Royal Borough of Windsor and Maidenhead v The Mother & Ors

HHJ RICHARD CASE: Parties

1. This is an application for care orders which the Local Authority, the Royal Borough of Windsor and Maidenhead, make in respect of three children, who I will refer to for anonymisation purposes as CA, CB and CC. The Local Authority is represented today by Ms Watson, counsel. The mother of the three children I will refer to as “the mother”. She is represented today by Mr Dove, counsel. The father of the three children is represented by Mr Williamson, counsel.

2. The Guardian who represents the children’s interest is Ms Arnold, represented by Ms Rai, solicitor. Also in attendance is Ms Evelyn-Bates, Minister Councillor of the St Lucian High Commission. The children’s social worker is Ms Ashama, who also attends today. Mother is in attendance by video from Sweden. The father has decided not to attend today either in person or remotely. Background

3. I set out an extensive background to these proceedings in a fact-finding judgment that I handed down on 14 February 2025, with the neutral citation [2025] EWFC 29 (B). I am going to repeat the summary set out there from paragraph 25: “25. The family lived in another European country (Country X) [Pausing there, in the course of that judgment, I referred to it as country X. With the agreement of the parties today, I will identify the country. It is Sweden.] between approximately 2013 and 2017.

26. CA was born in the UK before the family moved to Country X; he suffered a birth injury and he has a diagnosis of cerebral palsy. CB was born in Country X. CC was born in the UK.

27. This Local Authority have been involved with the family since 2020 but there was local authority involvement in 2013 and apparently in Country X. The following is taken from the Local Authority case summary and I do not understand it to be in dispute:

3. On 13 December 2022 a School Attendance Order was made: the parents did not comply with it. On 22 August 2022 the children were made the subjects of child protection plans under the category of neglect: the parents did not comply with statutory visits or attend any child protection conferences or Core Group meetings. On 5 November 2022 a Child Assessment Order was made to enable professionals to gain access to the children for assessment [my order in RG22C50192]. The parents did not co-operate with the order, and care proceedings were commenced in February 2023 [RG23C50013]. Interim care orders (ICOs) were made on 3 February 2023, in the absence of the parents, but the order could not be given effect because the parents would not respond to attempts to serve them. On 7 February the Court authorised the removal of the children under the ICOs [this was pursuant to a Recovery Order made by me and it was necessary for the police to attend the home to assist Children’s Social Care], however, on 10 February the children were returned to the parents’ care as the risk of harm caused by the potential duration of the separation was considered to be disproportionate in the circumstances... 4...On 16 November 2023 the proceedings concluded before this Court, with the Court finding threshold to be met; no order under s31 Children Act 1989 was sought, and the children were instead placed on child in need plans...

6. Following the conclusion of the last proceedings, the parents co-operated with the child in need plans and services in place to support the family...The children were accessing education, but in February 2024 an issue was raised at a CIN review meeting about low school attendance. At the next meeting on 12 March professionals were positive about the family’s engagement and progress. On 30 March [in fact April] CA was admitted to Hospital A for his right hip reconstruction surgery. A plan was agreed that the mother would remain with CA at hospital and the father would remain at the home to care for the children. CA was discharged home on 7 April [in fact May] but had to be returned by hospital transport...

7. In late April an incident occurred between the father and staff at CA’s school...A strategy meeting took place on 9 May to review mounting concerns about the family, and the decision was taken to initiate a s47 inquiry. The inquiry concluded that an initial child protection conference (ICPC) should be convened, and this took place on 28 May with the outcome that the children would be made the subject of child protection plans under the category of neglect. Following the ICPC the father ceased to attend meetings and was considered to co-operate in only a superficial way with professionals.

8. On 6 June Ms Chioko, a senior social worker, undertook a child protection statutory visit...[concerns were raised forming the basis of allegations in these proceedings]...

9. On 28 June at another home visit the father presented with [alleged] bizarre behaviour...CA was not taken to an important appointment at Hospital A on 15 July because [it is alleged] the father would not co-operate with the transport that attended at the home to take him.... Both ambulance crew describe a tense situation in the home, led by the father...

12. On 16 July an initial meeting was arranged between the mother and Fiona Mee, domestic abuse support worker. The meeting had to be arranged under the pretext of the mother attending a pre-planned health visitor appointment with Ms Obodoagu in order not to arouse suspicion on the part of the father [C123]....In short, beginning on 16 July, the mother has made a series of allegations of physical and sexual violence and controlling and coercive behaviour towards her by the father over more than 10 years...

13. On 23 July a review CPC took place: the children remained subject to CP plans. On 26 July 2024, the mother made significant allegations to Fiona Mee. In summary, she told Ms Mee that the father would force/coerce her to take cocaine in order for her to be compliant while having sexual intercourse with her ‘at least once a week’. There was some ambivalence on the part of the mother as to whether she considered this was consensual or not [C6].

14. As a result of the mother’s allegations, a plan was devised with professionals for the mother and the children to move to a place of safety. The father was arrested on 30 July in relation to alleged offences perpetrated against the mother, including non-fatal strangulation. Police Officers had attended the family home in response to a report of a domestic incident. The Officers spoke with the parents separately, and the mother made allegations in a similar vein to those made to Ms Mee to PC Madeleine Dudley and PC McKee. The father was taken to the police station and interviewed under caution. The father gave a ‘no comment’ interview. He was released on Police bail, with contact with the children to be arranged through children’s services. On 31 July the mother and the children left the family home and moved to their confidential address…

16. Care proceedings were issued on an ex-parte basis on 30 July. The application was considered by HHJ Tolson KC, who determined that the urgency was not made out and directed that the matter should be dealt with on notice in the usual manner. [A revised C110A at [B1] records it was issued on 9 August 2024]…

19. A CMH took place before this Court on 29 August 2024, when the Court granted interim care orders in respect of all 3 children. The care plans for the children were for them to remain placed with the mother at the safe house. The father’s contact was to be subject to a risk assessment.

20. A FCMH took place before this Court on 8 Oct 2024. The Court made directions to progress the matter to a fact-finding hearing in January 2025. The Court also considered assessments to inform the welfare decisions. The case was listed for an IRH on 2 July 2025 with directions for assessments and final evidence. By the October hearing, the LA had completed a risk assessment in respect of the children’s direct and indirect contact with the father. The father did not engage with assessments. The arrangement has been for twice monthly letterbox contact facilitated by the LA”.

4. In the fact-finding judgment, I set out a summary of the findings that I made at the conclusion of that hearing, and I am going to read them out from paragraph two: “2. On 19, 23, 27 and 30 July 2024 in the presence of some or all of the Children the Father verbally abused the Mother including calling her a ‘psycho’, ‘narcissistic’ and a ‘thief’, telling her to ‘go back to hell and burn’. The parents argued in front of the Children. The Father’s verbally abusive behaviour is likely to have been emotionally harmful to the Children who witnessed it.

3. The Father socially isolated the Mother by only allowing her to leave the home with his permission.

4. The Father had control of the family finances and restricted the Mother’s access to money.

5. The Father’s behaviour on 8 May 2024 (calling the Mother a thief and a con-artist and accusing her of drinking CA’s morphine and going mental) and 19, 23, 27 and 30 July 2024 (as above) was denigrating of the Mother in the presence of the Children and likely to have caused emotional harm to them.

6. From 7 May 2024 the Father controlled the Mother by restricting her care of CA.

7. The Father coerced the Mother to take cocaine from 2023 as a means of facilitating non-consensual sexual activity including vaginal rape and oral, vaginal and anal penetration by him of her with sex toys. The non-consensual sexual activity occurred between fortnightly and weekly from a point in 2023. The Children were present in the home at the time although not in the same room.

8. The Father attempted to coerce the Mother by threatening to disclose photos he had taken of the Mother using cocaine or threatening to take such photos and disclose them.

9. The Father has physically abused the Mother. On or around 19 July 2013 the Father non-fatally strangled the Mother and she lost consciousness. In February 2023 the Father dragged the Mother off a bed and non-fatally strangled her. On an unknown date the Father punched the Mother to the lip causing a scar and on a separate unknown date threw a computer at her head leaving a small scar to her right ear.

10. On 31 July 2024 the Father sent 2 emails to the Mother which were designed to coerce the Mother into returning to him with the Children. The content of the emails was emotionally coercive.

11. The parents have neglected the Children’s school attendance:- a) CA’s attendance at school was 47% at July 2024. b) CB’s attendance at school was 70% at May 2024. c) CC’s attendance at pre-school was 63% at July 2024. Non-attendance at school is likely to have been educationally and emotionally harmful to the Children.

12. The Father did not permit CA to return to school after 12 June 2024 contrary to the recommendations of professionals. Non-attendance at school is likely to have been educationally and emotionally harmful to CA.

13. On 22 April 2024 the Father was abusive to a member of CA’s school staff telling him to ‘go suck balls’; he received a final written warning from the school.

14. The Father was abusive to the social worker on 7 May 2024 telling her to ‘get the fucking away from me and my family’, that she ‘will be destroyed’ and that ‘Satan is looking to destroy your children’. The Father was aggressive to police on 8 May 2024. The Father was abusive to the social worker on 16 May 2024 saying ‘I have never seen such a cynical person and never met anyone as bad as she is in my life...you have an evil smile on’ and abusive to the social worker on 11 July 2024 saying he had to record her because she tells lies. These findings demonstrate the Father’s lack of engagement with professionals seeking to support the Children risking harm to the Children.

15. The Father did not attend the Core Group meeting on 16 June and 19 July 2024 nor the Review Child Protection Conference on 23 July 2024. This finding demonstrates the Father’s lack of engagement with professionals seeking to support the Children risking harm to the Children.

16. The Father failed to attend Hospital A on 7 May 2024 to collect the Mother and CA and failed to take CB and CC to school. Non-attendance at school is likely to have been educationally and emotionally harmful to CB and CC.

17. After CA’s discharge from hospital on 7 May 2024 the Father refused to use CA’s hoist in the family home contrary to the advice of professionals and presenting a risk to CA.

18. The Father tested positive for medium level cannabis and cocaine use and chronic excessive alcohol use in June, July and August 2024. The Mother admits fortnightly use of cocaine to June 2024 and tested positive for chronic excessive alcohol use from mid-June to mid-September 2024 and excessive alcohol use from mid-September to mid-October. Parental drug and alcohol misuse is likely to present a risk of harm to the Children.

19. The Father had a diagnosis of anxiety on 16 June 2024, but denied ongoing mental health concerns on 16 September 2024.

20. The Father’s evidence lacked credibility in many significant respects. In relation to important matters I find he lied:- a) He lied on oath when telling me that the Mother had hit the Children a lot; b) He lied in denying the accuracy of the social worker’s note of 16 May 2024 where it recorded that he had said she had an ‘evil smile’; c) He attempted to mislead the Court when asserting through counsel that a photograph of CA’s chest was taken on 15 July 2024 when in fact it was taken in 2020; d) By his own admission he lied in a position statement in relation to drug use; e) By his own admission he lied in a declaration made to a hair strand testing company; f) By his own admission he lied in a document prepared in response to threshold which was signed with a statement of truth; and g) He admitted he lied on oath in oral evidence when confirming he had read his witness statement the day before.

21. The Father has engaged in coercive and/or controlling behaviour over a period from 2023 (at the latest) to 30 July 2024 as evidenced by my findings on allegations 1 and 3-8 above.

22. The threshold test in section 31(2) Children Act 1989 is met”.

5. Following that fact-finding hearing on 11 March 2025 I made a non-molestation order against the father. The terms of the order were such that it was to remain in force for the duration of the proceedings or until the final order. In most respects it is in a standard form, requiring that he was not to use or threaten violence against the mother or threaten, intimidate, harass or pester her. It also included a provision for him not to attend any address where he knew or thought she was attending or receiving medical treatment; not to send abusive communications to her; indeed, not to communicate with her at all except through solicitors or the children’s social worker.

6. The non-molestation order extended to the protection of the children: not to use or threaten violence, threaten, intimidate, harass or pester them, or go anywhere where he thought they were, or indeed to communicate with them, save, as agreed in writing, with the children’s social worker.

7. The Guardian in her final analysis at E159 summarises the position thereafter. She records that the mother moved to Sweden to receive medical treatment after the fact-finding hearing. CA, CB and CC remained living in the UK with carers employed by the Local Authority and remained in their schools until 24 July 2025, when they travelled to join the mother in Sweden. The children have been living with the mother since then, settling into their home in Sweden. The mother has been supported by the maternal family.

8. In their case summary for this hearing, the Local Authority record that CA and CB were registered with the Swedish state system on 17 November 2025, and CC was registered with the Swedish state system on 3 December 2025. The Local Authority in the same document summarised the applications that are before the Court at this issues resolution / early final hearing. Applications being pursued

9. Firstly, there is the Local Authority’s application for an order under section 31 of the Children Act.

10. Secondly, the mother makes applications by an application dated 3 October 2025 for a child arrangements order for the children to live with her in Sweden, for an extension of the non-molestation order that I have referred to, and for an order pursuant to section 4(2A) of the Children Act for the father’s parental responsibility for all three children to be removed. Children’s living arrangements and parental responsibility

11. The current living arrangements, as will be apparent from what I have already said, is that the children are living with the mother at an undisclosed confidential address in Sweden, known to the Local Authority I should say.

12. As far as parental responsibility is concerned, there has, throughout proceedings, been some confusion in relation to CB. It has always been clear that the father has parental responsibility for CA and CC as a father named on their birth certificates. As far as CB is concerned, he has a Swedish birth certificate. That document does not name the father as the father, but immediately prior to this hearing counsel for the mother provided me with a document in Swedish which appears to be a form of parental responsibility agreement. I am invited by the mother to determine that that is the equivalent of a parental responsibility agreement in this jurisdiction. As a result, the father has parental responsibility for CB as well as CA and CC, which in fact had been my understanding, certainly since the fact-finding hearing.

13. The document is written in Swedish, but Mr Dove on behalf of the mother, using software on the internet, has been able to suggest a translation. Having considered the document in its translated form, it does appear to represent a form of parental responsibility agreement. I am satisfied on the balance of probabilities on that, albeit rather thin evidence, that the father has parental responsibility for all three children.

14. I should say for completeness, before turning to the positions of the parties, that the children with whom I am concerned are, in the case of CA, early teenager, CB pre-teen and CC of early years school age. Parties’ positions

15. The Local Authority position today is that they seek no order on their section 31 application, and they support the mother’s various applications, which I will turn to in a moment. They have set out within their evidence, and copied into their case summary for this hearing, a transition plan. I am going to set that out verbatim: “The Local Authority will facilitate the children’s educational transition by arranging a transition meeting between their current schools in the UK and their new schools in Sweden. Given the significant experiences of CA, CB and CC, support for their academic and emotional wellbeing is essential. Consequently, a handover will be beneficial to support the children. CA and CB’s education, health and care plans will also be provided to their new schools. Support will be provided with the necessary documentation required for CA’s surgery. The Local Authority will assist the mother in understanding the importance of creating a will and encourage her to nominate individuals who will manage CA’s civil litigation case, and provide care for CA, CB and CC, should the mother become unable to do so at any time”.

16. Pausing there, the reference to CA’s civil litigation case is a reference to a clinical negligence claim he pursues in the High Court, which is ongoing. The transition plan continues: “Assistance will be provided with CB’s citizenship application. Support will be provided in establishing an email address to facilitate letterbox contact between the children and the father for the maternal family. A physical handover will be completed to see the children in Sweden, and a formal handover will be completed with Swedish social care services”.

17. The Local Authority had in their case summary and their evidence indicated an intention to provide assistance to the mother if she wished to obtain mirror orders in Sweden. In fact, discussions between counsel for the Local Authority and the mother have concluded that the most effective way of the mother ensuring the enforcement of any order I make today is for me to be invited to complete an Article 40 certificate. That is a certificate pursuant to the 1996 Hague Convention on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, Recognition and Enforcement and Cooperation in Respect of Parental Responsibility and Measures for Protection of Children.

18. In relation to the arrangements for contact between the children and the father, the Local Authority’s case summary records that it does not make a firm recommendation. The social worker, Ms Ashama, has undertaken five risk assessments in respect of the issue of indirect contact and the possibility of direct contact resuming. The children have been, it is said, consistent in not wanting to see the father. There has been limited indirect contact. Principally, cards sent by the father have been shared with any of the children who wished to hear from him. He has had the opportunity to send indirect contact twice a month but has not utilised that facility. The Local Authority, as I have set out already, propose a mutual email address for the purpose of indirect contact continuing with the maternal aunt to monitor the mailbox for that purpose.

19. It has been agreed between the Local Authority and the mother, and as I understand it supported by the Guardian, that there should be a recital to the order at the conclusion of these proceedings setting out the arrangements for contact rather than an order for contact under section 8 of the Children Act. The Local Authority also invited me to make an order giving permission for the order to be disclosed as required to children’s social care and state authorities in Sweden and also to be disclosed to CA’s lawyers in his clinical negligence litigation.

20. For her part, the mother invites me to make a child arrangements order recording the children are to live with her and an order removing parental responsibility in respect of all three children from the father; an extension of the non-molestation order with some variation to take account of the fact the social worker and the mother’s solicitors will no longer be involved after a final order has been made.

21. On 4 April 2025, the father gave undertakings to the Court expressed to be “until further order”. That undertaking was for him not to travel to Sweden, and the mother invites me to make no order discharging that undertaking, save that she concedes it should be limited to the youngest child attaining their majority.

22. As far as the father is concerned, there has been no engagement with the Local Authority since early December 2025. Counsel, on behalf of the father, set out the position as he understood it by way of an email to the Court yesterday. He subsequently was able to speak to the father who indicated through him that he did not intend coming to the hearing today. Counsel for the father informed me that he had explained that the Court was considering making final orders today, including a child arrangements order for the children to live with the mother, granting permission to the mother to live with the children outside the jurisdiction in Sweden, and other matters were discussed.

23. Mr Williamson reports that the father instructed him that he “does not need counsel to make any submissions on his behalf”. The father expressed through counsel disappointment about delay in the children entering school and delay to CA’s back surgery. It is fair to observe that, in some part at least, that delay has been occasioned by the father.

24. As far as the Guardian is concerned, she is wholly in agreement with the Local Authority’s position and supports the mother’s applications.

25. This case has had the benefit of judicial continuity, not only from the outset of these proceedings, but with, I think, one exception, the two previous sets of proceedings: one in relation to child assessment orders and the first set of care proceedings. Specifically for today’s hearing, I have had the benefit of reminding myself of the findings that I made in the judgment I have already referred to.

26. I have considered the social workers’ final evidence in two witness statements at C560 and C585, together with the contact risk assessment at C556 and the care plans which start at D22. I have also considered the Guardian’s final analysis, which, in light of the complexities in this case, is admirably succinct, and I am very grateful to her, and that is at E159. I have considered the Local Authority’s case summary, the mother’s position statement and skeleton argument, and the Guardian’s position statement. Law

27. Let me turn to the law. I am invited to make a child arrangements order under section 8 of the Children Act 1989 . I remind myself of the matters that are set out in section 1 of the Children Act. Firstly, the children’s welfare is my paramount concern. Secondly, in assessing their welfare, I am to have regard to the matters set out in section 1(3) and I should make the least interventionist order that is necessary to protect their safety. I observe that there is a presumption in favour of a parent spending time with a child, unless the contrary is shown.

28. As far as the non-molestation order application is concerned, section 42 of the Family Law Act 1996 provides that: “(2) The court may make a non-molestation order— (a) if an application for the order has been made (whether in other family proceedings or without any other family proceedings being instituted) by a person who is associated with the respondent; or (b) if in any family proceedings to which the respondent is a party the court considers that the order should be made for the benefit of any other party to the proceedings or any relevant child even though no such application has been made. (5) In deciding whether to exercise its powers under this section and, if so, in what manner, the court shall have regard to all the circumstances including the need to secure the health, safety and well-being— (a) of the applicant and (b) of any relevant child”.

29. In summary, the criteria for the making of a non-molestation order are all the circumstances, including the need to secure the health, safety and wellbeing of the applicant and any relevant child, and there are three principles: (a) there must be evidence of molestation, C v C (Non-Molestation Order: Jurisdiction) [1998] 1 FLR 554 ; (b) the applicant or child must need protection and (c) the judge must be persuaded that judicial intervention is required to control the behaviour which is the subject of the complaint, see for example C v C [2001] EWCA Civ 1625 .

30. In relation to the application under section 4(2A) of the Children Act, I am grateful to counsel for the Local Authority for setting out various principles, which I will repeat. Firstly, she sets out the terms of section 4(2A): “A person who has acquired parental responsibility under subsection (1) shall cease to have that responsibility only if the court so orders”.

31. In D v E (Termination of Parental Responsibility) [2021] EWFC 37 , Macdonald J set out a summary of the law, and I will read that from paragraphs 31 to 35 in full: “ Termination of Parental Responsibility

31. Where, as in this case, the father has acquired parental responsibility pursuant to s.4(1) (a) of the Children Act 1989 by being registered as the subject child’s father, his parental responsibility may only be removed by an order of the court pursuant to s.4 (2A) of the 1989 Act . Having regard to the terms of s.1 of the Children Act 1989, when deciding whether to terminate a father’s parental responsibility, the child’s welfare is the court’s paramount consideration (that question being a question with respect to the upbringing of a child pursuant to s.105(1) of the Act ) but is not required to consider the factors set out in s.1(3) of the 1989 Act , as an order terminating the father’s parental responsibility is not an order specified in s.1(4) of the 1989 Act . However, in Re D (Withdrawal of Parental Responsibility) [2015] 1 FLR 166 the Court of Appeal made clear at [12] that: ‘[12] When a court is considering an application relating to the cessation of parental responsibility, the court is considering a question with respect to the upbringing of a child with the consequence that by s 1(1) (b) of the CA 1989 the child’s welfare will be the court’s paramount consideration. By s 1(4) , there is no requirement upon the court to consider the factors set out in s 1(3) (the ‘welfare checklist’) but the court is not prevented from doing so and may find it helpful to use an analytical framework not least because welfare has to be considered and reasoned. Given that the cessation of parental responsibility is an order of the court, the court must also consider whether making such an order is better for the child than making no order at all (the ‘no order’ principle in s 1(5) of the CA 1989)’.

32. With respect to the factors to be taken into account, in Re P (Terminating Parental Responsibility) [1995] 1 FLR 1048 , Singer J held as follows at p.1052: ‘I start from the proposition that parental responsibility – both wanting to have it and its exercise – is a laudable desire which is to be encouraged rather than rebuffed. So that I think one can postulate as a first principle that parental responsibility once obtained should not be terminated in the case of a non-marital father on less than solid grounds, with a presumption for continuance rather than for termination. The ability of a mother to make such an application therefore should not be allowed to become a weapon in the hands of the dissatisfied mother of the non-marital child: it should be used by the court as an appropriate step in the regulation of the child’s life where the circumstances really do warrant it and not otherwise. I have been referred in outline to four authorities as to the circumstances in which a court will make an order for parental responsibility on application to it under s 4 , notwithstanding maternal opposition and, more particularly, as to the criteria and considerations which are relevant. The authorities in question are: Re H (Minors) (Local Authority: Parental Rights) (No 3) [1991] Fam 151 , sub nom Re H (Illegitimate Children: Father: Parental Rights) (No 2) [1991] 1 FLR 214 ; Re C (Minors) (Parental Rights) [1992] 1 FLR 1 , in the Court of Appeal, and Re G (A Minor) (Parental Responsibility Order) [1994] 1 FLR 504 , also in the Court of Appeal; and, finally, a decision of Wilson J, Re P (A Minor) (Parental Responsibility Order) [1994] 1 FLR 578 . Such applications for parental responsibility orders are governed by the considerations set out in s 1(1) of the Children Act, namely that the child’s welfare is the court’s paramount consideration. I can see no reason why that principle should be departed from in considering the termination of a parental responsibility order or agreement. Key concepts to the consideration of the making of an order are evidence of attachment and a degree of commitment, the presumption being that, other things being equal, a parental responsibility order should be made rather than withheld in an appropriate case’.

33. Within this context, in CW v SG (Parental Responsibility Consequential Orders) [2013] EWHC 854 (Fam) , [2013] 2 FLR 655 Baker J (as he then was) endorsed the approach taken by Singer J in Re P (Terminating Parental Responsibility) . In CW v SG (Parental Responsibility Consequential Orders) Baker J held as follows at [59]: ‘As in Re P , I find that, if the father did not have parental responsibility, it is inconceivable it would now be granted to him, and that this is a factor I should take into account when considering this application to terminate his parental responsibility. Furthermore, like Singer J in Re P , I find that in this case there is no element of the bundle of responsibilities that make up parental responsibility which this father could, in present or foreseeable circumstances, exercise in a way which would be beneficial for D.’

34. The decision of Baker J (as he then was) was upheld by the Court of Appeal in Re D (Withdrawal of Parental Responsibility) [2015] 1 FLR 166 , in which Ryder LJ (as he then was) held as follows at [13] and [14] with respect to the factors to be taken into account on an application to terminate parental responsibility pursuant to s.4 (2A) of the Children Act 1989 : ‘[13] The paramountcy test is overarching and no one factor that the court might consider in a welfare analysis has any hypothetical priority. Accordingly, factors that may be said to have significance by analogy or on the facts of a particular case, for example, the factors that the court considers within the overarching question of welfare upon an application for a parental responsibility order (the degree of commitment which the father has shown to the child, the degree of attachment which exists between the father and the child and the reasons of the father for applying for the order) may be relevant on the facts of a particular case but are not to be taken to be a substitute test to be applied (see Re M (Parental Responsibility Order) [2013] EWCA Civ 969 , [2014] 1 FLR 339 , at paras [15] and [16]). [14] An unmarried father does not benefit from a ‘presumption’ as to the existence or continuance of parental responsibility. He obtains it in accordance with the statutory scheme and may lose it in the same way. In both circumstances it is the welfare of the child that creates the presumption, not the parenthood of the unmarried father. The concept of rival presumptions is not helpful, although I entirely accept that the fact of parenthood raises the welfare question, hence the right of a parent (with or without parental responsibility) to make an application under s 8 of the CA 1989 without permission (see s 10(4) (a) of the CA 1989). There is also ample case-law describing the imperative in favour of a continuing relationship between both parents and a child so that ordinarily a child’s upbringing should be provided by both of his parents and where that is not in the child’s interests by one of them with the child having the benefit of a meaningful relationship with both. A judge would not be criticised for identifying that, as a very weighty, relevant factor, the significance of the parenthood of an unmarried father should not be under estimated’.

35. Within the foregoing context, it is also important when considering an application to terminate the parental responsibility of an unmarried father to have regard to the shared nature of parental responsibility when the same is conferred upon both parents. In this context, in Re W (Direct Contact) [2013] 1 FLR 494 at [80] McFarlane LJ (as he then was) observed as follows: ‘Whether or not a parent has parental responsibility is not simply a matter that achieves the ticking of a box on a form. It is a significant matter of status as between parent and child and, just as important, as between each of the parents. By stressing the ‘responsibility’ which is so clearly given prominence in the Children Act 1989 , section 3 and the likely circumstance that that responsibility is shared with the other parent, it is hoped that some parents may be encouraged more readily to engage with the difficulties that undoubtedly arise when contemplating post separation contact than may hitherto been the case’”.

32. Counsel for the Local Authority also referred me briefly to Lieven J’s decision in Ms X v Mr Y [2023] EWHC 3170 (Fam) , paragraph 60: “I have considered whether some lesser step, such as removing any obligation to consult or inform the F about medical or educational decisions, would be more proportionate. However, in practice once I have removed these rights and he has no contact with the children, in reality parental responsibility is diminished to such a point it has little meaning”. Evidence

33. Turning to the facts of this case then for the reasons already given, I have found that threshold for making an order is met, and because it is relevant to the assessment of whether to make an order under section 8 of the Children Act, and may be of significance in considering an application under section 4 (2A) of the Children Act, I will set out the evidence in relation to welfare following the Welfare Checklist. Wishes and feelings

34. First of all, the children’s wishes and feelings: the Local Authority’s penultimate statement, that is Ms Ashama’s penultimate statement, records that C571: “The Local Authority has worked with CA, CB, and CC and their parents since February 2020. The first round of Family Court proceedings was due to concerns about the father and mother’s non-engagement with professionals, despite the extensive efforts made to get them to engage. The current proceedings were initiated by the Local Authority due to concerns regarding significant domestic abuse and coercive control from the father towards the mother. CA, CB, and CC are also victims as they have experienced the domestic abuse throughout their lives. The fact-finding hearing in January 2025 established that the mother, CA, CB, and CC are victims of the domestic abuse perpetrated by the father. CA, CB, and CC have a very strong bond and attachment to their mother and have consistently expressed their wish to live with her to their social care and their independent advocate, Ms Alexander Samarine”.

35. In relation to their wishes so far as the father is concerned, the Guardian in her final analysis on her final page in her final paragraph, says this: “CC said he wanted to ‘Stay with Mummy’. CB said, ‘I am not sure if I’m going to stay here or not. I don’t really know the answer’. CA wouldn’t speak to me but showed from his behaviour towards the mother that he seemed happy”. As I have understood the evidence, there has been some interest shown by CB in having some contact with his father, but not on the part of CA and CC. Physical, emotional and educational needs and age sex and background

36. As far as the children’s physical, emotional, and educational needs, and their age, sex, and background are concerned, much of this has been set out already in my judgment. As I have already said, in mid-November and early December 2025, all three children were registered with the Swedish authorities. At the time of the penultimate statement, CA continued to be supported by his UK educational placement, pending his enrolment in school in Sweden, similarly CB and CC.

37. From a medical point of view, CA suffers from spinal scoliosis. He underwent an MRI scan on 27 November 2025 in Sweden. The degree of scoliosis was described as serious, but not an emergency and plans are in place for the surgery to be undertaken within the next four to five months. The mother reported to the social worker that an occupational therapist follow-up appointment had been arranged for CA in mid-January in Sweden. It follows from that evidence that his needs arising from his cerebral palsy are being met, or are in hand, in Sweden.

38. As far as CB is concerned, he needed to see an optician and an audiologist. He utilises a hearing aid in his left ear, and the mother was making arrangements for that in Sweden.

39. As far as CC is concerned, he was said to have no identified health issues, and his development was in accordance with age-related expectations.

40. As far as housing was concerned, children’s social care had supported the mother in booking short-term accommodation in Sweden for her and the three children from July 2025, when the children arrived. They are described as living in an apartment. CA has a room to himself. CB and CC share a room. The mother has a room, and when Maternal Grandmother visits provision is made for her to also stay in the apartment.

41. The mother has indicated to the social worker that she would like to remain in the current accommodation for the time being, because although it did not have all of the rooms that were required, the living space was adequate, and the apartment was close to the family network. As I will come on to describe that is a very important part of the safety net that is in place around these children but also close to the proposed schools.

42. The information provided by CA’s solicitor in the civil litigation is to the effect that CA will likely be awarded a substantial sum of money. My understanding is that that runs into millions of pounds. As a result of that, it is likely that a house could be bought to meet CA and the rest of the family’s needs in Sweden. Indeed, that seems to be the mother’s intention.

43. Of that litigation, the social worker says this at C572 paragraph 3.4: “It’s acknowledged that the medical negligence case has been ongoing for over a decade, and the timeline for its conclusion remains uncertain”. Just pausing there for a moment, in part, as I understand it, that is because of uncertainty about where CA will eventually be living; there being a significant effect on any agreed or awarded compensation, depending on whether that is in the UK or outside the UK.

44. The social worker continued: “CA will continue to require the support of his legal representatives to ensure the case is resolved in its best interest and that his needs are fully met, given that he has sustained a lifelong life-limiting disability resulting from the medical negligence caused by the NHS at birth. The impact of the medical negligence upon CA and that of his family has been consistently evident throughout social care’s involvement, as CA’s additional needs have often been central to planning for the family, accommodation, health appointments and activities for him and his siblings. CA requires extensive health care and appointments to be planned and supported. Furthermore, he is highly dependent on responsible adults for his self-care, accessing the community and other daily living activities”.

45. An update provided in a statement dated 22 January is that in relation to education, CC started preschool on 12 January, CB was due to start school on 22 January and CA was waiting for a school to be identified by the Swedish authorities to meet his particular needs.

46. The Guardian in her final analysis sets out helpful summaries in respect of all three children. As far as CC is concerned, she says at E166 that whenever she has met him he has enjoyed playing physical games and when she has met him online, necessitated by him being in Sweden, he has been drawing and talking about what he has been doing and learning in Sweden.

47. In respect of CB, at the time of her final analysis she reported that he had not yet started school in Sweden but was still getting homework from his school in the UK and his education and health care plan sets out the needs and support that will have to be addressed by the school he attends in Sweden. She describes a video call with him during which he was engaging, contented and communicative. However, when speaking to him most recently he raised how hard it was for him to adjust to moving countries and there was a discussion between her and him about being kind to himself and talking about how he felt. She observed in her final analysis that she was not surprised by what CB had said because he was not sure about Sweden yet and probably would not be for some time, but that seemed to be usual for someone making such a big change and usual for someone of CB’s age as they enter their teenage years.

48. As far as CA is concerned, she records that he has seen a spinal specialist. He is on the waiting list for spinal surgery. He has the equipment he needs in the home to be able to sleep and move around and a wheelchair that is suitable for outside use, certainly in non-snowy conditions. She describes him as always having been shy and quiet when she met him in person and online but had always demonstrated that he liked living with Mother and his siblings. He did not want to talk to her on 14 January but said hello from the sofa and she observes that his start to school may be delayed by the planned surgery. Likely effect of change in circumstances

49. As far as the likely effect on the children of a change in circumstances, under the order that the mother proposes and is supported by the Local Authority and the Guardian, there will not be any change in the current circumstances. Looking at matters more globally, there has been a very significant change in that all three children have moved from the UK to Sweden, having spent that part of their life which they will have good recollections of in the UK. That is a significant change for them.

50. They have also moved away from having their father in their lives day by day. That will have also been a significant change in their circumstances. However, the evidence which I have read and in part referred to indicates that they are settling, save to the extent that there are expected difficulties with the change of culture, change of language, change of country. Risk of harm

51. In part that feeds into a consideration of the risk of harm. In relation to that, the social worker in her penultimate statement at C582 records this: “The Local Authority has no evidence that would indicate that the children are at risk of continuing significant harm that would necessitate their removal from the mother. The information gathered from professionals and child in care reviews, statutory visits, Children’s Guardian, independent advocate and independent reviewing officer identified many positives for CA, CB and CC in the care of the mother. Therefore, the realistic option would be for the children to remain in the care of their mother”.

52. The Guardian addresses risk in this way at E163 paragraph five and the majority of paragraph six: “5. There are two low risks within this case now. Firstly, the risk that the mother’s ill health may suddenly decline as a result of further complications with her health status or that she may suddenly die as a result of her health status”. Pausing there, it was the mother’s medical condition that led her to travel to Sweden earlier in 2025 without the children in her care for a number of months until they moved to Sweden to be with her. There is limited medical information about the prognosis in relation to that, but it appears generally positive.

53. The Guardian continues: “As the social worker has recommended in her final statement, I would also agree that it’s very important that the mother appoints adults who can care for her children in the sad event that she’s unable to continue caring for them through the making of a will.

6. Secondly, there is a risk that the father may attempt to find the mother and the children once proceedings have ended. He may then try and persuade the mother to resume her relationship with him, allowing him back into the family home and resume caring for the children. This has happened before the first proceedings and resulted in the mother and the children moving and living in Berkshire. I have been speaking to the mother about this risk throughout proceedings. The mother has shown that she’s not been in contact with the father by phone or email and disclosed any communication he has made to the social worker. The mother has talked at length about her experiences and trauma living with the father. Now that the mother is settling into her new home and has the support of her maternal family around her, I feel that the risk of this happening remains low”. Capability of parents

54. Turning next to consider the capability of the parents and dealing first with the mother, the social worker in her penultimate statement at C569 says that since the commencement of social care involvement, the mother has consistently engaged with social care and other professionals and that that has been sustained since her separation from the father. She has facilitated access to the children as required and has demonstrated effort independently and in collaboration with professionals to address the needs of the children, actively participated in all relevant assessments and meetings with the children’s schools and health appointments for the children and communicated pertinent information in relation to them.

55. She is described as being highly responsive via phone, email and text messages and none of the children’s schools or other professionals have expressed any concerns regarding her engagement. Her overall view set out at C578 is that Mother has demonstrated positive parenting since the children have been in her care, even though she had been subject to significant domestic abuse, sexual abuse and coercive control from the father for the majority of their relationship spanning over 14 years.

56. The Guardian echoes that in her final analysis at E164, saying that the children have now been living with the mother since July 2025; that she has been engaging, open and communicative about the children’s progress, activities and well-being. She references a report from Swedish social care, which I have seen in the bundle at C519, which summarises the mother and the children’s progress and references it concluding with information that the mother is a “present mother”, somebody who can put her needs to one side and shows love and warmth to the children.

57. She cautions that the children have significant additional needs and the Swedish social care assessment notes that it is likely the mother will need extensive professional support, educationally, medically and family support in her ongoing care of the children. That is to be expected, and in setting that out, in no way do I suggest that undermines the ability of the mother to effectively care for these three children.

58. As far as the father is concerned, no parenting assessment has been carried out of him. I considered and determined at a previous hearing that it would be of no material benefit in these proceedings in light of the extremely serious findings that I made against him. The most recent contact risk assessment at C557 identifies that telephone contact should not be initiated pending the father’s completion of a perpetrator programme and therapeutic support of the children. It recommends that the father continues to be permitted to write letters to the children twice a month, those to be vetted at the time of the risk assessment by the social work team and thereafter by a member of the maternal family.

59. The author of the assessment, Ms Ashama, the children’s social worker, says this at C559: “It’s my professional view that direct contact between the father and the children will not be beneficial at the current time. The father’s persistent lack of insight regarding the children’s exposure to domestic abuse and coercive controlling behaviour remains a significant concern. The father’s not acknowledged the children’s considerable exposure to domestic abuse whilst in his care. Consequently, it’s assessed that direct contact may not be beneficial for the children, given the father’s failure to validate their experiences. Concerns are held that the children will not receive the acknowledgement they may seek and will instead continue to face the father’s denial and unrealistic perspective of their lived experiences. There’s a risk the father may communicate or act in ways that can directly or indirectly cause the children emotional harm. Further emotional damage is likely if the children are exposed to the father’s denials of domestic abuse, violent conduct and coercive controlling behaviour they witnessed and heard during their time in his care”. The risk assessment then sets out the proposal, which I have identified already, of a neutral email address monitored by a family member.

60. The social worker in her penultimate statement says this of the father at C570, paragraph 1.22: “The father’s engagement with social care has been minimal. There is an ongoing concern that the father will only engage meaningfully when mandated by the Family Court or requested by his legal representative. The concern persists that he has not demonstrated insight into the reasons for social care involvement in the care proceedings. I remain concerned regarding the father’s capacity to acknowledge the children’s experience of the domestic abuse and coercive control perpetrated by him and that this behaviour may continue. I have significant concerns that he will continue to subject the children and the mother to these behaviours, should he have any opportunity to be involved in decisions regarding the children or have any contact with the mother. An example of the father’s non-engagement in behaviour that has persisted is the email exchange copied below”.

61. She then sets it out. It is an email sent as recently as 3 December 2025. The social worker had emailed the father noting that he had not written to the children for a while. It was a neutral and clear, straightforward email. It had the children’s best interests in mind. His response was, and he names the social worker, “take a long walk off a short pier. God will judge”. That is entirely in line with his previous communications in relation to which I made findings against him, which I have already set out.

62. The Guardian says at E165: “I would be extremely concerned about the father having any direct contact with the children, given the findings that were made against him given his current behaviour and apparent inability to reflect or engage with support services locally.

63. In addition, then E168: “At present, I would be concerned that the children would continue to be at risk of significant harm emotionally, physically and through neglect if they had any direct contact with the father now. The children should continue to have indirect contact with the father until the father has made the changes needed to his behaviour and ability to promote positive family relationships”.

64. As far as others are concerned, at C578 in the Local Authority’s penultimate statement, the social worker records a positive assessment of the maternal family’s support to the mother and the children. She records numerous strengths within the network and the beneficial impact of that on the children, with no concerns being raised about the maternal family and the children having consistently expressed positive feelings towards members of their maternal family.

65. Members of the mother’s family live in the local area in Sweden. The social worker records it is positive that the children are now where the mother and their maternal family network are. The maternal grandmother has been a regular support and elsewhere in the bundle there is reference to the support from the maternal aunt but also the maternal uncle, who has provided assistance with care.

66. In the care plan, in the event that there is a difficulty with the placement that is proposed, it is said that if the mother is unable to care for the children, then the maternal grandmother would step in to care, and if she was not able to care, then the maternal aunt has put herself forward to care with support from the maternal uncle. Range of orders

67. In terms of the range of orders that may be made, it ranges from a care order at one end to no order at the other, with a child arrangements order falling somewhere between. Analysis

68. I am going to turn now to my analysis starting with the placement for the children. A care order is not pursued by the Local Authority, and any form of public law order in the circumstances of this case I find would be unnecessary and disproportionate. The risks of harm, as identified by the Guardian, are of the mother not being able to continue to care for the children, although there is no current likelihood of that, and the father trying to make direct contact with the children or destabilise the placement in some other way, which other orders can attempt to regulate and mitigate.

69. The alternative to making a child arrangements order might be to make no order at all. The children are in the care of Mother. She has parental responsibility. She is in Sweden and they are with her.

70. The difficulty with making no order is it does not recognise the reality of the situation, which is as I have just described. There is no realistic likelihood of the father sharing responsibility for caring for the children in the short to medium term and a child arrangements order as an alternative will recognise that reality, but also will likely assist the mother in the exercise of her parental responsibility in Sweden, both in relation to meeting the medical needs of the children as and when they arise and their educational needs.

71. All of the evidence that I have set out in the course of this judgment leads me to the firm conclusion that on balance, it is in the welfare interests of the children for me to make a child arrangements order for them to live with the mother. Making no order risks attempts by the father to inveigle his way into the family, an outcome that would manifestly not be in the children’s welfare interests in light of the findings that I have made, together with the evidence of his lack of engagement with, save in a very superficial way, professionals, and the assessment of him by professionals.

72. Therefore in those circumstances, recognising that the mother and the children are now settled in Sweden, I consider it is in the children’s welfare interests for me firstly to make an order reflecting that they should live with the mother, and giving permission to the mother to permanently remove them from the jurisdiction to Sweden.

73. I will turn next to consider the application in relation to the father’s exercise of parental responsibility. Although the father is not before the Court in person today, and has not advanced a positive case, I am satisfied that he had notice of the application to remove his parental responsibility. That was an application that was dated 2 October, and I made an order on 7 October, directing that the application was to be considered at today’s hearing. In the circumstances, I have no reason to think he was unaware of the application.

74. The evidence in support of the mother’s position that I should remove parental responsibility from the father is as follows. In the social worker’s final witness statement at page C590 of the bundle, she records the current difficulty that the mother faces in obtaining consent from the father to support CC’s application for a Swedish passport, which is still pending. The social worker says this: “The delay is primarily caused by the father’s failure to provide the necessary consent forms and his documents required for the children’s registration are an ongoing concern, and the children’s needs will continue to be delayed and suffer significantly. In addition, the Swedish state is very keen on respecting parental responsibility, and it will be beneficial for CA, CB and CC. Otherwise, it will continue to impact any future applications the mother makes for the children in Sweden”.

75. Over the page at C591, she describes the situation as being one of “sustained concern” and looking to the future, considers that the situation is likely to cause continued and significant detriment to the children’s needs. She also says that, and I accept this evidence: “There is a possibility that this action represents an attempt by the father to obstruct the mother and regain influence in her life following the conclusion of proceedings”. That would be consistent with the findings of coercive control that I have already made against the father. The Guardian observes, and again I accept this on the evidence that’s before me at page E165, that the father’s parental responsibility is not in fact being exercised in any meaningful way by him and has not been for some time.

76. In summary, the mother says this in her skeleton argument in support of this aspect of the application, reading from A356: “The father has been found to have perpetrated physical violence, including non-fatal strangulation, sexual abuse, coercive and controlling behaviour, abuse in the presence of the children. These findings are described as extensive, severe, and continuing across many years”.

77. Under the heading, “The father’s non-engagement and hostility”, she says through counsel the father has repeatedly refused to engage with professionals, failed to provide necessary consents for the children, sent hostile and concerning communication, and the Guardian and social worker identify him as lacking insight, dishonest, unable or unwilling to consider the children’s needs, and continuing to pose emotional and possibly physical risk. I had already made findings of dishonesty on his part, of quite a serious nature.

78. In addition, then under the heading, “Current welfare position of the children”, the mother says through counsel the children now live safely with their mother in Sweden. All professionals agree they are thriving. Their needs are being met. The mother’s parenting is safe and protective. The maternal family provides stable, practical support and none of the professionals identify any realistic possibility of safe direct contact with the father in the foreseeable future. Indirect contact is already filtered and limited. Recent evidence from the social worker’s updating statement dated 22 January 2026 confirms the continuing positive welfare trajectory of the children.

79. In light of that, the submission made on behalf of the mother by Mr Dove in the skeleton argument at A358 paragraph 15 is this: “The evidence demonstrates complete absence of engagement with essential parental tasks, a proven history of severe abuse, including to the mother and in the presence of the children, continuing hostility, denial and risk of manipulation. His failure to provide statutory consent has actively impeded the children’s access to education, healthcare, immigration registration processes”.

80. In addition, then at paragraph 16: “Despite repeated requests on 16 December 2025, 6 January 2026 and 21 January 2026, the father has failed to sign the consent forms required for CB’s British citizenship application. His failure to respond has caused material delay in the children’s registration processes, including their ability to access services and secure necessary documentation in Sweden. The Local Authority identifies these delays as sustained concern, noting the father’s non-provision of required consents is likely to cause significant detriment to the children’s needs, and may constitute a deliberate attempt to obstruct the mother and regain influence in her life following the conclusion of the proceedings (evidence which I have already set out)”.

81. In addition, then finally, through counsel she says: “The recent conduct is consistent with the findings already made, and it demonstrates his retention of parental responsibility continues to cause active harm, enabling him to impede education and healthcare, nationality processes and essential welfare decisions affecting the children”.

82. Although the authorities indicate that the checklist in section 1(3) is not directly applicable, it informs the decision that I have to make, which has to be in the welfare interests of the children. From a practical point of view, the father is not, and in the foreseeable future will not, be able to exercise parental responsibility in the form of day-to-day care of the children. To the extent that he has had the opportunity to exercise his parental responsibility in a way that is to the positive welfare advantage of the children, he has failed to demonstrate his ability to do so. He has failed through failing to support the various applications which I have made reference to.

83. It is apparent from his response to the social worker in the recent email, and in relation to even the most basic form of contact, indirect contact by letters, he has demonstrated a disregard for the children’s welfare. If I were to reverse the picture and ask myself whether I would grant a parental responsibility order in the circumstances, I would inevitably come down on the side of refusing such an application, and that is something which it is relevant for me to consider on the authorities.

84. I am not satisfied, therefore, in the circumstances that it would be in the children’s welfare interests for the father to continue to exercise parental responsibility. Indeed, it would be the antithesis of the children’s welfare interests. It would be contrary to their welfare interests for him to continue to exercise parental responsibility.

85. I do observe that in making an order removing his parental responsibility, I am not removing from him the ability in the future to make an application, if it was considered appropriate, to increase the level of contact he has with the children. That, at least, would be the position under the law in England and Wales. I cannot speak for what it would be in Sweden. However, the effect of withdrawing parental responsibility is not to end any involvement in the children’s lives, but to end the involvement that comes with the responsibility of parental responsibility and so I will make that order.

86. Next, I turn to the undertakings that have been given and the non-molestation order application. I will deal with the undertakings first of all. The undertakings, which were given and are set out at page B368 of the bundle, were open-ended. They were clear to the father at the time that I accepted the undertakings because he was in Court when they were given. There has not been an application to discharge them and in a sense, I could just leave them as they are, but I do not consider that is necessary or proportionate for the protection of the children.

87. If it were to continue beyond CC’s majority, it may be limiting to the father to hold him to an undertaking not to travel to Sweden beyond that point in time. I remind myself that, as in relation to contact, the father may make an application to discharge those undertakings prior to CC’s 18 th birthday, in which case the Court will consider the matter at that stage. That then points out one reason why it is important for there to be a transcript of this judgment.

88. As far as the non-molestation order is concerned, the Guardian in her final analysis at E163, paragraph six, said that: “The mother should have the support of a legal order to prevent the father from making contact in person by email, text message, WhatsApp or through another social media forum”. As I have indicated already, the application has the support of the Local Authority and of the Guardian.

89. The mother’s submissions on that application are that the need for an extension is overwhelming. Just pausing there, whilst it might be phrased as an extension, effectively what I am being asked to do is to grant a new non-molestation order, because the current non-molestation order in its current form will come to an end at the end of these proceedings, and what is required is a varied version of that non-molestation order in light of the fact the social worker and solicitors will no longer be involved. However, the basis upon which counsel says that the need for an extension is overwhelming is that there have been findings of severe abuse; that there has been continued hostility in communication; and that there is a risk of the father attempting to locate the mother and the children, a risk that has been identified by the Guardian and the Local Authority.

90. Whilst there is some protection to the mother in that she is now residing outside the jurisdiction and there is some protection derived from the undertaking which the father has given and which will persist, the non-molestation order that I am invited to make extends further than attempting to meet the mother face-to-face by travelling to where she is thought to be residing. It includes indirect communication and the undertaking not to travel to Sweden would not be sufficient to protect the mother from that risk of harm.

91. The nature of the findings that I have made are really so serious that I am satisfied that the mother and the children require the protection of a non-molestation order and I note that a non-molestation order is not limited in terms of its jurisdictional effect. The findings that I made of dishonesty and abusive behaviour on the part of the father demonstrate the risks of harm to the mother and to the children of not making a non-molestation order. When I step back and go back to the test that I set out earlier in my judgment, I am satisfied, firstly, that clearly there is evidence of molestation; secondly, that there is a need for protection, and thirdly, that intervention is required from the Court to control the behaviour that the mother and the children are at risk of being on the receiving end of.

92. In those circumstances, I will make a non-molestation order in similar terms to that which is already set out in the existing non-molestation order, but in relation to making contact about arrangements for indirect contact for the children with a variation to allow the maternal aunt to be the conduit for those discussions.

93. That concludes the formal decision-making part of my judgment, but I wish to add some concluding remarks to my judgment, firstly directed towards the mother. I have written them down, so I apologise to the mother that I will be reading them out, but I think it was important that I had the opportunity to select the words I used carefully.

94. Nothing that I say can come close to doing justice to the resilience that the mother has shown in the face of incredible adversity. To care for a child with cerebral palsy with two other children, whilst the victim and survivor of horrific domestic abuse and then to move country to address her own urgent medical needs and to best meet the needs of her children, whilst navigating the complexities of a High Court clinical negligence claim, is nothing short of remarkable. I say to her that I recognise she is a very determined woman, a woman who has my enormous respect and to whom I offer my very best wishes for the future, both to her personally and in bringing up these three very special children.

95. Next, it would be wrong to fail to acknowledge the work of the Guardian and the social worker. Both of them have provided consistent, steady and even-handed support to the mother, to the children and to me as the judge.

96. If I may, I must offer a special thanks to Ms Ashama, the children’s social worker, for her unstinting commitment to the children. This has been a complex and challenging case with a huge number of moving parts in terms of CA’s medical needs, the mother’s medical situation, CA’s clinical negligence claim, jurisdictional issues, and the father’s behaviour all over a protracted period of some three years.

97. Ms Ashama’s work on the case has gone above and beyond what might reasonably be expected of a children’s social worker and she is to be commended for her dedication and for her commitment to them. I want to personally thank her. After this hearing, I intend emailing the joint legal team and asking for this paragraph of my judgment to be drawn to the attention of the director of Children’s Services at the Royal Borough of Windsor and Maidenhead. Ms Ashama, thank you very much for your assistance. That is the end of my judgment. End of Judgment Transcript of a recording by Acolad UK Ltd 291-299 Borough High Street, London SE1 1JG Tel: 020 7269 0370 [email protected] Acolad UK Ltd hereby certify that the above is an accurate and complete record of the proceedings or part thereof