Lee Stratford Parson v The Information Commissioner

1. These proceedings concern an application (the “Application”) under section 166(2) of the Data Protection Act 2018 (“DPA 2018”) for an order to progress the Applicant’s complaint against Hampshire Police regarding alleged unlawful disclosure of his personal data to a third party. The complaint was submitted to the Information Commissioner (“IC”) on 30 September 2024 and was dealt with under reference IC-336340-J2B7. .

2. On 4 February 2025, the IC’s case officer wrote to the Applicant. The case officer explained that, based on Hampshire Police’s confirmation and the evidence reviewed, there was no indication that personal data had been disclosed to the third party and therefore no breach of UK GDPR was established. The case officer also clarified that a Data Protection Impact Assessment was not required in this instance and that Subject Access Requests entitle individuals to personal data, not full documents. The case officer informed Hampshire Police of its decision and confirmed that no regulatory action would be taken.

3. On 5 February 2025, the Applicant requested an internal review of the case officer’s decision, contesting the outcome and raising concerns about implied disclosure, refusal of SAR requests without citing exemptions, and lack of a DPIA. The Applicant asked the case officer to reconsider her assessment of his complaint.

4. On 6 February 2025, the case officer responded to the Applicant, confirming that the review request had been considered but that its position remained unchanged and new evidence would need to be submitted for further action. The case officer also confirmed that issues relating to another third party would be addressed under a separate complaint.

5. On 24 February 2025 the Applicant requested an internal review of the outcome provided to him.

6. On 4 March 2025, the IC’s reviewing officer issued the outcome of that review to the Applicant. The reviewing officer confirmed that the complaint had been handled appropriately and in line with IC procedures and acknowledged that there were contradictory responses from Hampshire Police but noted that they had clarified the position in their letter of 4 December 2024 that no disclosure of the Applicant’s personal data had occurred and that the suggestion to the contrary was the result of human error. Based upon this factor, the reviewing officer concluded, that this was sufficient for the initial case officer to have issued an outcome to the Applicant.

7. On 19 May 2025, the Applicant made further representations concerning his complaints.

8. On 28 May 2025, the reviewing officer responded and had advised that the complaint relating to Hampshire Police and his other complaint were being dealt with separately by the IC.

9. On 11 June 2025, the case officer, upon receipt of further representations from the Applicant concerning his complaint, had advised that they were willing to consider the matters raised, but as a first step, to await the response from the Police and Crime Commissioner.

10. On 20 June 2025 the Applicant provided further evidence which prompted the case officer to request further information from Hampshire Police.

11. On 30 June 2025, the case officer wrote to Hampshire Police and raised a number of queries regarding the Applicant’s complaint. On the same date, the case officer provided an update concerning the actions taken on the complaint to the Applicant.

12. Between July and August 2025, the case officer made further enquiries and made requests for further information from Hampshire Police concerning its handling of the Applicant’s subject access request (SAR) and complaint process. Hampshire Police reiterated its position that no disclosure occurred and confirmed that its internal review had concluded the same.

13. On 6 August 2025, following the Applicant’s provision of further evidence, the reviewing officer wrote again to the Applicant having considered the additional evidence provided by the Applicant, and concluded that there had been no infringement of Hampshire Police’s obligations under data protection legislation, namely the disclosure of the Applicant’s personal data to a third party.

14. On the same day the case officer informed Hampshire Police that there had been no contravention of data protection legislation and that no further action would be taken. The Application

15. The Applicant applied to the Tribunal by way of form GRC3 dated 4 November 2025. He stated that the outcome he was seeking was as follows: “ In summary, I ask the Tribunal to exercise its powers under section 166(2) -(3) of the Data Protection Act 2018 to: • Declare that the Information Commissioner had failed to take appropriate steps to respond to my complaint and • Direct the Commissioner to reopen and complete a lawful, proportionate investigation into the processing of …data by Hampshire Police and [third party], issuing a reasoned decision that satisfies the duties imposed by Articles 57 and 58 UKGDPR and sections 115-116 and 165 GDPR.”

16. In his grounds for the Application, the Applicant stated in summary: “ I am applying under Section 166 of the Data Protection Act 2018 because the Information Commissioner failed to take appropriate steps to respond to my complaint and to enforce data-protection law. My complaint to the ICO (submitted 30 September 2024) concerned the unlawful disclosure/processing and continued retention of … data by Hampshire Police and [third party]. The ICO opened two linked cases (IC-336340-J2B7 and IC-336350-X5D5) but failed to investigate them lawfully or competently. The ICO accepted contradictory explanations from both controllers without testing their accuracy, declined to verify key evidence, and relied on unsupported assurances rather than carrying out an independent assessment. It also failed to apply or enforce the provisions of Articles 5, 10, 57 and 58 UK GDPR and Sections 115 to 116 and 165 to 166 DPA 2018. In addition, the ICO misrepresented the available remedies by omitting any reference to my statutory right of appeal to the Tribunal and by directing me instead to irrelevant or non-existent options (for example, a private prosecution under Section 197 DPA 2018 or referral to the PHSO). This omission breached Section 165(4)(c) DPA 2018 and caused the delay in submitting this application. The ICO's handling therefore resulted in no meaningful investigation, no findings of lawfulness, and no regulatory action. I now ask the Tribunal to declare that the Information Commissioner failed to take appropriate steps as required under Section 166(2) and to direct the Commissioner to do so .”” The strike-out application

17. The IC applied by way of form GRC5 dated 8 December 2025 to strike out the Application on the basis that the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to consider it under Rule 8(2)(a) and/or that there is no reasonable prospect of it succeeding under Rule 8(3)(c) (the “strike-out application”).

18. The reasons which the IC gave for striking out the application were set out in its Response, particularly at paragraphs 24 to 27 and 46 to 49. In summary, these were as follows: a. the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to consider the present application, as the IC has already determined the Applicant’s complaint when he sent an outcome to the Applicant on 4 February 2025 (as upheld upon initial review on 4 March 2025 and explained upon further review on 6 August 2025). b. The present application shows no discernible grounds that would warrant the Tribunal exercising its powers under section 166(2) of the DPA18, given that the IC provided an outcome to the Applicant’s complaint on 4 February 2025 (as upheld upon initial review on 4 March 2025 and explained upon further review on 6 August 2025). Accordingly, there is no reasonable prospect of persuading the Tribunal to make any form of order pursuant to section 166(2) of the DPA18. c. The remedies sought by the Applicant are not outcomes that the Tribunal can grant in a section 166 of the DPA18 application against the IC. An Application under section 166 of the DPA18 permits a Tribunal to make an order against the IC only if he has failed in some procedural respect. d. the IC has taken appropriate steps to investigate and respond to the Applicant’s complaint, providing them with an outcome on 4 February 2025 (as upheld upon initial review on 4 March 2025 and explained upon further review on 6 August 2025). Accordingly, it is respectfully submitted that the IC has taken steps to comply with the procedural requirements set out in section 166(1) of the DPA18, and there is therefore no basis for the Tribunal to make an order under section 166(2) of the DPA18. e. It is clear from the grounds in support of the application that the Applicant does not agree with the outcome provided on his complaint. However, as set out above, section 166 DPA18 does not provide a mechanism by which complainants can challenge the substantive outcome of a complaint. The relief available from the Tribunal on an application under section 166 DPA18 only applies where it is satisfied that the IC has failed in some procedural respect to comply with the requirements of section 166(1) DPA18, limited solely to those orders that are set out in section 166(2) . f. If the Applicant wishes to seek an order of compliance against the Police for any alleged breach of his data protection rights, the correct route for him to do so is by way of separate civil proceedings in the County Court or High Court under section 167 of the DPA18.

19. I directed on 7 January 2026 that the Applicant should provide representations in relation to the strike out application by 22 January 2026 under Rule 8(4). The Applicant provided a response dated 12 January 2026, so I am satisfied that the Applicant has had an opportunity to make representations on the proposed striking out. The additional points made by the Applicant, in summary, were as follows: a. By failing to inform the Applicant of his rights under section 166 , the IC failed to take one of the “appropriate steps” required by section 165(4)(a) of DPA 2018, The IC does not dispute that the Applicant was not informed of the right to apply to the Tribunal under section 166 , but characterises it as “immaterial” on the basis that the Applicant later exercised the right independently. The Applicant argues that this does not negate the IC’s failure to notify him of his rights under section 166 . b. Whether the IC’s failure warrants an order under section 166(2) DPA 2018 is a matter for determination on the merits and is not a questions suitable for resolution on a strike-out application under Rule 8. Legal framework

20. Section 165 DPA 2018 sets out the right of data subjects to complain to the IC about infringement of their rights under the data protection legislation. Under section 166 DPA 2018 a data subject can make an application to this Tribunal for an order as follows: “Orders to progress complaints (1) This section applies where, after a data subject makes a complaint under section 165 or Article 77 of the UK GDPR, the Commissioner - a. fails to take appropriate steps to respond to the complaint, b. fails to provide the complainant with information about progress on the complaint, or of the outcome of the complaint, before the end of the period of 3 months beginning when the Commissioner received the complaint, or c. if the Commissioner's consideration of the complaint is not concluded during that period, fails to provide the complainant with such information during a subsequent period of 3 months. (2) The Tribunal may, on an application by the data subject, make an order requiring the Commissioner - d. to take appropriate steps to respond to the complaint, or e. to inform the complainant of progress on the complaint, or of the outcome of the complaint, within a period specified in the order.”

21. The Tribunal can only make an order under section 166(2) if one of the conditions at section 166(1) (a), (b) or (c) is met. There have been a number of appeal decisions which have considered the scope of section 166 . It is clearly established that the Tribunal’s powers are limited to procedural issues, rather than the merits or substantive outcome of a complaint.

22. Section 165 deals with the complainant’s right to make a complaint and states that: “(4) If the Commissioner receives a complaint under subsection (2), the Commissioner must— (a)take appropriate steps to respond to the complaint, (b)inform the complainant of the outcome of the complaint, (c)inform the complainant of the rights under section 166 , and (d)if asked to do so by the complainant, provide the complainant with further information about how to pursue the complaint. (5) The reference in subsection (4)(a) to taking appropriate steps in response to a complaint includes— (a)investigating the subject matter of the complaint, to the extent appropriate, and (b)informing the complainant about progress on the complaint, including about whether further investigation or co-ordination with foreign designated authority is necessary.”

23. In the case of Killock v Information Commissioner [2022] 1 WLR 2241 , the Upper Tribunal at paragraph 74 stated - " …It is plain from the statutory words that, on an application under section 166 , the Tribunal will not be concerned and has no power to deal with the merits of the complaint or its outcome. We reach this conclusion on the plain and ordinary meaning of the statutory language but it is supported by the Explanatory Notes to the Act which regard the section 166 remedy as reflecting the provisions of article 78(2) which are procedural. Any attempt by a party to divert a tribunal from the procedural failings listed in section 166 towards a decision on the merits of the complaint must be firmly resisted by tribunals."

24. Mostyn J in the High Court in R (Delo) v Information Commissioner [2023] 1 WLR 1327 , paragraph 57 - " The treatment of such complaints by the commissioner, as before, remains within his exclusive discretion. He decides the scale of an investigation of a complaint to the extent that he thinks appropriate. He decides therefore whether an investigation is to be short, narrow and light or whether it is to be long, wide and heavy. He decides what weight, if any, to give to the ability of a data subject to apply to a court against a data controller or processor under article 79. And then he decides whether he shall, or shall not, reach a conclusive determination... ”.

25. Mostyn J’s decision in Delo was upheld by the Court of Appeal ( [2023] EWCA Civ 1141 ) – “ For the reasons I have given I would uphold the conclusion of the judge at [85] that the legislative scheme requires the Commissioner to receive and consider a complaint and then provides the Commissioner with a broad discretion as to whether to conduct a further investigation and, if so, to what extent. I would further hold, in agreement with the judge, that having done that much the Commissioner is entitled to conclude that it is unnecessary to determine whether there has been an infringement but sufficient to reach and express a view about the likelihood that this is so and to take no further action. By doing so the Commissioner discharges his duty to inform the complainant of the outcome of their complaint .” (paragraph 80, Warby LJ).

26. The decision of the Upper Tribunal in Cortes v Information Commissioner (UA-2023-001298-GDPA) which applied both Killock and Delo confirmed that the nature of section 166 is that of a limited procedural provision only. “ The Tribunal is tasked with specifying appropriate “steps to respond” and not with assessing the appropriateness of a response that has already been given (which would raise substantial regulatory questions susceptible only to the supervision of the High Court)….As such, the fallacy in the Applicant’s central argument is laid bare. If Professor Engelman is correct, then any data subject who is dissatisfied with the outcome of their complaint to the Commissioner could simply allege that it was reached after an inadequate investigation, and thereby launch a collateral attack on the outcome itself with the aim of the complaint decision being re-made with a different outcome. Such a scenario would be inconsistent with the purport of Article 78.2, the heading and text of (paragraph 33). section 166 and the thrust of the decisions and reasoning in both Killock and Veale and R (on the application of Delo). It would also make a nonsense of the jurisdictional demarcation line between the FTT under section 166 and the High Court on an application for judicial review.”

27. The case of Dr Michael Guy Smith v Information Commissioner [2025] UKUT 74 (AAC) , noted at paragraph 60 that “ it is for the Tribunal to decide, applying an objective test, if an “appropriate step” has been omitted, but observe that, in practice, that is unlikely to be the case where an ‘outcome’ has been produced. That is for two main reasons: first, because section 166 is a procedural provision and, as the principal mechanisms for enforcing rights or challenging the Commissioner are either claims against the data controller or judicial review of the Commissioner, section 166 should not be used to obtain ‘by the back door’ a remedy normally only available in those proceedings; secondly, because, if the Commissioner has already produced an outcome then, given the very wide discretion that the Commissioner has, both as to what and how to investigate and as to outcome, the scope for the Tribunal to say that an appropriate step has been omitted is limited.” In considering this the Tribunal must, as set out in paragraph 85 of Killick “when deciding objectively whether any (further) appropriate step needs to be taken by the Commissioner, take into account and give weight to the views of the Commissioner as an expert regulator.”

28. Paragraph 85 of Killick reads as follows: “ However, in considering appropriateness, the Tribunal will be bound to take into consideration and give weight to the views of the Commissioner as an expert regulator. The GRC is a specialist tribunal and may deploy (as in Platts) its non-legal members appointed to the Tribunal for their expertise. It is nevertheless our view that, in the sphere of complaints, the Commissioner has the institutional competence and is in the best position to decide what investigations she should undertake into any particular issue, and how she should conduct those investigations. As Mr Milford emphasised, her decisions about these matters will be informed not only by the nature of the complaint itself but also by a range of other factors such as her own regulatory priorities, other investigations in the same subject area and her judgment on how to deploy her limited resources most effectively. Any decision of a Tribunal which fails to recognise the wider regulatory context of a complaint and to demonstrate respect for the special position of the Commissioner may be susceptible to appeal in this Chamber.” Discussion and conclusions

29. I decided not to determine whether to strike out the Application at an oral hearing, because I considered that both sides had provided extensive written submissions and had an opportunity to put the points they wished to the Tribunal and it would therefore not be proportionate to do so. I am also mindful that rule 32(3) permits the Tribunal to determine strike-out applications under Rule 8 without an oral hearing.

30. The first question is whether the IC provided an outcome to the Applicant’s complaint. The IC provided the Applicant with a response to his complaint on 4 February 2025 which was upheld on 4 March 2025 following a review and further explained upon further review on 6 August 2025. I consider that the response dated 4 March 2025 was in fact an outcome to the complaint, because provided an answer to all outstanding issues and demonstrated that the IC had given consideration to whether there were other appropriate steps which could be taken to progress the Applicant’s complaint.

31. Even if I am wrong on this, I am satisfied that when taken together with the responses dated 4 March and 6 August 2025, these responses have provided an outcome to the Applicant’s complaint, provided an answer to all outstanding issues and demonstrated that the IC had given consideration to whether there were other appropriate steps which could be taken to progress the Applicant’s complaint. This is sufficient in my view to demonstrate that the IC has complied with the requirements of section 165(4). The fact that the Applicant does not agree with the outcome does not render it wrong in law.

32. The appropriate step which the Applicant says the IC omitted was informing him of his rights under section 166 , pursuant to DPA 2018 section 165(4)(c). This is not included in the non-exhaustive list of appropriate steps set out at section 165(5) and the fact that section 165(5) refers only to section 165(4)(a) not (c) suggests to me that informing of rights was not one of the “appropriate steps” to respond to the complaint envisaged by the statute. It is something that the IC must do if a complaint is received, but this is not a step taken substantively to respond to the complaint. I do not see failure to do this invalidates the outcome which was provided by the IC to the complaints.

33. It appears to me therefore that there are no further appropriate steps which the IC ought reasonably to take to progress the complaint. In making this decision I have given significant weight to the view of the IC as the expert regulator that there are no further appropriate steps he should have taken.

34. The outcome sought by the Applicant is also, in effect, challenging the substantive outcome of the complaint to the IC. The Tribunal does not have power under section 166 to consider the merits or substantive outcome of a complaint. Section 166 is limited to narrow procedural issues and there is no further procedural failing in respect of which the Tribunal can make a decision. In an application under section 166 , the Tribunal has no power to direct the IC to investigate, in a particular way or at all, to take enforcement action to secure compliance with a request or determine whether or not there has been a breach of the UK GDPR. I also agree with the IC’s position that it is not a court or ombudsman and that orders for compliance need to be sought through civil action. Accordingly, I find that the Tribunal does not have the power to grant the outcomes sought.

35. Because I consider that there was an outcome determining the complaint and that there were no further appropriate steps which should be taken, I find the complaint has already been determined and therefore the Tribunal has no jurisdiction over it. I am also satisfied that there is no reasonable prospect of the case, or any part of it, succeeding because the outcome sought by the Applicant is not something which is within the Tribunal’s power to grant.

36. The proceedings are therefore struck out under Rule 8(2)(a) because the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to deal with them and under Rule 8(3)(a) because there is no reasonable prospect of them succeeding.