Raphael Folarin v The Immigration Services Commissioner

Background to the appeal

1. This is an appeal pursuant to section 87(2) of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 (“ The Act ”) which concerns a decision made by the Immigration Services Commissioner (the “Commissioner”). The Office of the Immigration Service Commissioner (“OISC”) has recently been renamed the Immigration Advice Authority (“IAA”).

2. The Commissioner decided on 1 August 2025 to refuse Mr Folarin’s application for registration at Level 1 under Schedule 6 of the Act (the “Decision”). Agreed facts The Application

3. On 19 March 2025, Mr Raphael Taiwo Folarin and his organisation, DSN Global Immigration Lawyers, applied for registration at Level 1 in the categories of ‘Immigration’ and ‘Asylum and Protection’.

4. Mr Folarin applied to be the sole adviser of DSN Global Immigration Lawyers.

5. On 28 May 2025, Mr Folarin passed the IAA’s Level 1 Competence Assessment. Fitness

6. Pursuant to the Guidance on Fitness for Advisers, the IAA’s criteria for assessing fitness to provide immigration advice and/or services are: a. The likelihood of compliance with the IAA’s Regulatory Scheme b. A history of honesty and legal compliance c. A history of financial probity

7. The Guidance on Fitness for Advisers confirms that when determining the fitness of those who will be providing advice, one of the factors the Commissioner will take into account is: “Criminal convictions in the UK or abroad regardless of whether or not they are spent included under the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 (Exceptions) Order 1975)”

8. The IAA has a guidance note on applications from ex-offenders. This policy states at paragraph 4: “The IAA is committed to the fair treatment of all advisers and applicant advisers regardless of race, gender, religion, sexual orientation, age, physical/mental disability or offending background. The fact that you have a criminal conviction will not necessarily bar you from being regulated by the IAA… Crimes where the individual has acted with dishonesty are of particular concern to the IAA. This is even in the case when the conviction is ‘spent’, as set out in the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 . This is because the IAA must assess an individual’s honesty and integrity when deciding whether or not to allow them to provide immigration advice or immigration services to clients.”

9. The Guidance on Fitness for Advisers and guidance note on applications from ex- offenders are both publicly available on the IAA’s website. Previous Convictions

10. Mr Folarin has previous convictions for the following offences: a. Attempt/Robbery on 8 December 2008 under s.8 of the Theft Act 1968 b. Having firearm with intent to commit indictable offence on 8 December 2008 under s.18(1) of the Firearms Act 1968 c. Robbery on 8 December 2008 under s.8 of the Theft Act 1968 d. Having firearm with intent to commit indictable offence on 8 December 2008 e. Attempt/Robbery on 9 December 2008 under s.8 of the Theft Act 1968 f. Having firearm with intent to commit indictable offence on 9 December 2008 under s.18(1) of the Firearms Act 1968 g. Having counterfeit currency note on 11 September 2013 under s.16(2) of the Forgery and Counterfeiting Act 1981 h. Possessing controlled drug – Class A – Cocaine on 24 May 2013 under s.5(2) of the Misuse of Dugs Act 1971 i. Failure to comply with the requirements of a Community Order under Sch. 8 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 j. Driving whilst disqualified on 15 October 2013 under s.103(1)(B) under the Road Traffic Act 1968 k. Making off without paying on 15 October 2013 under s.3 of the Theft Act 1978 The Decision

11. On 1 August 2025, the Commissioner refused Mr Folarin’s application for registration as he could not be satisfied that Mr Folarin is fit to provide immigration advice and/or services.

12. In the Decision at Paragraph 2 under the heading “4. Reasons for this Decision” the Commissioner states: “ The applicant responded (“the response”) on 14 July 2025 , 16 July 2025 and 17 July 2025 . These responses have been taken into consideration in reaching this decision, along with all the other evidence before the Commissioner. This includes all of the documents submitted by the applicant as part of his application. These documents are not listed here but have been considered. The Commissioner has also taken into account previous declarations made by the applicant within previous applications for registrations he has submitted to the OISC/IAA.”

13. On 1 August 2025, Mr Folarin appealed the Decision. The Decision

14. In the Decision, on which they rely to oppose the appeal, the Commissioner gave the following reasons for the refusal: a. Mr Folarin’s previous convictions are serious in nature, some of which involve dishonesty, disobedience and a degree of violence. b. Dishonesty is at the upper end of the spectrum of wrongdoing. Advice seekers can be some of the most vulnerable members of society and registered advisers are in a position of trust. Having been convicted of an offence involving dishonesty puts Mr Folarin’s trustworthiness into question. c. Additionally, Mr Folarin was convicted for driving whilst disqualified and failed to comply with a community order. d. Altogether, this does not show a positive history of honesty and legal compliance. Furthermore, it does not suggest that Mr Folarin is likely to comply with the IAA Regulatory Scheme. e. The Commissioner has taken all of the evidence into account. This includes the applicant’s correspondence dated 14 July 2025. Solely based on reading this correspondence, the Commissioner, on balance, considers the contents of this correspondence to be sincere. f. The relevant test is whether the applicant is fit and competent to provide immigration advice and/or services. The applicant must be able to demonstrate both fitness and competence to the Commissioner. The Respondent does not consider that he has demonstrated his fitness. The Grounds of appeal

15. Mr Folarin in his grounds of appeal gave the following reasons, in summary, why he considered that the decision was wrong: a. The decision places undue weight on historic criminal convictions in the period from 2008-2013. It is unreasonable and disproportionate to allow these to override the Appellant’s evidence of rehabilitation, reform, and positive contribution. The Appellant has not reoffended in the interim and made deliberate and sustained efforts to rebuild his life in a responsible and lawful manner. b. The Appellant has provided evidence of his personal reform and community contribution including his employment records, character witnesses, educational development and evidence of his work in the community. None of this evidence appears to have been properly acknowledged or weighed. c. The decision appears to reflect a rigid and punitive approach that does not align with the principles of proportionality and fairness. Regulatory bodies including the IAA must balance public protection with the opportunity for rehabilitation. The approach taken by the IAA here suggests that a person with any historical offence, no matter how distant or how reformed they have become, is permanently disqualified from contributing to this field. d. The IAA has misinterpreted the likelihood of compliance and the assertion that the Appellant is unlikely to comply with IAA rules is both speculative and unsubstantiated. e. Regulation exists not to punish individuals indefinitely for past mistakes, but to protect the public and ensure the profession is upheld by competent, ethical individuals. The Appellant asserts that he has demonstrated that he meets this standard. Legal framework

16. The Immigration & Asylum Act 1999 (“ the Act ”) provides a scheme for regulation of immigration advisers. The Office of the Immigration Services Commissioner (now renamed the IAA) is established by section 83 of the Act and the Commissioner has a general duty to promote good practice by those who provide immigration advice or immigration services. The Commissioner also has certain regulatory functions set out in Schedule 5 to Part 1 of the Act .

17. The Commissioner must exercise their functions so as to ensure, so far as is reasonably practicable, that those who provide immigration advice and services are inter alia, “ fit and competent to do so ” [ Section 83(5) (a)] and “ act in the best interests of their clients ” [ Section 83(5) (b)].

18. Section 84(1) of the Act provides that “No person may provide immigration advice or immigration services unless he is a qualified person ”. A qualified person is defined in section 84(2) to include: “(a)A registered person … (ba) [A person] authorised to provide immigration and advice or immigration services by a designated qualifying regulator (e) [A person] acting on behalf of, and under the supervision of, a person within any of the paragraphs (a) to (d) (whether or not under a contract of employment ).”

19. The reference to a registered person in section 84(2) (a) is reference to a person who is registered with the Commissioner under section 85 of the Act . A person’s entitlement to provide immigration advice or immigration services by virtue of sub-section (2)(b) “Is subject to any limitation on that person’s authorisation imposed by the regulatory arrangements of the designated qualifying regulator in question …” ( section 84 (3A)). By section 86 A of the Act a “ designated qualifying regulator ” includes “ the Institute of Legal Executives ”.

20. By section 85 , the Commissioner must prepare and maintain a register of those persons registered by it to provide immigration advice and services. The system of registration is established under Schedule 6 of the Act . If the Commissioner considers that an applicant for registration is “competent and otherwise fit to provide immigration advice and immigration services ”, they must register that applicant. Equally, the Commissioner must cancel a person’s registration if they consider that a person “ is no longer competent or otherwise unfit to provide immigration advice or immigration services ”. No further definition is provided by the Act as to what is meant by “ competent or otherwise [un]fit ”.

21. Schedule 5 of the Act provides that the Commissioner may make rules regulating any aspect of the professional practice, conduct or discipline of registered persons. These rules are known as the Immigration Service Commissioner’s Rules. The same schedule provides for the Commissioner to issue a Code of Standards, which apply to any person providing immigration advice or immigration services. “ It is the duty of any person to whom the code applies, to comply with its provisions in providing immigration advice or immigration services ” (paragraph 3(4) to schedule 5 to the Act ).

22. An appeal process is provided for, so that “ any person aggrieved by a relevant decision of the Commissioner may appeal to the First-tier Tribunal against the decision” ( section 87(2) ). The refusal of an application for registration made under Schedule 6 of the Act is a relevant decision.

23. The appeal is to the First-tier Tribunal and is a full appeal and not simply a review of the exercise by the Commissioner of their decision-making power. In an appeal it is necessary for the Tribunal to determine for itself whether the Commissioner’s decision was right and, in the circumstances of the instant case, to determine whether the applicant is, as of the date of the Tribunal hearing, fit and competent to provide immigration advice and services to the specified level. In doing so, the Tribunal will consider all relevant admissible evidence whether or not it was known to or taken into account by the Commissioner when making their decision ( Visa Joy Ltd v Immigration Services Commissioner [2017] EWCA Civ 1473 ). The burden is on the appellant, the standard of proof being to the balance of probabilities. The issues

24. The following neutral list of issues was agreed by the parties, and the Tribunal adopts this. Factual Issues a. Whether the Respondent failed to take into account the evidence and factors as noted in the Appellant’s grounds of appeal. b. Whether the Respondent placed disproportionate weight on the Appellant’s previous convictions, without adequately assessing the current risk the Appellant poses in accordance with legal requirements, which resulted in the refusal as set out in the Respondent’s decision letter dated 1 August 2025. c. Whether the Respondent failed to take into account the evidence the Appellant provided of his rehabilitation, positive conduct, and mitigating circumstances, as referred to in the Appellant’s letter dated 14 July 2025. Legal Issues d. Whether the Respondent’s decision-making process complied with the principles of procedural fairness and natural justice. e. Whether the Respondent applied the correct legal test under section 83(5) (a) in assessing the Appellant’s fitness to provide immigration advice and services. f. Whether the Appellant is fit to provide immigration advice and/or services at Level 1 pursuant to section 83(5) (a). The evidence

25. The Tribunal considered a bundle of 133 pages.

26. The Tribunal had the benefit of a witness statement and heard oral evidence from Mr Mohammed Rakib, the IAA’s employee who assessed Mr Folarin’s application. When cross-examined by Mr Folarin, Mr Rakib in summary made the following points: a. When deciding to refuse the application he weighed all the evidence Mr Folarin had submitted against the serious nature of the previous offences and found that the former was not sufficient to demonstrate that the application should be granted. He asked Mr Folarin to provide further information and tested his responses. Mr Rakib said that the evidence provided to support Mr Folarin’s assertion that he had founded a crime prevention project did not demonstrate that he had done so, as it consisted only of a few items of correspondence with prisons. b. The dishonesty offences with which the IAA was particularly concerned included those convictions relating to counterfeit currency and making off without payment. These prompted greater scrutiny of the risk Mr Folarin might pose. c. Mr Rakib considered that he had applied the IAA’s criteria for fitness, namely: i. The likelihood of compliance with the IAA’s regulatory scheme; ii. A history of honesty and legal compliance; and iii. A history of financial probity. d. Mr Rakib said that his decision was quality assured by his manager and there was also a legal review of it before issue. e. On the question of Mr Folarin’s likelihood of compliance, Mr Rakib said that on balance of probabilities he considered that Mr Folarin’s some of the responses to his further questions were reckless and did not match the declarations he had made on previous applications. He highlighted a discrepancy between boxes completed to indicate CILEX status and attempts to verify this information in a previous application made by Mr Folarin in 2021. Previous discrepancies in an application form on another application which had provided incorrect information about Mr Folarin’s convictions had not been taken into account on this application. Another example provided by Mr Rakib of concerns over the accuracy of information provided by Mr Folarin was his statement that: “ One of my proudest achievements is the founding of the Crime Prevention Project (CPP), based in Bermondsey.” When asked for further information on this, none of the evidence provided by Mr Folarin demonstrated that he founded the project as claimed. f. Mr Rakib stated in response to cross-examination that he did not take into account the time which had elapsed since Mr Folarin’s previous convictions. g. Mr Rakib noted that the evidence provided in relation to rehabilitation was all in relation to Mr Folarin’s personal life, not his professional life. When asked for a contact to seek a reference from a firm of solicitors for whom Mr Folarin had previously worked, Mr Folarin did not provide this information. h. Mr Rakib said that he considered being able to buy a house was evidence of financial success rather than financial probity or honesty.

27. The Tribunal also heard oral evidence from Mr Folarin. In summary, he made the following additional points: a. The legal test required is one that is forward looking and must assess present fitness and present risk not just historic convictions. He argued that the decision had been focused overwhelmingly on previous convictions. He sought to rely on the case of CHRE v Grant [2011] EWHC 927 as authority for the fact that the decision should be forward looking, but did not provide a copy of this decision or name of the case to the Tribunal before the hearing. This case appeared to the Tribunal not to support the point made and was made under a different regulatory regime, so we placed little reliance on this. b. The IAA’s reasoning is legally inaccurate, because it fails to evaluate rehabilitation, and failed to apply its guidance on a case-by-case basis rather than mechanistically. In particular, he argued that the IAA had not taken into account his current behaviour and the risk he poses to its statutory objectives, particularly the protection of the public, going forward. He argued that the IAA relied on its own internal guidance rather than the statutory test of fitness. He suggested that other measures such as supervision could be put in place to enable his application to be accepted with conditions. c. The refusal of his application was harsh and disproportionate. He argued that refusal of his application meant that his past convictions were being treated as a permanent barrier to registration when they do not appear on the list of offences which result in automatic disqualification. He stated that he had voluntarily disclosed his DBS certificate, although the Tribunal notes that the IAA guidance states that this must be disclosed, so was not voluntary. He had also cooperated with the IAA and responded to all communications. d. Mr Folarin said the reason why he had not obtained a reference from a previous employment as an immigration paralegal was because there was not time to do so within the period to respond provided. e. When asked about what evidence he had submitted as to his rehabilitation from the dishonesty convictions and what he had learned from them, he pointed to his academic qualifications and said that he had learned that compliance with the law is mandatory and done a lot of work to ensure he lives a life free of crime.

28. In presenting his case, and in particular in the section of his witness statement dealing with the legal framework, Mr Folarin referred to a number of decided cases in support of his points. The Tribunal asked questions in the hearing about these cases, because no or inaccurate citations and no copies of these cases were provided and the panel had struggled to locate some of these cases when preparing for the hearing. When asked directly if he had used artificial intelligence (AI) in compiling his legal submissions, Mr Folarin said that he had. He said he had used Westlaw and a paid subscription to a legal portal on ChatGPT in doing so. Upon further questioning, he explained that when making a point in his submissions he had asked ChatGPT to provide him with the top 10 relevant cases supporting the points he wished to make and asked it to produce an extract from the case law which he then had edited and abbreviated in his submissions. Accordingly, the cases on which he had relied were ones which AI had located for him. He accepted that he had not read the judgments in the underlying cases and had used ChatGPT to provide him with a summary so he could understand what they say. He also used AI for additional research and to polish the wording. He said that he had not intended to mislead the Tribunal but that he did not have the means to employ a lawyer and wanted to present his case to the best possible standard.

29. When asked about his previous employment history, Mr Folarin said that he had worked for NHS England as a paralegal and as an immigration paralegal at a firm of solicitors. He had also worked as a trainee case investigation officer at a professional regulatory body. He stated that he had worked with vulnerable people and dealt with multi-million pound transactions in which he described as “major roles”. No written evidence, including any references, was provided to support these assertions. Mr Folarin said that he thought the main concern was in relation to his personal character and that providing evidence on this rather than his professional experience would have weight. The oral hearing

30. The hearing was held remotely by Cloud Video Platform (CVP) and the Tribunal was satisfied that it was fair and in the interests of justice to proceed in this way.

31. Mr Folarin explained that he was joining the hearing remotely from Nigeria due to a family bereavement. Upon checking, the Tribunal was satisfied that individuals in Nigeria are permitted to give oral evidence from abroad in administrative Tribunal hearings, so consented to this and the hearing was able to proceed. Discussion and conclusions Issues of fact Whether the Respondent failed to take into account the evidence and factors as noted in the Appellant’s grounds of appeal.

32. Mr Rakib’s statement at paragraph 15 states “ The IAA considered all the evidence which was put before it when reaching a decision on Mr Folarin’s application. This included all of Mr Folarin’s responses as outlined above. I took into account the length of time that has passed since Mr Folarin’s last conviction. Mr Folarin has explained that these offences occurred during a difficult period in his life and he has taken steps to reform and rehabilitate himself. Indeed, I consider Mr Folarin to be sincere in his responses .”

33. On balance of probabilities, based on the oral and written evidence of Mr Rakib the Tribunal was satisfied that the Respondent had taken into account all the evidence which Mr Folarin had submitted. The Tribunal, likewise, considered all the written and oral evidence and submissions from both parties before it in reaching its conclusions.

34. The Respondent referred in the hearing to its guidance on applications from ex-offenders which appeared in the bundle at page 126. This states at paragraph 4 that “ When deciding applications from a person with a criminal conviction, the IAA will make decisions on a case-by-case basis. The IAA will consider the following: • the nature of the crime that resulted in the criminal conviction • the scale, impact and relevance of the conviction on the individual’s ability to provide immigration advice or immigration services • the services that the individual intends to deliver and the responsibilities that will come it • whether the nature of the crime or its circumstances raises questions of the person’s honesty, integrity or competence • whether the appropriate penalty, restitution or other remedial steps required have been carried out • the record of the individual since the relevant crime including any repeat offences, employment history and personal conduct (including restitution to any victims) • the time that has passed since the criminal conviction”

35. We were satisfied from the evidence of Mr Rakib that it was more likely than not the IAA had taken the relevant factors into account. Even if Mr Rakib were to have made errors in this, and we were not persuaded that he had, the process had additional checks and balances in the form of quality assurance at manager level and legal review. Whether the Respondent placed disproportionate weight on the Appellant’s previous convictions, without adequately assessing the current risk the Appellant poses in accordance with legal requirements, which resulted in the refusal

36. In our view, past criminal convictions, particularly if relevant in substance to the IAA’s statutory obligation to protect the public and advice seekers who may be unfamiliar with the UK and vulnerable, form part of the material which must be taken into account when reaching a decision on registration, but must be considered alongside any more recent evidence which demonstrates rehabilitation. The weight to be placed on historic convictions will therefore depend on the evidence submitted to counterbalance it.

37. Mr Folarin appeared to be arguing at several points in the hearing that there was no evidence to suggest that he does not meet the tests of honesty, financial probity and likelihood of compliance with regulatory requirements. However, the burden is on the Appellant to demonstrate that they are now fit and to provide evidence to support this position. An absence of evidence to the contrary does not by itself demonstrate rehabilitation, merely that no evidence has been provided. Given the nature and extent of the criminal convictions, in order to prove his case that he was fit to be registered, it was up to Mr Folarin positively to provide sufficient evidence to demonstrate on the balance of probabilities that he had rehabilitated himself, rather than reactively relying on the Respondent to do so or simply responding to the requests from the Respondent.

38. In all the circumstances, we considered that the evidence which Mr Folarin had provided did not outweigh the obvious concerns as to fitness raised by the criminal convictions. We discuss the weight placed on Mr Folarin’s evidence of rehabilitation below. Whether the Respondent failed to take into account the evidence the Appellant provided of his rehabilitation, positive conduct, and mitigating circumstances, as referred to in the Appellant’s letter dated 14 July 2025.

39. As stated above, we are satisfied that as a matter of fact the Respondent did consider all the evidence provided by Mr Folarin, including the evidence provided in his various responses to the Respondent following the indication it was minded to refuse registration, and that it took this evidence into account.

40. The evidence which Mr Folarin did provide of rehabilitation and reform in his life was focused primarily on his personal life; he provided written evidence of property ownership, family life and involvement in his church community. There was some limited evidence of involvement in community activities in relation to crime prevention, but this was largely historic, dating from 2011, and actually appeared to predate some of the convictions. By contrast, we considered that the evidence provided in relation to Mr Folarin’s professional life was very limited. There was no evidence as to his employment history, other than his oral evidence in the hearing; no references from previous employers detailing experience with, for example, vulnerable clients and evidence of acting with integrity in a professional context which may have assisted Mr Folarin’s case.

41. We were also concerned that while seeking to distance himself from his previous criminal conduct, Mr Folarin did not provide sufficient evidence of how he has demonstrated his honesty and integrity such that he has rehabilitated from the dishonesty offences. Similarly, we considered that there was insufficient evidence to counterbalance the historic evidence of failing to comply with rules and regulations, such as driving while disqualified and failing to comply with a community sentence. We therefore considered that Mr Folarin had not demonstrated in his evidence either his ability to comply with regulatory requirements or that, taken as a whole, he now has a history of honesty. Legal Issues Whether the Respondent’s decision-making process complied with the principles of procedural fairness and natural justice.

42. We are satisfied on balance of probabilities, based on the evidence of Mr Rakib, that the Respondent’s decision-making process considered all the relevant factors it was required to. Mr Folarin sought to highlight a procedural irregularity when cross-examining Mr Rakib, in that Mr Rakib stated that he did not take into account the time lapse since the previous convictions. As this directly contradicts Mr Rakib’s written evidence the Tribunal explored this in more detail and Mr Rakib confirmed that his view was that it did not matter how much time had elapsed. The Tribunal took this to mean that time lapse by itself will not displace the weight of the convictions, because convictions remain relevant to the Respondent’s registration process even when spent. We therefore placed little weight on this inconsistency and considered it did not outweigh the evidence of proper consideration in the Respondent’s decision-making process.

43. We disagreed with Mr Folarin’s assertion that to refuse his application was in effect to find that previous convictions were a permanent bar to inclusion in the immigration adviser profession. Refusal of an application is simply refusal of that specific application; it does not preclude the making of further applications or alternative routes to becoming an immigration adviser.

44. We preferred the evidence of Mr Rakib, which was consistent between his oral and written evidence, that the Respondent considers each application from a previous offender on a case-by-case basis and considers the evidence provided in each individual instance. Whether the Respondent applied the correct legal test under section 83(5) (a) in assessing the Appellant’s fitness to provide immigration advice and services.

45. Based on the evidence of Mr Rakib and the written evidence in the bundle, we accept on balance of probabilities that the Respondent applied the correct test as to whether Mr Folarin was fit to provide immigration advice and/or services. We were satisfied that in doing so the Respondent took into account the IAA’s relevant guidance on determining fitness of advisers and, in particular, the criteria of the likelihood of compliance with the IAA’s regulatory scheme, a history of honesty and legal compliance and a history of financial probity. We were also satisfied that the Respondent took into account the IAA’s guidance on applications for ex-offenders. Whether the Appellant is fit to provide immigration advice and/or services at Level 1 pursuant to section 83(5) (a).

46. The Tribunal has to determine this question afresh and may take into account information and evidence which was not previously before the Respondent when the initial decision to refuse was made.

47. For the reasons set out above, the Tribunal is not satisfied on balance of probabilities that Mr Folarin has demonstrated that he is more likely than not to comply with the IAA’s regulatory requirements and standards. We also consider that the evidence of financial probity provided, in the form of evidence of Mr Folarin’s property ownership, is not sufficient to outweigh the previous convictions for financial irregularities such as being in possession of counterfeit currency. We disagreed with Mr Folarin’s assertion that the checks involved in obtaining a mortgage or buying a property were sufficiently rigorous in and of themselves to demonstrate financial probity without further evidence. There was no evidence before the Tribunal as to Mr Folarin’s financial probity in his professional life.

48. In relation to whether Mr Folarin has a history of honesty and legal compliance, although we noted that he provided evidence of reform and rehabilitation in his personal life, there was insufficient evidence to demonstrate such rehabilitation in the work context. Consequently, the Tribunal could not be satisfied that Mr Folarin would not pose a risk to the statutory objective of the Respondent, namely to ensure that all advice seekers receive reliable immigration advice from regulated professionals.

49. The Tribunal also had significant concerns about Mr Folarin’s integrity as a result of the way in which he presented his appeal and, in particular, in relation to his use of AI. He presented a number of cases to the Tribunal as settled law when these had been located for him by AI. In preparing for the hearing, the panel was unable to locate several of these cases in any database and could not therefore be satisfied that they actually exist. This would have had the effect of misleading the Tribunal had the Tribunal not challenged the point. We note that section 83(5) (a) states that the Commissioner must exercise his functions to so as to secure, so far as reasonably practicable, that those who provide immigration advice or immigration services do not knowingly mislead any court, tribunal or adjudicator in the UK, so potential misleading of a tribunal is a serious matter. We note Mr Folarin’s evidence that he did not intend to mislead the Tribunal, but also that he was aware that he had not verified the case law on which he relied.

50. The use of AI for legal research in the context of litigation has been recently considered by the High Court in the case of R on the Application of Frederick Ayinde v London Borough of Haringey [2025] EWHC 1383 (Admin) . The decision of Dame Victoria Sharp P indicated at paragraph 26 that “ Placing false material before the court with the intention that the court treats it as genuine may, depending on the person’s state of knowledge, amount to a contempt. That is because it deliberately interferes with the administration of justice.” Whilst mere negligence would not be sufficient to establish contempt, and knowledge that the information is false or a lack of honest belief that it was true would be required, she stated at paragraph 29 that “ Where a lawyer places false citations before the court (whether because of the use of artificial intelligence without proper checks being made, or otherwise) that is likely to involve a breach of one or more of the regulatory requirements that we have set out above, and it is likely to be appropriate for the court to make a reference to the regulator.”

51. We accept that Mr Folarin is not a qualified lawyer but we heard that he has completed an LLB and the Legal Practice Course. He also seeks registration as an immigration adviser which will, among other things, involve advising on some aspects of immigration law. The Tribunal has concerns that if Mr Folarin presents his own case before the Tribunal based on some non-existent cases and demonstrates a lack of care in verifying the legal information provided by AI, there is a risk that a similar approach may be applied to advising advice seekers, who may be inexperienced in immigration matters and/or vulnerable. Had Mr Folarin already been registered and conducted his case in such a way, the Tribunal would have needed to consider reporting him to the IAA in any event.

52. For all these reasons we concluded that Mr Folarin is not currently fit to provide immigration advice and that the Commissioner was correct to refuse his application.

53. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.