UK case law

Attila Gulyas v Registrar of Approved Driving Instructors

[2026] UKFTT GRC 52 · First-tier Tribunal (General Regulatory Chamber) – Transport · 2026

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The verbatim text of this UK judgment. Sourced directly from The National Archives Find Case Law. Not an AI summary, not a paraphrase — every word below is the original ruling, under Crown copyright and the Open Government Licence v3.0.

Full judgment

1. This Appeal is brought by the Appellant pursuant to section 131(2) (a) Road Traffic Act 1988 (" the Act "). It relates to a Decision made by the Respondent ("the Registrar") dated 19 April 2024 ("the Decision") to remove the Appellant's name from the Register of Approved Driving Instructors ("the Register") on the grounds that he had accepted a fixed penalty notice and 6 penalty points and was no longer a fit and proper person ("FPP").

2. What follows is a summary of the submissions, evidence and the law. It does not seek to provide every step of the reasoning. The absence of a reference to any specific submission or evidence does not mean it has not been considered. Law

3. A person may only provide paid driving instruction if his name is on the Register ( section 123(1) of the Act ) or if he holds a licence by section 129(1) of the Act and in accordance with The Motor Cars (Driving Instruction) Regulations 2005. By section 128(1) and (2) of the Act the Registrar may remove the name of an ADI from the Register if satisfied that the ADI has "(e) ceased, apart from fulfilment of any of the preceding conditions, to be a fit and proper person to have his name included in the register. "

4. By section 128(4) & (5) of the Act before the Registrar removes an ADI's name from the Register that person must be notified and given a period to make representations. If such representations are made the Registrar must take them into consideration before deciding whether or not to remove his name.

5. The FPP test was considered in Harris -v- Registrar of Approved Driving Instructors [2010] EWCA Civ 808 in which Richards LJ held at para 30:- ".....I do not accept that the scope of the "fit and proper person" condition is as narrow as Mr Leviseur contended. Of course, a central question is an applicant's fitness to be a driving instructor – that he has the requisite instructional ability and driving ability and that he does not pose a risk in any respect to his pupils or other users of the road. The "fit and proper person" condition has obvious relevance to that issue, though the more technical aspects are covered by other, more specific conditions relating to tests, driving licence and the like. But the condition is not simply that the applicant is a fit and proper person to be a driving instructor; it is that he is a fit and proper person to have his name entered in the register. Registration carries with it an official seal of approval: those registered are known as "Driving Standards Agency Approved Driving Instructors" Guidance and the Code

6. The DVSA has issued Guidance which an ADI is required to declare they have read when applying to become an ADI. It states:- "You must be a ‘fit and proper’ person to be an ADI. ADIs are in a position of considerable trust. The ADI Registrar protects the image of the register and maintains the public’s confidence in the ADI industry. "It’s also unlikely that you’ll be classed as a ‘fit and proper’ person if you’ve been found guilty of:...driving while using a hand-held mobile phone"

7. Additionally a Code has been agreed between the DVSA and the National Associations Strategic Partnership. Whilst it is voluntary the Guidance states that "I t is a framework within which all instructors should operate." The DVSA also says that it gives "a summary of the conduct and behaviours that DVSA and the public expect from an ADI ." It says for example that an instructor will "at all times comply with legislative requirements including:...not using mobile devices like phones when driving or supervising client’s driving and only when parked in a safe and legal place."

8. On 1 December 2025 in Danks -v- the Registrar of Approved Driving Instructors [2025] UKFTT 1435 Upper Tribunal Judge Mullan when allowing that appeal added:- "33.... Following the conviction for the offence of breach of requirements as to control of vehicle (including mobile phone offences that carry a mandatory 6 penalty points), resulting in the endorsement of his driving licence with 6 penalty points, the Appellant has come very close to losing a professional career and employment to which he has already expended financial outlay and given a significant time-commitment. It should be self-evident that there are significant learning outcomes from this process and that any future legal or professional transgressions are likely to have considerable adverse consequences. "

9. I endorse and repeat this warning (also given recently in Safaye -v- The Registrar of Approved Driving Instructors [2025] UKFTT 1580) as to the need for adherence with the rules relating to the use of mobile devices and the risk to an ADI's status in the event of a breach. Role of the Tribunal

10. Section 131(1) (c) of the Act provides that "A person who is aggrieved by a decision of the Registrar...(c) to remove his name from the register... may appeal to the First-tier Tribunal." Section 131(3) of the Act provides that the Tribunal may make such order:- ( a)for the grant or refusal of the application or, (b)for the removal or the retention of the name in the register, or the revocation or continuation of the licence, (as the case may be) as it thinks fit.

11. In considering the appeal the Tribunal must give appropriate weight to the Registrar's view. The Court of Appeal in Hope and Glory Public House Ltd, R (on the application of) v City of Westminster Magistrates Court & Ors [2011] EWCA Civ 31 (26 January 2011) held that the answer to " How much weight was the district judge entitled to give to the decision of the licensing authority?" was:- "45...the proper conclusion....can only be stated in very general terms. It is right in all cases that the magistrates' court should pay careful attention to the reasons given by the licensing authority for arriving at the decision under appeal, bearing in mind that Parliament has chosen to place responsibility for making such decisions on local authorities. The weight which the magistrates should ultimately attach to those reasons must be a matter for their judgment in all the circumstances, taking into account the fullness and clarity of the reasons, the nature of the issues and the evidence given on the appeal."

12. In Danks relevant previous decisions of the First-tier Tribunal ("FtT") about 6 penalty points and the FPP test were cited at para 26:- " In D/2018/183, First-tier Tribunal Judge Hunter said the following, at paragraphs 15 and 16: ‘15. There has been debate, in Tribunal hearings and decisions, as to the position when 6 penalty points have been incurred. The accumulation of that number of penalty points is regarded as a “tipping point”. That is, the accumulation of 6 penalty points will not automatically lead to the conclusion that an ADI should not be, or should be, removed from the Register. The position is set out clearly in and reiterated and approved in Appeal 2003/191 K Bates and others, and reiterated and approved in Appeal 2005/95 M Wild: “… A total of 6 points from speeding offences should not by itself lead to an automatic finding that a person is not fit and proper to be a driving instructor.… Each case must be viewed separately.” The Tribunal considers this dictum may validly be applied also to other motoring offences such as the offence in this instant case. Accordingly, cases such as this very much depend on their individual merits, and “demerits”, and the particular circumstances of the individual cases fall to be carefully scrutinised, as this Tribunal has done in this case.’

13. The Appellant has the burden of proof in satisfying the Tribunal that the Registrar’s decision was wrong and conclusions are reached on the balance of probabilities. When making its decision, the Tribunal stands in the shoes of the Registrar and takes a fresh decision on the evidence available to it, giving appropriate weight to the Registrar’s decision being the person tasked with making such decisions. It is not the role of the Tribunal to carry out a procedural review of the Registrar's decision-making process but it does need to consider all the circumstances. Evidence and matters considered

14. For this appeal I heard from the Appellant and considered the content of a bundle of 25 pdf pages. Mr Russell also attended as set out below. Representation at the appeal

15. The Registrar failed to provide a response within the time required by Directions issued on 16 May 2024 and then on 10 September 2024 at which time a warning was given that if the time-limit was not complied with the Registrar might be barred from taking further part in the appeal. The response was not received and it appears that on 18 December 2024 Judge Findlay barred the Registrar from further participation in the proceedings. On 17 March 2025 the Registrar applied to lift the bar but this was outside the time limit to do so imposed by the Judge which expired on 15 January 2025. The application to lift the bar was refused.

16. I considered whether to allow the Registrar to take part in the hearing (and if so to what extent) having heard the Appellant's view on this question. By the Act this is an appeal from the Registrar's decision. The Tribunal needs therefore to know with certainty what that decision was and why it was made. It is also a FPP case in which the Registrar has decided the Appellant does not meet that criteria but the Appellant says he does. The outcome will decide whether he is a FPP to be involved in the responsible role of teaching pupils. In my view therefore, despite the failure to comply with Directions, the Tribunal should be cautious in excluding the Registrar's view and evidence where that is necessary and helpful to the Tribunal in reaching its decision. The level of any caution and thus participation is likely to depend on the issues in any case and the nature of any allegations. On that basis, having heard from the Appellant and considered the overriding objective, I concluded it was appropriate to vary the previous Directions to be able to read the Registrar's response and to allow Mr Russell to attend to assist on questions of fact and to explain the Registrar's view if necessary.

17. It is important that parties keep to the time-tables set by the Tribunal and what I say above does not in anyway seek to undermine this. Chronology

18. The following summar y was agreed by the parties:- (a) the Appellant's name was first entered into the Register in September 2013. (b) on 5 March 2023 an incident occurred which resulted in the Appellant receiving a conviction, on 8 December 2023, for " ...breach of requirements as to control of the vehicle, mobile telephones and so on (CU80) on 5 March 2023 resulting in 6 penalty points and a £166 fine." (c) the Appellant did not notify the Registrar about the above. (d) on 21 March 2024 the Registrar wrote to the Appellant to say that he had been notified of the conviction and points by DVLA and because of that and the Appellant's failure to report them he was considering the removal of the Appellants name from the Register on the grounds he was no longer a FPP. (e) on 21 March 2024 the Appellant made representations. (f) on 19 April 2024 the Appellant was notified of the Registrar's decision that his name was to be removed as he was no longer considered a FPP because of the conviction and points. The failure to report issue was not now cited. The Appeal

19. This appeal is from the Decision and was commenced on 5 May 2024. It was first heard on 9 June 2025 and dismissed. On 2 July 2025 the Appellant asked for permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal. Permission was not granted but on 17 July 2025 the decision was set aside pursuant to rule 41(1) 2009 Rules. It was ordered to be relisted with a different Tribunal. The Appellant was concerned about certain conclusions reached in the 9 June 2025 decision with which he disagreed. He was assured that this hearing was being dealt with afresh without regard to the previous outcome.

20. As a result of section 128(7) of the Act except for the period between the appeal being dismissed on 9 June 2025 and that decision being set aside on 17 July 2025 the Appellant's name could have remained on the Register since the Decision on 19 April 2024 except that:- (a) the Appellant told me that he stopped being an ADI in September 2024 but would like to re-apply. (b) the Appellant's registration would have expired at the end of September 2025 and he has not taken steps to seek its renewal. Mr Russell was able to give the Appellant guidance at the appeal about the time-limits for making any application for re-registration with or without the need to re-qualify. The Appellant's position

21. In his representations, his grounds of appeal and at the appeal hearing the Appellant dealt with the issues of the conviction and the points and his failure to report them.

22. As regards the failure to report he apologised for what he said was an oversight and "simply forgetfulness, not an attempt to conceal." He also said "Regrettably, I missed informing you because it did not occur to me that I also needed to inform you. This is my fault, and I apologize for it."

23. As regards the incident itself he described it as "isolated" and he was not instructing at the time nor in a car marked with L-plates or any instructional signage. He also said in his representation "The road and traffic circumstances were optimal, as noted by the officer in the report, with quiet traffic, perfect weather, and goo d visibility at the time of the phone touch."

24. He said he was using the mobile for navigation only " I briefly touched my securely placed mobile phone, which was in a holder, to adjust the m ap while driving (12). This action was solely for navigation purposes and not for any other use of the mobile phone." He said at the appeal hearing that the car was moving at the time travelling at between 15mph and 20mph having just gone through a junction.

25. He was asked if he had thought about challenging the points in court but said that he had not and he had not remembered what the Guidance said about the risk to his ADI status of having 6 points.

26. In his appeal he indicated his regret in this "lapse in judgment" and said that he fully understood "... the importance of adhering to regulations regarding the use of mobile and other digital devices while driving." He said in his representations that "Before and after the penalty, I consider myself a proper person, and I sincerely believe that this administrative error can be understood in my case. An appropriate warning would suffice and reasonable decision." He also said in the grounds of appeal for example:- "Throughout my 25-year career, including over a decade as an instructor, I have maintained a flawless driving record, devoid of any prior infractions. My experience underscores my unwavering commitment to vehicular safety and responsible conduct on the road."

27. He said that removal due to an isolated mistake could be perceived to be disproportionate and unfair and in support he cited the FtT decision in Gore-v- The Registrar of Approved Driving Instructors D/22018/7. He asked to be given a "second chance". The Registrar's position

28. The Registrar said he came to the Decision:- "...because of the following: Conviction dated 8 December 2023 for breach of requirements as to control of the vehicle, mobile telephones and so on (CU80) on 5 March 2023 resulting in 6 penalty points and a £166 fine."

29. In his response to the appeal the Registrar set out his grounds for the Decision as follows:- "(a) The appellant’s driving licence is currently endorsed with 6 penalty points having been convicted of breach of requirements as to control of the vehicle, mobile telephones and so on (CU80) on 5 March 2023. Although he states he was only touching the phone for navigation purposes, I would have expected a qualified instructor for over 10 years to be fully aware of the rules for mobile phone use. The conditions for entry onto the register extend beyond instructional ability alone and require that the applicant is a fit and proper person. As such, account is taken of a person’s character, behaviour and standard of conduct. Anyone who is an Approved Driving Instructor (ADI) is expected to have standards of driving and behaviour above that of the ordinary motorist. Teaching (generally) young people to drive as a profession is a responsible and demanding task and should only be entrusted to those with high standards and a keen regard for road safety. In committing this offence, I do not believe that the appellant has displayed the level of responsibility or commitment to improving road safety that I would expect to see from a professional ADI.

30. The Registrar also:- (a) referred to how, in 2018, use of a mobile device had contributed to 25 deaths, 92 serious injuries and 306 minor accidents. (b) said he could not condone motoring offences and to allow a person with 6 penalty points to remain on the Register would appear to sanction this behaviour. (c) said that "It would be offensive to other ADIs and persons trying to qualify as ADIs, who had been scrupulous in observing the law, for me to ignore this recent and relevant motoring offence." Review

31. I considered all the circumstances presented on the basis of the Tribunal's role as defined by the Act and in the relevant legal authorities such as Harris and Hope and Glory.

32. Dealing first with the failure to report I did not know whether its absence from the Decision and the response was the Registrar's desired outcome, having considered the representations, or a mistake. The Registrar is required by section 128(5) (c) to consider representations made before deciding whether to remove a name or not. From the Decision it is clear that the Registrar did consider the Appellant's representations which sought to explain the failure to report. It is therefore possible that having seen that explanation the Registrar deleted it as one of his FPP concerns. That in my view is the probable explanation as it also did not feature in the response to the appeal. For this reason only (and while a failure to report is a serious issue that might influence a FPP decision) I have not included it in my consideration of this appeal.

33. The public expects the Registrar to work to ensure that ADIs are FPP in the wider Harris sense and has the right to expect ADIs to adhere to the highest standards of motoring. It is right for the Registrar to be concerned about a person with 6 points potentially being on the Register. The Guidance and the Code deal specifically with the use of mobile devices and I accept all the Registrar says about the dangers of mobile phone use.

34. I did not find issues such as the absence of a pupil, the time of day or road and weather conditions to be factors that went very far to the credit of the Appellant in this case although had they been otherwise they would have been aggravating features. I also noted that the although the engagement with the device was brief the car was moving at the time.

35. This is not a case where the outcome of the appeal determines the ability of the ADI to carry on teaching pupils with potential negative personal and financial results. While the need to maintain the integrity of and public trust in the Register is likely always to be greater than the needs of an individual appellant in this case the registration has expired and he says he has not been working as an ADI since 2024.

36. The Appellant did say he wished to seek re-registration and if so would wish to avoid the need to re-qualify. I am aware that this decision might impact these timing issues and had them in mind especially on the question of proportionality.

37. I considered the decision in Gore referred to me by the Appellant where the appeal had been allowed . Judge Hinchliffe in Gore made it clear (see para 12) that his decision was not intended to set a precedent and FtT decisions only bind the parties to that case. Upper Tribunal Judge Jacobs in London Borough of Camden v The Information Commissioner & YV [2012] UKUT 190 (AAC) said:- "20...Previous decisions are of persuasive authority and the tribunal is right to value consistency in decision-making. However, there are dangers in paying too close a regard to previous decisions. It can elevate issues of fact into issues of law or principle."

38. An ADI's FPP status and thus registration is likely to be at risk if the ADI uses a mobile phone in breach of the Act , Guidance and the Code even when not with a pupil remembering that the Guidance says " The ADI Registrar has refused applications or removed an ADI f rom the register when they’ve had 5 or more penalty points within the last 3 years under the ‘totting up’ rules. " However I do accept that it is to his credit that the Appellant has taken responsibility and shown remorse for what happened and has been open with the Tribunal about the circumstances of the offence. I also noted (without minimizing this important issue) that while the car was moving the engagement with the device was very brief. Importantly I also noted his otherwise long and clean driving record and that apart for this isolated matter he has been an ADI without incident since 2013. Decision

39. The issues in this case are finely balanced but having considered and weighed these issues the Appellant has persuaded me that the appeal should be allowed. Signed Judge Heald Date: 12 January 2026