The Decision Notice refers to the Appellant’s submissions of 80 pages, illustrating the disproportionate impact of his correspondence on both the public authority and regulator.

33. Kent Police considers that if they responded substantively to the Requests, further requests would follow.

34. Kent Police identified the issues to be determined as those flowing from the same three Dransfield categories relied upon by the Commissioner. Appellant’s reply

35. The Appellant’s reply is composed of five documents. We do not attempt to summarise all the points, it being impractical and unnecessary to do so.

36. The Appellant disputes that Kent Police made substantive responses to the first two requests, claiming the responses were contradictory and nonsensical. He questions the integrity and soundness of the legal representations. The Appellant believes that the number of penalty notices generated at one camera compared to county wide is statistically significant. The Appellant submits that the Requests were not motivated by a ‘presumption of fault’ as alleged by Kent Police but were being made anyway. It was the information about numbers that strengthened his resolve.

37. Kent Police were not asked to prove anything, but asked for factual records, if any, that would indicate if faults or anomalies were recorded with speed cameras.

38. The Appellant challenges the relevance of Kent Police raising the Appellant’s two other speeding offences (prior to the two notices that initiated his interest in the specific camera on Hythe Road). It is the camera for the second two offences with which the Appellant is concerned.

39. The Appellant maintains that he expressed serious concerns to the Magistrates Court in March 2024 over the relationship between Kent Police and third-party operators and data mishandling. He submits that his guilty pleas were a result of having insufficient information, such as maintenance and diagnostic logs. The pleas were entered after exhausting the possibility of Kent Police providing potentially exculpatory evidence regarding the proper functioning of the cameras.

40. The Appellant submits that he has no interest in “casting down” his convictions. He says that the Magistrates Court in March 2024 ruled in his favour on procedural errors by Kent Police aside from the camera itself and did not impose penalty points for either of the two offences.

41. He says that the requests were driven by reasonable concerns and clear grounded evidence or strong instinct, pursued diligently and professionally.

42. In terms of the themes identified in Dransfield , the Appellant maintains that all lay in his favour: 42.1 The Appellant says that the information he has been requesting is contained in the SS15 45 Fixed Safety Camera Contract, which may be easily obtained from Kent and Medway Safety Camera Partnership or Kent County Council. He maintains that any perceived burden on Kent Police is self-inflicted from ‘stonewalling’. 42.2 His motive is said to be heavily geared towards the public interest. He is committed to resolving a very serious issue that has affected countless people and will continue to infringe on people’s rights. This appeal is part of a broader case heading towards the Administrative Court likely to have astounding reverberations on the field of automated enforcement technology. 42.3 With regard to the ‘value or serious purpose of the request’, the case is said to be directly linked to accessing information that will reveal whether exculpatory evidence is being concealed by Kent Police. By repeatedly stating it does not have any maintenance or repair logs, the Appellant asserts that Kent Police has itself confirmed its own guilt. 42.4 Kent Police has agreed that ‘harassment or distress’ is not a relevant factor. Legal Framework

43. Section 1 FOIA provides a right of access to recorded information held by public authorities. It provides: General right of access to information held by public authorities (1) Any person making a request for information to a public authority is entitled— (a) to be informed in writing by the public authority whether it holds information of the description specified in the request, and (b) if that is the case, to have that information communicated to him.

44. That right is subject to several exemptions, one of which is section 14. The relevant provisions are: Vexatious or repeated requests (1) Section 1(1) does not oblige a public authority to comply with a request for information if the request is vexatious. (2) Where a public authority has previously complied with a request for information which was made by any person, it is not obliged to comply with a subsequent identical or substantially similar request from that person unless a reasonable interval has elapsed between compliance with the previous request and the making of the current request. …

45. FOIA does not define what is meant by ‘vexatious’. It is apparent from the wording of section 14(1) that it is the request that must be vexatious, not the Appellant. The Upper Tribunal gave guidance in Information Commissioner v Devon County Council and Dransfield [2012] UKUT 440 (AAC) , as upheld and clarified by the Court of Appeal in Dransfield v Information Commissioner and Devon County Council [2015] EWCA Civ 454 . As noted by Arden LJ in the Court of Appeal , the hurdle of showing a request is vexatious is a high one: “… the starting point is that vexatiousness primarily involves making a request which has no reasonable foundation, that is, no reasonable foundation for thinking that the information sought would be of value to the requester, or to the public or any section of the public. Parliament has chosen a strong word which therefore means that the hurdle of satisfying it is a high one, and that is consistent with the constitutional nature of the right. The decision maker should consider all the relevant circumstances in order to reach a balanced conclusion as to whether a request is vexatious ” [68].

46. The Upper Tribunal’s decision in Dransfield provides more detailed guidance that was not challenged in the Court of Appeal. The ultimate question is: “ is the request vexatious in the sense of being a manifestly unjustified, inappropriate or improper use of FOIA? ” [43]. In the context of reviewing the Commissioner’s Guidance, the Upper Tribunal highlighted “ the importance of adopting a holistic and broad approach to the determination of whether a request is vexatious or not, emphasising the attributes of manifest unreasonableness, irresponsibility and, especially where there is a previous course of dealings, the lack of proportionality that typically characterise vexatious requests ” [45]. Arden LJ in the Court of Appeal also emphasised that a “ rounded approach ” is required [69].

47. Overall, the purpose of section 14 is to “ protect the resources (in the broadest sense of that word) of the public authority from being squandered on disproportionate use of FOIA ” (Upper Tribunal at [10]).

48. In Craven v ICO & Department for Energy and Climate Change [2015] EWCA Civ 454 the Court of Appeal accepted “ there is no warrant for reading section 14 FOIA as subject to some express or implied qualification that a request cannot be vexatious in part because of, or solely because of, the costs of complying with the current request. ” [85].

49. This has subsequently been confirmed in Cabinet Office v Information Commissioner and Ashton [2018] UKUT 208 (AAC) , in which the Upper Tribunal stated, having considered the relevant case law: “The law is thus absolutely clear. The application of section 14 of FOIA requires a holistic assessment of all the circumstances. Section 14 may be invoked on the grounds of resources alone to show that a request is vexatious. A substantial public interest underlying the request for information does not necessarily trump a resources argument. As Mr Armitage put it in the Commissioner’s written response to the appeal (at §18): • In deciding whether a request is vexatious within the meaning of section 14(1), the public authority must consider all the relevant circumstances in order to reach a balanced conclusion as to whether a request is vexatious. • The burden which compliance with the request will impose on the resources of a public authority is a relevant consideration in such an assessment. • In some cases, the burden of complying with the request will be sufficient, in itself, to justify characterising that request as vexatious, and such a conclusion is not precluded if there is a clear public interest in the information requested. Rather, the public interest in the subject matter of a request is a consideration that itself needs to be balanced against the resource implications of the request, and any other relevant factors, in a holistic determination of whether a request is vexatious.” [27] Role of the Tribunal

50. The role of the Tribunal is governed by section 58 FOIA. This requires the Tribunal to consider whether the Commissioner’s Decision Notice is in accordance with the law, or, where the Commissioner’s decision involved an exercise of discretion, whether he should have exercised it differently. The Tribunal may review any finding of fact on which the Decision Notice was based (section 58(2)). This means that we may review all the evidence provided to us (even if that evidence was not before the Commissioner) and make our own decision on the merits.

51. As set out by the Upper Tribunal in NHS England -v- Information Commissioner and Dean [2019] UKUT 145 (ACC) " The First-tier Tribunal ‘exercises a full merits appellate jurisdiction and so stands in the shoes of the IC and decides which (if any) exemptions apply. ..". It does not mean that we can consider matters falling outside the scope of the Requests. The Issues

52. The main issue for the Tribunal to determine in this appeal is: • Whether the Commissioner was correct to uphold the decision of Kent Police to rely upon section 14(1) of FOIA in refusing the Appellant’s Requests.

53. This turns on whether or not the Requests were ‘vexatious’. Evidence

54. The documentary evidence comprises a hearing bundle of 900 indexed and paginated pages. The Appellant produced a 2-page reading guide for the bundle highlighting 252 pages (A7 to A207 and A271 to A322) as the core substantive material. Ahead of the hearing, the Tribunal also received skeleton arguments from the Appellant (27 pages) and from Counsel acting on behalf of Kent Police (8 pages).

55. On the morning of the hearing, the Tribunal received from the Appellant a document titled “Questions” setting out questions and topics that the Appellant wanted covered by the Tribunal. The conduct of the hearing was a matter for the presiding Judge to decide and not for the Appellant to dictate.

56. No witness evidence was given at the hearing. Instead, the Tribunal heard submissions from Mr Gill (the Appellant) and Mr Garnett representing Kent Police. Our Approach

57. The Tribunal’s role is simply to determine whether the Requests are vexatious, and consequently, whether the Commissioner was entitled to refuse the Requests in reliance upon section 14(1) FOIA. This key issue has become somewhat lost in the high volume of material generated by this appeal.

58. The Appellant addressed at length in his grounds of appeal and submissions, multiple matters concerning his underlying concerns and theories about Kent Police. It may well be a disappointment to the Appellant, but we do not answer his questions. FOIA involves a very clear process. A complaint is made to the Commissioner against a refusal to provide information. The Commissioner deals with one item at a time. On appeal, the Tribunal decides whether or not the Commissioner’s decision was well-founded. The appeal is not the opportunity to introduce other complaints. The system does not allow for that.

59. Indeed, this appeal is not a platform for a roving and open-ended inquiry by the Appellant across the issues he identifies, into which he can slot evidence relating to those issues as and when he identifies it.

60. Where matters fall outside the scope of the appeal, we have not considered them further. Complaints against the Commissioner’s office and the way that this appeal to the General Regulatory Chamber has been handled are not relevant to the issues to be decided and have been disregarded.

61. Furthermore, it is not the Tribunal’s role in this appeal to determine whether Kent Police has contracts in place with its third-party manufacturers, or anyone else. The Requests before us did not ask about contracts. Similarly, we are not deciding if Kent Police made “falsehoods” in replies to earlier requests. We reiterate that our remit in the determination of this appeal under section 58 FOIA is the Decision Notice and the findings of fact on which it is based.

62. The ‘evidential prosecution information’ and accompanying notices within the bundle are treated as background information to inform our understanding of the history behind the Requests.

63. The Tribunal has focussed its considerations on the application of section 14(1) FOIA to the Requests and the question of whether or not the Requests were vexatious. Findings and Consideration

64. The Upper Tribunal in Dransfield set out four non-exhaustive broad issues or themes which can be useful in assessing whether a request is vexatious in the context of section 14 FOIA. All the parties to this appeal made submissions in relation to these issues. We emphasise that the Tribunal has not been constrained by considering the issues in Dransfield . Nor have we adopted the issues as a formulaic approach or checklist. They are a helpful tool in structuring this decision.

65. The Tribunal has reminded itself that vexatiousness is a high hurdle. That is consistent with the right of access to information held by public authorities under section 1 FOIA, save insofar as the right is qualified or exempt. We also remind ourselves that the qualifications and exemptions embody a careful balance between the public interest considerations militating for and against disclosure.

66. The text quoted in italics below is taken from the Upper Tribunal’s decision in Dransfield with the paragraph numbers therefrom given in square brackets. The burden imposed on the public authority by the request

67. The burden may be inextricably linked with a previous course of dealings between the parties. At [29] the Upper Tribunal said: “… the context and history of the previous request, in terms of the previous course of dealings between the individual requester and the public authority in question, must be considered in assessing whether it is properly to be characterised as vexatious. In particular, the number, breadth, pattern and duration of previous requests may be a telling factor ”.

68. In this case, the very first FOIA request was made by the Appellant to Kent Police on 14 March 2024, two days after his speeding conviction on 12 March 2024. The timing shows that this conviction was the trigger for that first request. A second request followed in quick succession. The Appellant himself confirmed at the hearing that his FOIA requests followed his unanswered questions raised in the Magistrates Court about the calibration of speed cameras.

69. The Appellant was critical of the responses he received from Kent Police to the first two requests about speed cameras. The Requests followed within a matter of months. We find that the Requests emerged from those raised earlier. They were all linked. The Appellant’s previous dealings with Kent Police are relevant to the issue of burden. We are entitled to look at the burden of the Requests in the light of the two earlier requests and related correspondence, up to the point at which Kent Police responded to the Requests. We have only taken into account matters that took place after the response to the Requests, to the extent that they shed light (if any) on the position at the relevant time.

70. The Requests were expressed at length. The first part of Request 1 essentially asked for the number of notices generated from each fixed speed camera in Kent for the 12 months up to 31 December 2023. That part may not have appeared overly burdensome, but Request 1 proceeded to seek the information for four other years. It also sought camera numbers, installation dates, locations and the speed limits. All of this was requested in a prescribed format. It was burdensome.

71. The conversational style of Request 2 does not make it easy to extricate the information being sought. It includes questions as well as requests, which need to be disentangled from the narrative. In essence, the badge numbers are requested of police officers involved in identifying faults with speed cameras and monitoring the number of notices generated, but in specific circumstances, over the preceding 5-year period. The Appellant dictated what constituted a ‘fault’ for the purposes of his Requests. This was not a straightforward request.

72. Compliance with the Requests required input from different departments. This was in circumstances where there had already been previous requests about speed cameras from the same requester. The first request of 14 March 2024 had asked who maintains and repairs the camera and who is monitoring the number of notices generated by the camera along with a series of other questions. The next request on 24 April 2024 asked a series of questions on the repair of the camera, its calibration and contract for service/repair. Thus, by the time of the Requests, Kent Police had already replied to two lengthy requests (even though the Appellant was dissatisfied with the responses).

73. We agree with the Appellant that Kent Police was not being asked “to prove a negative”. The Requests did not ask them to prove anything, but to provide information. Moreover, we disregard Kent Police’s reference to the burden placed on the regulator in dealing with the complaints. It is the burden upon the public authority that we are considering.

74. The Appellant made it plain at the hearing that he was trying to assemble as much information as possible to support his judicial review proceedings. The Requests were clearly not going to be the end of the matter. Evidence contained within the bundle makes clear that further requests would follow. For instance, in an email to Kent Police on 12 July 2024 the Appellant warned “… I am going to request more information about how the estate of cameras is managed in the county …”. On 8 October 2024, the Appellant said “ I will soon start the next phase of my FOI requests related to the topics I have mentioned in my past messages. These requests may come from my partner, ****, on my behalf ”. Then on 21 October 2024, the Appellant said “… this foi request is part of a series about Kent Police’s management of its network of speed cameras . ..”.

75. Kent Police can have been left in no doubt that however they responded, the Appellant would still want more information and was prepared to involve his partner in making those requests.

76. The Requests also need to be considered in the context of the regularity, volume and nature of his associated communications. The conduct of the Appellant falls squarely within a ‘pattern’ as contemplated by the Upper Tribunal at [32]. “As regards the ‘pattern’, a requester who consistently submits multiple FOIA requests or associated correspondence within days of each other, or relentlessly bombards the public authority with e-mail traffic, is more likely to be found to have made a vexatious request. [32]

77. Following each request, the Appellant persisted in sending Kent Police a stream of regular emails that were not only lengthy adding information each time but were demanding in tone and with threats of more requests to come. We are told that Kent Police has only a small team tasked with dealing with requests for information.

78. When considered in the context of the previous requests, the clear intention to continue with a series of requests, and the accompanying bombardment of emails, the nature of the Requests was an undue and disproportionate burden on scarce public resources.

79. The Appellant says that he has since obtained some information that he was seeking from Kent and Medway Safety Camera Partnership and Kent County Council. That may be so, but it appears to be in the wider context of speed camera enforcement rather than the information sought in these Requests. It does not reflect upon or diminish the burdensome nature of the Requests. The motive of the requester

80. Although FOIA is motive-blind, the Upper Tribunal observed that “ what may seem like an entirely reasonable and benign request may be found to be vexatious in the wider context of the course of dealings between the individual and the relevant public authority ”. [34]

81. We do not question the sincerity of the Appellant’s belief in the importance of the issues he is seeking to address by the Requests. That sincerity is evident from the care and detail applied in his written submissions, correspondence and applications. It was equally evident in his oral submissions at the hearing.

82. Kent Police suggests that the Appellant was motivated in his Requests by the desire to undermine or overturn his speeding convictions despite having pleaded guilty. At the hearing, the Appellant did not accept this was the case.

83. The Appellant says that he has not driven a car since October 2023, having recognised that his driving record “ is so bad that after a six-month disqualification ending around April 2024, I made the decision to not drive again .” He elaborated at the hearing that within 18-months he had received 8 points on his licence for driving without insurance, a conviction for driving without due care and attention, and accumulated several speeding tickets.

84. The Appellant explained how he was already on a “speeding ban” when he received the two further speeding tickets in December 2024. He thought that something was “very wrong” with Kent Police trying to bring him back to court. He believed it was a procedural error and admitted that “I was pretty annoyed”. The Appellant said he went to the Magistrates Court to find out where they sit on someone being taken to court for speeding when they are already on a ban. The senior Magistrate had said that speed cameras were outside their remit and suggested he ask Kent Police. The Appellant spoke to Counsel acting for the Crown Prosecution Service who directed him to a named individual at Kent Police to ask about the calibration of speed cameras. This had led to the first FOIA request asking about speed cameras.

85. It is the Appellant’s position that Kent Police cannot say if their speed cameras are functioning properly when prosecuting. He is looking for a definitive outcome for the motoring public, which is “good for all of us”.

86. The Appellant described himself as a “public interest investigator”. He wanted the requested information to refine his ‘Gaussian’ Distribution statistics to demonstrate that among 102 similar 30mph cameras, the particular camera that captured him speeding, is an extreme statistical outlier. This means there ought to be a reason why that camera is generating nearly double the country average.

87. The Appellant also maintains that Kent Police lied in their earlier reply about there being no service/maintenance contract for their speed cameras. This cannot have been the motivation behind the Requests as the Appellant relies on information obtained after the Requests were made as the basis for his belief. Furthermore, the contract is not part of the Requests.

88. Kent Police argues that the confrontational approach taken by the Appellant speaks to his motive. The Tribunal notes that the Appellant’s communications have on occasions been targeted at a named employee of Kent Police and suggestions made of inappropriate contact and collusion between the Respondents’ legal representatives. Those communications arose during the course of the appeal. Such conduct may have been inappropriate (we give no view on that), but it is not demonstrative of the Appellant’s motive in making the Requests.

89. It appears that the Appellant’s motive may have changed over time. We are considering the position at the time of the Requests. There is a clear link in the timing of the first request and the Appellant’s speeding conviction which prompted the further requests, including those that are subject to this appeal. Very specific information has been requested about the camera that captured the Appellant speeding. Notably, on 12 July 2024 (i.e. after the initial requests but before the Requests) the Appellant wrote to Kent Police: “ I will be asking more about speed cameras in Kent – and the nature of my foi request will be the same (management of the estate of cameras). Respecting what you say about this camera, I’ll ask those foi requests referring to other cameras where I have received a speeding notice .”

90. This all reinforces our view that the Appellant was motivated by obtaining information to establish that fixed cameras were faulty and his convictions wrong, even if he had no interest in overturning it/them. The value or serious purpose of the Requests

91. Regard should be had to the inherent value of the request, specifically “ does the request have a value or serious purpose in terms of the objective public interest in the information sought? ” [38], albeit that a lack of apparent objective value cannot provide a basis for refusal on its own.

92. The Appellant is affronted that the Commissioner described the Requests as “low value”. He believes the Requests have national significance. We do not doubt the Appellant genuinely holds that belief.

93. We acknowledge that there is public interest in the number of notices of intended prosecution generated by speed cameras but not in the prescriptive format or depth sought. We are not swayed that there would be public interest in camera numbers and dates of installation. The Appellant has provided a lot of information on his theories and how the information will assist him in verifying his calculations. However, we are not satisfied that the prescriptive details sought would be of much interest to the wider public.

94. The scenario described in Request 2 refers to the Appellant’s own definition of a camera ‘fault’ in specific circumstances. Those factors limit the likely public value. In our view, there is no reasonable foundation to think that the request for police officer badge numbers would be of value to the public. By admission at the hearing, the Appellant wants the badge numbers so that those police officers can be called to give evidence in the Administrative Court in his judicial review proceedings against Kent Police.

95. Overall, we find there was limited public interest in the requested information. It is the Appellant himself who wished to make use of the information to pursue judicial review proceedings against Kent Police. The value in the information is primarily to the Appellant. Even so, we keep well in mind that a request can have a value or a serious purpose while serving an entirely private interest. Any harassment of, or distress caused to, the public authority’s staff

96. There is no suggestion that the Requests caused staff of Kent Police harassment or distress in dealing with them. A finding of harassment or distress is not a prerequisite for concluding that a request is vexatious. Conclusions

97. One of the main purposes of FOIA is to provide citizens with a qualified right of access to official documentation. It thereby provides a means of holding public authorities to account. Hence, the high bar for vexatiousness. Whilst we have structured our discussion around several convenient headings, we have taken a holistic approach to our assessment.

98. We consider that the Requests, viewed in the round, were an improper use of FOIA and the high bar of vexatiousness is met in the sense of being a manifestly unjustified, inappropriate or an improper use of FOIA.

99. The Commissioner was correct to find that the Requests were vexatious. The Decision Notice is in accordance with the law and the appeal must be dismissed.