Mohammadreza Shahmirzadi v The Information Commissioner

Introduction

1. On 15 November 2025, the Applicant made an application to the Tribunal seeking an order under section 166(2) of the Data Protection Act 2018 (DPA 2018) to take appropriate steps to respond to their complaint concerning Companies House including issuing a formal enforcement notice to Companies House, ordering rectification and erasure, and investigating the Applicant’s claim for compensation for distress.

2. In his response to the application, the Commissioner invites the Tribunal to strike out the appellant’s appeal on the basis that the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to consider the appeal and/or that the appeal has no reasonable prospects of succeeding and accordingly, should be struck out. The Commissioner avers that an outcome has been provided to the Applicant on 26 September 2025. The Commissioner submits that the Tribunal does not have the power to grant the remedies sought by the Applicant under s166 DPA 2018 Legal Framework

1. Under Rule 8(2)(a) of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal)(General Regulatory Chamber) Rules 2009, the Tribunal may strike out the whole or part of the proceedings if the Tribunal considers it does not have jurisdiction in relation to the proceedings or that part of them; and does not exercise its power under rule 5(3)(k)(i) (transfer to another court or tribunal) in relation to the proceedings or that part of them.

2. Under Rule 8(3)(c) of the Rules, the Tribunal may strike out the whole or part of the proceedings if the Tribunal considers there is no reasonable prospect of the applicant’s case, or part of it, succeeding.

3. Section 165 DPA sets out the right of data subjects to complain to the Commissioner about infringement of their rights under the data protection legislation. Under section 166 DPA a data subject can make an application to this Tribunal for an order as follows: 166 Orders to progress complaints (1) This section applies where, after a data subject makes a complaint under section 165 or Article 77 of the UK GDPR, the Commissioner - (a) fails to take appropriate steps to respond to the complaint, (b) fails to provide the complainant with information about progress on the complaint, or of the outcome of the complaint, before the end of the period of 3 months beginning when the Commissioner received the complaint, or (c) if the Commissioner's consideration of the complaint is not concluded during that period, fails to provide the complainant with such information during a subsequent period of 3 months. (2) The Tribunal may, on an application by the data subject, make an order requiring the Commissioner - (a) to take appropriate steps to respond to the complaint, or (b) to inform the complainant of progress on the complaint, or of the outcome of the complaint, within a period specified in the order.

3. The Tribunal can only make an order as prescribed by section 166(2) , it does not have the power to make an order beyond the scope of s166(2) , and even then, only if one of the conditions at section 166(1) (a), (b) or (c) is met. There have been a number of appeal decisions which have considered the scope of section 166 . It is clearly established that the Tribunal’s powers are limited to procedural issues, rather than the merits or substantive outcome of a complaint. Some key decisions are: a. Scranage v Information Commissioner [2020] UKUT 196 (AAC) , paragraph 6 - "In my experience – both in the present appeal and in many other cases – there is a widespread misunderstanding about the reach of section 166 . Contrary to many data subjects’ expectations, it does not provide a right of appeal against the substantive outcome of the Information Commissioner’s investigation on its merits. Thus, section 166(1) , which sets out the circumstances in which an application can be made to the Tribunal is procedural rather than substantive in its focus." (emphasis in original). b. Killock v Information Commissioner [2022] 1 WLR 2241 , Upper Tribunal at paragraph 74 - "… It is plain from the statutory words that, on an application under section 166 , the Tribunal will not be concerned and has no power to deal with the merits of the complaint or its outcome. We reach this conclusion on the plain and ordinary meaning of the statutory language but it is supported by the Explanatory Notes to the Act which regard the section 166 remedy as reflecting the provisions of article 78(2) which are procedural. Any attempt by a party to divert a tribunal from the procedural failings listed in section 166 towards a decision on the merits of the complaint must be firmly resisted by tribunals ." Background

4. The factual background to this case is succinctly set out at [27] to [38] of the Commissioner’s response dated 4 December 2025:

27. On 11 September 2025, the Applicant emailed the ICO submitting a complaint about Companies House’s publication of his residential address and requesting its immediate removal [Annex 1]. 9

28. On 25 September 2025, the Applicant re-submitted his complaint via the online complaint form. The complaint was then logged under case reference IC-430247-D8P3 and allocated to a case officer [Annex 2].

29. On 26 September 2025, the case officer sent the outcome to the Applicant. The case officer explained that Companies House appeared to be complying with its data protection obligations, given that the relevant forms were filed correctly and accepted via an authentication code that had been sent to the Applicant’s company. The case officer further explained that Companies House had explained the steps to be taken in order for the Applicant’s address to be supressed and that this should be followed by the Applicant. However, the case officer acknowledged that the issue had caused the Applicant significant distress and detriment and advised that she would refer the matter back to Companies House, with a request that they review the handling of the complaint and to contact the Applicant within 14 days. [Annex 3]

30. On the same day, the case officer had sent a corresponding outcome to Companies House. The case officer confirmed receipt of the complaint, summarised the Applicant’s concerns, and requested that Companies House to review its handling of the complaint, and contact the Applicant within 14 days. The case officer also noted that while Companies House appeared to have responded to the Applicant, and provided a full explanation of what had occurred, and the steps that could be taken in order for the Applicant’s residential address to be supressed, it was nevertheless advised, that they should review the contact that they had with the Applicant in order to assist his understanding as to how it had dealt with the issue, given the significant distress and detriment that had been caused to both the Applicant and his family [Annex 4].

31. On 29 September 2025, the Applicant emailed the ICO requesting urgent intervention to ensure removal without charge and to prevent future disclosures of private addresses.

32. On 2 October 2025, the case officer confirmed to the Applicant that it had expedited the case and reiterated its expectation to Companies House that it should respond promptly to the Applicant as it had advised in its earlier correspondence of 26 September 2025. 10

33. On 7 October 2025, the Applicant thanked the case officer for expediting the case and confirmed he would await Companies House’s response.

34. On 24 October 2025, the Applicant informed the case officer that Companies House had failed to respond within the 14-day deadline. The case officer immediately issued a chaser to Companies House, requesting a response within 7 days and to provide a copy of their reply.

35. On 24 October 2025, the case officer sent a chaser email to Companies House asking for a response to be issued to the applicant. On the same day, Companies House replied to the case officer, apologising for the oversight and confirmed they had sent a response to the Applicant, and attached the response to the email. [Annex 5]

36. On 24 October 2025, Companies House emailed the Applicant, maintaining that the address was lawfully filed and could only be suppressed via payment of a £30 fee.

37. On 27 October 2025, the Applicant sent a rebuttal to Companies House, copying the case officer, rejecting their position and confirming his intention to escalate the matter to the Tribunal.

38. On 28 October 2025, the case officer informed Companies House that she was satisfied that they had complied with data protection obligations and closed the case. Conclusions

5. I find that the Commissioner has provided an outcome to the complaint on 26 September 2025. An ‘outcome’ and a ‘decision notice’ are not to be construed as the same thing.

6. Contrary to the expectations of many Appellants, section 166 does not provide a right of appeal against the substantive outcome of the Commissioner’s investigation on its merits. The Tribunal is bound to take into consideration and give weight to the views of the Commissioner, as described by the Chamber President in Barbara Rogers v ICO EA/2021/0348:

7. ’14…In the sphere of complaints, the Commissioner has the institutional competence and is in the best position to decide what investigations he should undertake into any particular issue, and how he should conduct those investigations. This will be informed not only by the nature of the complaint itself but also by a range of other factors such as his own registry priorities, other investigations in the same subject area and his judgement on how to deploy his limited resources most effectively: Killock & Ors v Information Commissioner [2021] UKUT 299 . The obligation of the Commissioner is to take appropriate steps to respond to the complaint’.

8. The Applicant’s application requests that the Tribunal order the Commissioner to undertake a substantive investigation in response to the complaint. It is clear that the Appellant is challenging the substantive outcome of the complaint to the Commissioner. The Tribunal does not have the power under section 166 to consider the merits or substantive outcome of a complaint, nor does it have the power to make an order in the terms sought by the Applicant.

9. Section 166 is limited to procedural issues . The Commissioner took steps to investigate and respond to the complaints pursuant to Section 165. The Commissioner provided outcomes to the complaint. For these reasons, I find that the Commissioner has not failed to comply with the procedural requirements set out in section 166(1) of the DPA and I am not permitted to make any order in the terms sought by the Applicant.

10. I therefore find that there is no reasonable prospect of the appeal or any part of it, succeeding. The proceedings are therefore struck out. Signed: Judge Peri Mornington Date: 12 December 2025