Nyrome Hinds, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for Justice

Her Honour Judge Belcher :

1. The Claimant, Nyrome Hinds, is a serving Category A prisoner at HMP Frankland, having been convicted of attempted murder, possession of a firearm with intent to endanger life and robbery in July 2017. He was sentenced to life imprisonment for the attempted murder and his minimum term was set at 15 years, 6 months and expires in 2030. He has now served a little over one half of the minimum term. He received concurrent determinate sentences for the other offences. He seeks judicial review of the decision of the Director of the Category A Team, Directorate of Security (“the Director”) dated 23 April 2024 not to grant him an oral hearing in connection with his Category A review.

2. The Claim originally included a challenge to the decision not to downgrade him to Category B. However a further Category A review took place in August 2025 which renders any challenge to the 2024 re-categorisation decision academic. This hearing therefore proceeded on Ground (b) only, that is the challenge to the decision to refuse an oral hearing. It is accepted that this challenge is not rendered academic by the 2025 review.

3. The Claimant challenges the decision not to grant him an oral hearing (the “Decision”) as being unreasonable and contrary to the principles of procedural fairness. The Secretary of State for Justice who is responsible for the the Category A Team and the decision of the Director disputes the claim and argues that the Director was entitled to reach the decision he did, and that it was a proper decision in the circumstances of this case.

4. References in this Judgment to the hearing bundle will be in bold type face, with the Tab letter and page number, for example D58. References to the authorities bundle will be by the letters AB followed by the page number, for example. AB63. The Law and Policy Framework

5. Under the Prison Rules 1999, all prisoners within the prison estate are subject to categorisation. Category A is the highest category. The Claimant is eligible for an annual review of his Category A status. The policy governing those reviews is contained in the Prison Service Instruction: PSI 08/2013 (“the PSI”). Paragraph 2.1 of the PSI defines a Category A prisoner as “…..a prisoner whose escape would be highly dangerous to the public, or the police or the security of the State, and for whom the aim must be to make escape impossible”.

6. The test for the Director to apply when deciding whether to downgrade a prisoner’s categorisation is set out at paragraph 4.2 of the PSI in the following terms: “Before approving a confirmed Category A/Restricted Status prisoner’s downgrading the DDC High Security (or delegated authority) must have convincing evidence that the prisoner’s risk of re-offending if unlawfully at large has significantly reduced, such as evidence that shows the prisoner has significantly changed their attitudes towards their offending or has developed skills to help prevent similar offending”

7. Paragraph 4.6 of the PSI gives general guidance on the question of whether an oral hearing should be held in connection with a Category A review. It states: “….This policy is intended to give guidance to those who have to take oral hearing decisions in the CART context. Inevitably, the guidance involves identifying factors of importance, and in particular factors that would tend towards deciding to have an oral hearing. The process is of course not a mathematical one; but the more of such factors that are present in any case, the more likely it is that an oral hearing will be needed. Three overarching points are to be made at the outset; First , each case must be considered on its own particular facts - all of which should be weighed in making the oral hearing decision. Secondly , it is important that the oral hearing decision is approached in a balanced and appropriate way. The Supreme Court emphasised in Osborn that decision-makers must approach, and be seen to approach, the decision with an open mind; must be alive to the potential, real advantage of the hearing both in aiding decision-making and in recognition of the importance of the issues to the prisoner; should be aware that costs are not a conclusive argument against the holding of oral hearings; and should not make the grant of an oral hearing dependent on the prospects of success of a downgrade in categorisation. Thirdly , the oral hearing decision is not necessarily an all or nothing decision. In particular, there is scope for a flexible approach as to the issues on which an oral hearing might be appropriate.”

8. Paragraph 4.7 provides that the following are factors that would tend in favour of an oral hearing being appropriate: “(a) Where important facts are in dispute. Facts are likely to be important if they go directly to the issue of risk. Even if important, it will be necessary to consider whether the dispute would be more appropriately resolved at a hearing. For example, where a significant explanation or mitigation is advanced which depends upon the credibility of the prisoner, it may assist to have a hearing at which the prisoner (and/or others) can give his (or their) version of events. (b) Where there is a significant dispute on the expert materials. These will need to be considered with care in order to ascertain whether there is a real and live dispute on particular points of real importance to the decision. If so, a hearing might well be of assistance to deal with them. Examples of situations in which this factor will be squarely in play are where the LAP, in combination with an independent psychologist, takes the view that downgrade is justified; or where a psychological assessment produced by the Ministry of Justice is disputed on tenable grounds….. (c) Where the lengths of time involved in a case are significant and/or the prisoner is post-tariff. It does not follow that just because a prisoner has been Category A for a significant time or is post tariff that an oral hearing would be appropriate. However, the longer the period as Category A, the more carefully the case will need to be looked at to see if the categorisation continues to remain justified. It may also be that much more difficult to make a judgement about the extent to which they have developed over the period since their conviction based on examination of the papers alone……. Where there is an impasse which has existed for some time, for whatever reason, it may be helpful to have a hearing in order to explore the case and seek to understand the reasons for, and the potential solutions to the impasse. (d) where the prisoner has never had an oral hearing before; or has not had one for a prolonged period”

9. I was referred to relevant case law. Mr Irwin submitted that the principles applicable when deciding whether or not the defendant is obliged to hold an oral hearing to decide whether or not to re-categorise a prisoner have been developed over three cases decided in the Court of Appeal: Mackay v Secretary of State for Justice [2011] EWCA Civ 522 (“ Mackay ”); R(Downs) v Secretary of State for Justice [2011] EWCA Civ 1422 (“ Downs ”), and R (Hassett and Price) v Secretary of State for Justice [2017] EWCA Civ 331 ; [2017] 1 WLR 4750 (“ Hassett ”). There was no dispute between counsel that, so far as relevant for this case, the following principles can be derived from those three decisions.

10. Whether fairness requires an oral hearing is a matter for the court, so that the issue on judicial review is whether the refusal of an oral hearing was wrong; not whether it was unreasonable or irrational (see for example, Paragraph 28 of the judgment of Gross LJ in Mackay ). Accordingly, it is for this court to exercise its own assessment as to whether an oral hearing was necessary.

11. The task of taking decisions regarding categorisations is, fundamentally, an administrative one undertaken by the Defendant’s officials as part of the management of prisoners and the broader management of the prison estate. This was established in the judgment of Sales LJ (as he then was) in Hassett at paragraph 50, where he said this: “The Director and CART officials are]… carrying out management functions in relation to prisons, whose main task is the administrative one of ensuring that prisons operate effectively as places of detention for the purposes of punishment and protection of the public. In addition to bringing to bear their operational expertise in running the security categorisation system, they will have other management functions which mean that in striking a fair balance between the public interest and the individual interests of prisoners, it is reasonable to limit to some degree how elaborate the procedures need to be as a matter of fairness for their decision making. Moreover, in relation to their decision-making, which is part of an overall system operated by the Secretary of State and is not separate from that system, it is appropriate to take account of the extent to which a prisoner has had a fair opportunity to put his case at other stages of the information gathering processes within the system as a whole.”

12. Oral hearings in the CART (Category A Review Team) context will be “few and far between” and there is no requirement that exceptional circumstances should be demonstrated ( Mackay at paragraph 28). However, fairness will sometimes require an oral hearing: per Sales LJ in Hassett at paragraph 61: “…it deserves emphasis that fairness will sometimes require an oral hearing by the CART/Director, if only in comparatively rare cases. In particular, if in asking the question whether upon escape the prisoner would represent a risk to the public the CART/Director, having read all the reports, were left in significant doubt on a matter on which the prisoner’s own attitude might make a critical difference, the impact upon him of the decision to maintain him in Category A would be so marked that fairness would be likely to require an oral hearing”

13. The fact that there is “a difference of professional opinion” between two experts (e.g. two psychologists), the fact that the decision-maker has “two clear, opposed views to consider”, and the fact that the decision-maker’s “task was to decide which view is accepted” does not, in and of itself, make an oral hearing necessary. ( Downs at paragraphs 44 to 45 and 50 ; Hassett at paragraph 69.)

14. I need to address the issue of previous first instance decisions. In his skeleton argument Mr Buckley, on behalf the Claimant, refers to a number of first instance decisions. Mr Irwin, for the Defendant, submitted that first instance decisions are at best of marginal assistance to the Court and the proper approach is to rely on the clear guidance given in the Court of Appeal authorities in this area. He referred me to the judgment of Elisabeth Laing LJ in Clarke when she dismissed an argument in relation to what was said to be an inconsistency between the decision in issue in Clarke and two first instance decisions in the following terms: “The Judge’s decision and those in Zaman and Seton (see paragraph 86.v., above) were made on different facts. They are all first instance decisions. The legal issues in all the cases were similar. So the decision of each judge involved the assessment, and weighting, of the various factors which happened to be relevant in each case. No point of any legal significance can be deduced from the fact that two other judges have reached different decisions from the Judge. Each case was different. A submission to the contrary is close to a submission that every judge in such a case must decide, as a matter of law, that an oral hearing is required. Any such contention is wrong”

15. Whilst acknowledging that judgment and accepting that this court is not bound to follow judgments of first instance, Mr Buckley nevertheless submits that it would be inappropriate to simply ignore them as not being relevant at all. As we shall see when I turn to the facts, the reports making up the Category A Review dossier for the Decision all supported a downgrade into Category B conditions. In those circumstances, Mr Buckley submitted that the challenge in this case falls squarely within the decision of Calver J in R(on the application of Smith) [2020] EWHC 2712 (Admin) and Mr Buckley relies in particular on the following passage from the judgment where Calver J quoted from a previous first instance decision of mine: “Furthermore, the Policy Guidance itself (PSI 08/2013, paragraph 4.7(b)) states that in a case where there is a significant dispute on expert materials an oral hearing might well be necessary. Here, since all three psychologists agree on downgrading, the claim to an oral hearing is obviously stronger than it would be in a case where there is a significant dispute on the expert materials. As HH Judge Belcher stated in R (Seton) v Secretary of State for Justice [2020] EWHC 1161 (Admin) at[53] in granting judicial review of the director’s decision not to hold an oral hearing: “Had the Director been presented with reports which were all in favour of re-categorisation, there would be a strong case for an oral hearing if he was minded to reject all of those conclusions”.

16. My decision in Seton was obviously based on the particular facts of that case. Those included the fact that in refusing re-categorisation the Director had given no reasons at all for his decision to refuse re-categorisation in the face of some reports being in favour of re-categorisation, and one from the Prison Offender Manager (“POM”) which was not. More importantly, as is clear from my judgment, the Director was in possession of information that further work in connection with risk reduction had been undertaken on the PIPE unit in the period of some 5 months between the making of the reports and the time when he came to make his decision. That further work was potentially capable of affecting the differences of opinion as to risk reduction and which informed the recommendations. I directed that there should be an oral hearing specifically limited to the question of the impact, if any, of that further work on risk reduction. In doing so I recognised that would inform the decision but might not change it. I did not indicate, and could not have indicated that in all cases where all reports favour re-categorisation there would inevitably be an oral hearing. If that were the law, the PSI would say so. I derive no assistance from previous first instance cases and I decide this case based on the facts before me and on my own assessment and weighting of the various factors which are relevant to this case. The Factual Background.

17. The Claimant was convicted after trial of attempted murder, possession of a firearm with intent to endanger life and robbery in July 2017. He continues to maintain his innocence in connection with the index offences. In August 2017 he was given a life sentence for attempted murder, and concurrent determinate sentences of 20 years for possession of a firearm with intent to endanger life, and 14 years for robbery. The Judge imposed a notional term of 32 years with a minimum term of 15 years and 6 months. Accordingly the Claimant will not be eligible to be considered for parole until 2033. The Claimant has been a Category A prisoner throughout his sentence, now some 8 years and approximately 4 months. The judge, when sentencing, said that the Claimant posed a significant risk of causing serious harm to the public in future. The Claimant had significant previous convictions including in 2005 for 2 offences of possession of a firearm with intent to endanger life for which he was sentenced to 14 years imprisonment.

18. As is clear from the Category A dossier ( G113-114) , the Claimant and a Co-Defendant attacked the victims as they approached the front door of their home in Leyton, north-east London, intending to rob them of jewellery. The victim and his wife resisted the robbery and in the process of trying to rob the victim, the Claimant shot him in his abdomen causing him considerable injury. The Claimant shot the victim a second time, this time when the victim was lying injured on the ground.

19. Category A review decisions are not made at prison level but are made by CART or the Director. The Director is solely responsible for approving the downgrading of a confirmed Category A prisoner. The annual review entails consideration by a local advisory panel (“LAP”) within the prison, which submits a recommendation about security categorisation to CART. (PSI paragraph 4.1. AB234 )

20. Prison staff must prepare reports for the prisoner’s annual review, and such reports must be disclosed to the prisoner at least four weeks prior to the prison’s LAP to allow representations to be submitted. Taking both the reports and any representations into account, the LAP must in turn make a recommendation on the prisoner’s continued suitability for Category A (PSI paragraphs 4.14 and 4.15 AB 237 ). The reports should be a comprehensive summary of the prisoner’s behaviour and progress to date, that will enable an assessment of any reduction in the prisoner’s level of risk (PSI paragraph 4.17; AB237 ).

21. Given the time served, the Claimant will have had previous Category A reviews. I have been referred to the outcome of the 2023 review and to the 2023 Decision ( G144-G146 ) which includes the following: “The Director noted that Mr Hinds has engaged in suitable intervention work and started making progress. He recognised that Mr Hinds general behaviour is acceptable. But he noted Mr Hinds has only recently completed the Kaizen and his progress now needs to be consolidated and carefully assessed before significant treatment gain and risk reduction can be accurately determined.” ( A22 ) I note that the LAP recommendation for the 2023 review was that the Claimant should remain in Category A at that time, and that there should be another review with full psychological assessment in 6 months’ time ( G145 ).

22. The Decision now challenged was taken some six months later on 23 April 2024 and is at C79-C81 . The Category A Dossier preceding the Decision is at G112-G151. Section 9 of the dossier ( G140-142 ) contains the LAP minutes and recommendations. At Section 9.1 it summarises the Director’s 2023 Decision noting that in November 2023 the director considered that Mr Hind’s offending showed he would pose a high level of risk if unlawfully at large and that before his downgrading could be justified there must be convincing evidence of a significant reduction in this risk, and further noted the conclusion I have set out set out in Paragraph 21 above.

23. The LAP noted that psychology had reported that the Claimant had completed all risk reduction work and had demonstrated consolidation of the skills he learned. It was noted that the author of the psychology report identified that the Mr Hinds had fully engaged with the identified treatment (Kaizen) and completed the expected consolidation period following completion of the program and evidenced his learning. It further noted that Mr Hinds had engaged with the PRA (psychological risk assessment) as recommended by LAP and that no further interventions were required. Psychology recommended a downgrade to Category B for Mr Hinds.

24. Pausing there, in response to a question from me, Mr Buckley accepted that the expected consolidation period referred to in the report from psychology is a period of six months expected of all those undertaking the Kaizen programme.

25. The LAP further noted that the Offender Management Unit (“OMU”) echoed the report provided by psychology: successful completion of the offence focused work identified and a period of consolidation. They too recommended a downgrade to Category B. The representations from Mr Hinds’s legal team were read out for the LAP Board to consider. The LAP recommended that Mr Hinds be downgraded to Category B ( G141 ).

26. Mr Buckley drew my attention to some of the detail in the psychology report including the following at paragraph 5.6.1: “Mr Hinds has participated in all relevant offending behaviour programmes and the current risk assessment indicates that his risk of future violence has reduced. Given the positive reaction to treatment and supervision, there is no current concern regarding the possibility of Mr Hinds being unlawfully at large….. Consequently, it is my opinion that Mr Hinds has now demonstrated risk reduction and warrants downgrade to Category B…” ( G129)

27. Mr Buckley also drew my attention to the OMU recommendation for progression at paragraph 6.6 in the following terms: “Overall Mr Hinds has engaged well with the prison regime throughout this reporting period, this is reflected in the positive behaviour and comments outlined above. He has engaged fully with the prison staff, meeting regularly with his key worker for supervision. Mr Hinds has engaged fully with the psychology department for the psychological risk assessment and preparation of his Category A report. Mr Hinds has engaged with regular meetings with probation, discussing programme gains, behaviour, and sentence plan objectives. Mr Hinds has engaged fully with the identified treatment, having engaged with Kaizen programme from September 2022 until March 2023. He has engaged with the expected consolidation following the completion of an offending behaviour programme and he has evidenced learning. Mr Hinds has engaged with a psychological risk assessment as recommended by the local advisory panel (L AP), which identifies no further programs at this time. Mr Hinds is sentence plan compliant and demonstrates positive engagement with prison regime. A downgrade to Category B is recommended.” ( G137 )

28. The reasons for the Decision determining that the Claimant ought to remain a Category A prisoner included the following: “The Director recognised that Mr Hinds has made some progress in recent years through completion of intervention work and his generally acceptable behaviour. There is evidence from the latest reports that Mr Hinds has shown insights into risk factors influencing his criminal and violent offending. He considered there are however a number of factors suggesting a longer period of post-programme consolidation is needed to provide convincing evidence of significant and lasting risk reduction…… He noted the psychology report…. recommends Mr Hinds’s downgrading on such grounds as: he poses a low-to-moderate risk in Category A; the presence of external controls; to enable him to build on skills and lower security; and there being no current concerns he could be unlawfully at large (i.e. lack of enhanced escape risk). The Director considered these were not totally convincing grounds to show that Mr Hinds has at this time achieved significant risk reduction if unlawfully at large. He noted also that Mr Hinds has completed intervention work on, and is assessed as making progress on, risk factors relating to his previous lesser offending, as he still denies his guilt of his present highly deliberate offences. He considered all these factors suggest more evidence over a longer period is needed before significant risk reduction if unlawfully at large, and not just if in lower security, can be confidently determined in Mr Hinds’s case. He is satisfied that Mr Hinds suggested manageability in lower security provides no such evidence….. The Director considered that convincing evidence of a significant reduction in Mr Hinds’s risk of similar reoffending if unlawfully at large is not yet shown. He is satisfied Mr Hinds therefore must stay in Category A at this time.” ( C81 )

29. The reasons go on to address the Claimant’s application for an oral hearing if the Director was minded not to re-categorise to Category B. The reasons on this are as follows: “The Director considered there are in the meantime no grounds for an oral hearing in relation to this review in accordance with the criteria in PSO 08/2013. He considered there are no significant facts in dispute and that the available information and reasoning for downgrading are readily understandable. While he noted there are recommendations for Mr Hinds’s downgrading: for the reasons stated above he considered there are valid grounds to show Mr Hinds has not yet achieved significant risk reduction if unlawfully at large. He did not accept that disagreeing with the downgrading recommendations in itself represents a significant dispute justifying an oral hearing (or that these recommendations have been disregarded, as suggested in the legal representations). He did not accept that an oral hearing is appropriate or necessary solely for Mr Hinds to further explore or make further representations on security information. He recognised that Mr Hinds has been in prison some years and has never had an oral hearing. He considered these facts alone could not however justify an oral hearing without other supporting grounds. He noted that Mr Hinds is some years from tariff expiry, and considered that no credible argument can be made his Category A status currently prevents his consideration for parole or release. He considered that Mr Hinds also remains free to engage further to enable a closer assessment of significant insight and progress, and is not in an impasse.” ( C81 ) The Parties’ Submissions

30. Mr Buckley submitted that the decision not to grant the Claimant an oral hearing was procedurally unfair. He submitted that all four of the criteria in the PSI which fall to be considered when determining whether to grant an oral hearing have been satisfied in this case. He asserted that there is a factual dispute, and an expert dispute, and taken together with the length of time Mr Hinds has been in prison and the fact of no previous oral hearing, these all support the need for an oral hearing in procedural fairness to the Claimant.

31. Mr Buckley also relies on the most recent Category A review decision dated 13 August 2025 ( I277-I279 ). For the 2025 review, the LAP again recommended there be a downgrade to Category B, but the Director did not accept that recommendation on the basis that convincing evidence of a significant reduction in risk if unlawfully at large was not yet shown and he decided that Mr Hinds should stay in Category A. That decision is not subject to challenge but Mr Buckley submitted there are relevant elements to be taken into account in terms of the position the Claimant is assessed to be at by those experts contributing to the process, and the contrary position being adopted by the Defendant.

32. Mr Irwin submitted that the 2025 review decision is of no relevance to the issue I have to decide. He submitted I have to look at the position in April 2024 when the Director refused an oral hearing, and the circumstances which led to that. That is the decision under challenge in these proceedings. He accepted that if I were to find that there should be an oral hearing, any such hearing would be conducted on the basis of all information available at the time of such hearing including the more recent review materials. However he submitted they have no relevance to my decision in this case. I accept that submission and I do not consider that the 2025 review decision assists me. In those circumstances I propose to address the four PSI factors which Mr Buckley submits are satisfied in this case as at the date of the Decision. Is there a dispute of fact and/or a dispute between experts?

33. As stated above, and as appears in his skeleton argument at Paragraph 5.2, Mr Buckley submitted that all four of the PSI factors are satisfied in this case, including factual dispute and expert dispute. In terms of a factual dispute, Mr Buckley submitted in his skeleton that the Director has relied on “security” information as impacting his decisions. He points to the fact that the security information was before the LAP but did not prevent the recommendation of a downgrading. This formed no real part of his oral submissions and was not pursued any further. In my judgment, Mr Buckley was correct not to pursue this. The Decision simply refers to the fact that the psychology report caveated its recommendations based on any security information. There is no suggestion that any security information impacted the Decision.

34. The thrust of Mr Buckley’s oral submissions was that the dispute in this case is between the experts providing reports for the dossier on the one hand and the Director on the other hand who, using his own expertise, then rejected those reports. At paragraphs 5.12 and 5.13 of his skeleton. Mr Buckley states “The instant case does not present as one where there is a clear factual dispute or a dispute between experts, as given the LAP dossier, it is clear that there was no dispute between those contributing to the process, all of whom recommend a downgrade to Category B. The dispute arises between the defendant and the LAP”.

35. In my judgement there is no clear factual dispute which would need to be resolved at an oral hearing before a decision as to re-categorisation could properly be made. Nor, as Mr Buckley accepts, is there any dispute between those contributing to the dossier, all of whom recommend downgrade to Category B conditions. Nor in my judgment is there truly a dispute between experts. That type of dispute generally arises where there is an independent psychology or other report which differs from the psychology report of the psychologist employed by the Ministry of Justice. It can also arise where one or more contributors to the dossier recommend downgrading, but another such as the offender manager does not as was the position in the case of Seton .

36. Mr Buckley seeks to characterise the dispute between experts here as the difference between the LAP recommendation on the one hand and the decision of the Director to reject that recommendation, and hold Mr Hinds at Category A. He relies upon the fact that in making his decision the Director brings his own expertise to that decision making process. Mr Irwin submitted that Mr Buckley’s submission in this respect confuses the roles of the report authors, the LAP, and the director. The role of the report authors is to provide evidence in the dossier and the role of the LAP is to make a recommendation based on those reports. However, the responsibility for making the decision on categorisation rests solely with the Director. The Director is entitled to reach his own judgement as to risk and re-categorisation based on the materials sent to him. He is plainly not bound to accept the recommendation. He must make his own decision. Whilst in doing so he inevitably relies on his own experience and expertise, in my judgment it is not appropriate to characterise the situation where the Director rejects a recommendation as amounting to a dispute between the experts of the type contemplated in paragraph 4.7 of the PSI. As made clear in paragraph 4.17 of the PSI the reports in the dossier should be a comprehensive summary of the prisoner’s behaviour to date that will enable an assessment of any reduction in the prisoner’s level of risk. ( AB237 ) (my emphasis added) . This wording contemplates material sufficient to enable an assessment, an assessment which has to be made by the Director and which will not necessarily reflect the LAP recommendations. This cannot in my judgement amount to a dispute between experts of the type contemplated by the PSI for the purposes of deciding whether an oral hearing is needed.

37. In my judgment the drafting of paragraph 4.7 of the PSI makes it clear that what is being considered is a significant dispute on the expert materials on points of real importance to the decision. What is contemplated there is disputes on the materials which the Director has to consider in coming to his own and separate decision. If Mr Buckley’s submission was correct, then any case in which the Director rejects the LAP recommendation to downgrade would constitute a dispute between the experts such that an oral hearing would follow. That is quite plainly not the position as a matter of law. The question is whether an oral hearing would assist the decision-making process in such a way that the principle of procedural fairness is engaged. As Sales LJ stated in Hassett at Paragraph 69: “I would add that even in a case where there is a significant difference of view between experts, it will often be unnecessary for the CART/Director to hold a hearing to allow them to ventilate their views orally. This might be so because, for example, there may be no real prospect that this would resolve the issue between them with sufficient certainty to affect the answer to be given by the CART/Director to the relevant question, and fairness does not require that the CART/Director should hold an oral hearing on the basis of a speculative possibility that that might happen”

38. Mr Buckley submitted that the fact that there is unanimous support for downgrade ought not to lead the Claimant being in a worse position in terms of an application for oral hearing when compared to a situation where some contributors to the dossier recommend downgrade and some do not. In my judgment that submission fails to consider the very point identified by Sales LJ at paragraph 69 in Hassett. Is there something which needs to be and might be resolved by an oral hearing, whether that be an issue of fact, an issue between the experts contributing evidence to the Director, or an issue which depends on the credibility or attitude of the prisoner himself and which can be explored at an oral hearing? Unanimity of support for downgrading does not, without more, provide a positive answer to that question.

39. Mr Irwin submitted that the Claimant has made no attempt to identify why an oral hearing would be helpful. He asked rhetorically “What jumps out of the papers that needs an oral hearing in fairness to determine it?” He submitted there is nothing that requires an oral hearing, no true value in an oral hearing and that it is pure speculation on the part of the Claimant to suggest there is any such value. Mr Irwin pointed to the fact that the Decision accurately summarises the shocking circumstances of the original offence, the Claimant’s background, his present circumstances, the representations received and the LAP recommendation ( C79-C80 ). He submitted that the Director gave extensive reasons for his decision including noting that the issue for the Director was whether Mr Hinds had achieved significant risk reduction if unlawfully at large, and indicating that Mr Hinds’ suggested manageability in lower security provides no such evidence. Both the OMU and psychology reports refer to the presence of external controls and the opportunity to build on skills in lower security, issues which are entirely different to the test of the Director has to consider which is that of a prisoner unlawfully at large and thus without external controls.

40. Mr Irwin submitted that this is a case where the two sides have different views. He reminded me that paragraph 4.2 of the PSI ( AB234 ) is directed solely to the Director, so that before he can approve a downgrading he must have convincing evidence that the prisoner’s risk of reoffending if unlawfully at large has significantly reduced. Mr Irwin pointed to the fact that the LAP makes recommendations but does not make that decision. He further submitted that in making its recommendation in paragraph 9.3 of the dossier, the LAP did not purport to say it had applied the test in paragraph 4.2 of the PSI. He pointed to the fact it would be outside the purview of the LAP to do so and it is for the Director to apply that test to the evidence before him.

41. Mr Irwin submitted that there is no dispute on the expert evidence. That evidence has been assessed by the Director as is clear from the reasons given for the Decision, but in applying the test which the Director has to apply, he has not accepted the recommendation. Mr Irwin submitted that the views put forward in the dossier are clear and there is nothing in terms of a dispute of fact or dispute of expert opinion which would warrant the holding of an oral hearing.

42. I accept Mr Irwin’s submissions. In my judgment there is nothing in the dossier suggesting ambiguity, confusion or inconsistency in reasoning or anything else to make the dossier or the reports contributing to it in any way unintelligible. The Director cannot have been (and based on his reasoning in the Decision clearly was not), in any doubt as to the position of psychology, the OMU and the LAP. Mr Buckley did not attempt to identify, and nor can I identify anything in the dossier that requires to be explored or resolved in an oral hearing. It is clear that Mr Hinds was able to contribute to the review process very fully both in terms of the interviews with the psychologist, and in the detailed legal submissions made on his behalf. In effect Mr Buckley’s submissions boil down to the fact that there ought to be an oral hearing because the Director has disagreed with the unanimous recommendations in the dossier. That is not the purpose of an oral hearing and in my judgment the Director was entitled properly to conclude in this case that there were “…no significant facts in dispute and that the available information and reasoning for the downgrading are readily understandable” ( C81 ). The Director formed his own judgment that there were a number of factors suggesting a longer period of post-programme consolidation is needed. In my judgment there nothing unclear in any of the reports that required, as a matter of procedural fairness, elucidation at an oral hearing. Length of Time; No Previous Oral Hearing

43. Mr Buckley recognised that the length of time, and whether there has been a previous oral hearing, are not necessarily determinative of the need for an oral hearing, but, he submitted, these are elements that cannot, and should not, be ignored. He pointed to the fact that the Claimant has now served some eight years as a Category A prisoner, a period of time which he submitted becomes relevant given that the Claimant has achieved all he can within the Category A estate. By that Mr Buckley is referring to the fact that Mr Hinds has completed the Kaizen programme, and the psychology review assessment recommended by the LAP in 2023, and that no other programme work has been identified. In my judgment that does not necessarily mean he has achieved all he can within the Category A estate. The Director does suggest he should undertake further programmes but, in effect, asks him to continue in Category A conditions for a further period of consolidation with a view to enabling Mr Hinds to demonstrate continued risk reduction, which would plainly inform the next review. The Director pointed to the fact that Mr Hinds remained free to engage further to enable closer assessment of significant insight and progress ( C81 ). In my judgment that is not an impasse.

44. Mr Hinds is still some years from tariff expiry, matter noted by the Director who added that he considered that no credible argument could be made that Mr Hinds’ Category A status currently prevents his consideration for parole or release. That is plainly correct. The Director considered that the fact that Mr Hinds has been in prison for some years and never had an oral hearing could not alone justify an oral hearing without other supporting grounds. In my judgment that was plainly right.

45. Given that I have rejected the Claimant’s submissions that there was either a dispute of fact or a dispute between experts, these further factors stand to be considered alone, and in my judgement they did not come close in 2024 to justifying the need for an oral hearing.

46. It follows that I reject the Claimant’s challenge to the Decision. In my judgment the decision not to hold an oral hearing for Mr Hinds’ 2024 review was entirely lawful and there was no breach of common law fairness in this case.